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Abstract
This thesis explores the role of values in the conduct of green politics. In 
political science and sociology this topic is most commonly addressed in 
terms of theoretical approaches that aim to identify green politics in terms 
of a distinct set of values. Such approaches attribute the emergence and 
growth of green politics to value change. I argue that this conventional 
wisdom is based on a m isunderstanding of the significance of values in 
political processes. One consequence of this m isunderstanding is that a 
num ber of typical issues that face green political organisations are not 
adequately addressed. In particular, attem pts to identify green politics in 
term s of values disregard the am biguity that is a central feature of 
normative political discourse.
In this thesis I develop an alternative approach which considers values as 
a type of good reason which is deployed in the context of rhetorical 
argument. In doing so, I investigate the relationship between values and 
other types of rhetorical reasoning. Green politics is a type of politics in 
which norm ative reasons are characteristically privileged in political 
discourse. I refer to this rhetorical privileging as 'value primacy'.
The second part of the thesis examines the consequences of value primacy 
for green political action taking as a case study a series of discussions 
among Australian green activists. These greens were engaged in drawing 
up structures and mechanisms for political co-operation with a view to 
forming a political party or network. This case study dem onstrates the 
various ways in which values are used rhetorically in the practice of green 
politics. In particular, it reveals a great deal of ambiguity and flexibility in 
the conduct of normative discourse among greens. I also explore some of 
the perverse effects that follow from attem pts to im plem ent green 
political values in the light such ambiguity. M any of the problems 
identified in the Australian example can be generalised to the experiences 
of other green political organisations. This exploration of the perverse 
effects of green normative rationality suggests that the emphasis that both 
academic analysts and green activists place upon value change and 
conversion as a way of understanding green politics is unwarranted.
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1Introduction
We want to do politics differently (Christabel Chamarette, The 
Canberra Times, 5 June 1993).
Christabel Chamarette is one of two senators from the Western Australian 
Greens. Together with other minor parties, the WA Greens have held the 
balance of power in the Australian Senate since the March 1993 federal 
election. In the current Australian political context, Senator Chamarette's 
ideas about doing politics differently, and those of her senate colleague 
Dee Margetts, have taken on an enormous significance to major political 
parties, the media, and many other groups involved in the institutional 
political process. Because of their strategic position, they have been able to 
make a num ber of substantial changes to the ways in which significant 
governm ent decisions have been made such as the 1993 Budget and the 
Native Title Act. Their demands are most frequently expressed in terms of 
g rea ter com m unity consultation  and partic ipa tion  in governm ent 
decision-m aking. In the A ustralian press, these dem ands have been 
characteristically portrayed as indicative of the maverick approach and 
naivety of the green senators.
From another perspective, how ever, the WA Green Senators are 
definitely not mavericks. They can be seen as the most visible Australian 
m anifestation of an international political movement which has become 
increasingly prom inent in western industrial democracies over the past 
two decades. The ways in which these senators see themselves as doing 
politics differently are not homegrown products of the political culture of 
Perth and Fremantle. These ideas are representative of the characteristic 
image greens present of themselves to the world. According to Sara 
Parkin, one-time spokesperson for the British Green Party, 'Green parties 
have been founded by a small number of people seeking to bring not only 
an ecological approach to politics but also a new set of principles for 
political practice' (Parkin 1990: 234-5). The name of one of the two national 
Belgian green parties, AGALEV,  is an acronym for the slogan 'go and live 
differently’. Greens contend that this different mode of politics implies
2profound political changes. In the introduction to Capra and Spretnak's 
Green Politics, James Robertson states '(t)he new ways of doing politics 
and governing ourselves will match the new patterns of activity, new 
structures of society and new systems of beliefs prevalent in the next 
historical period - the next stage of human development - that is now due' 
(Capra & Spretnak 1984: xxiii).
This new way of doing politics typically includes a num ber of ingredients. 
Green political actors have been noted for their willingness to question 
estab lished  features of rep resen ta tive  dem ocracy. They advocate 
consultative, participatory and 'non-hierarchical' m ethods of decision­
making. The different ways of doing politics adopted by greens are not just 
a feature of their involvem ent in parliam entary politics. Many of these 
ideas and practices can also be found in a range of organisations that make 
up new  social m ovem ents: the environm ental, peace, anti-nuclear, 
fem inist and indigenous peoples m ovem ents. This social m ovem ent 
backdrop to green politics is also indicative of the range and the content of 
green political orientations.
If greens 'do politics differently', w hat is it that is different about their 
action? Greens themselves frequently claim that their new ways of doing 
politics are founded upon a distinct set of values. Green political actors 
regard their actions as expressions of their commitment to values such as 
autonomy, equality, participation, consensus and sensitivity to ecological 
and social diversity. The world's most famous green party, die Grünen in 
Germany, describes itself as being built upon the foundation of four 
'pillars' or 'basic principles': ecological sustainablility, economic and social 
justice, grassroots democracy and non-violence. These principles, like 
those referred to by Parkin and Robertson, are normative principles. 
Values constitute the name of what is considered by many greens to be the 
first ever national green party, the New Zealand 'Values Party', which was 
formed in 1972.
Many academic approaches share with green activists the assumption that 
green politics is indeed an expression of a distinct set of values. This 
assumption can be found in an enormous range of literature relating to 
green politics. It provides common ground between Michigan empirical
3political science of Ronald Inglehart and Frankfurt school critical theory of 
Jean Cohen. It is a point of connection between the functionalism of Mary 
Douglas and the radical green political theory of Robyn Eckersley. It is an 
assum ption  shared  by the conventional A nglo-A m erican political 
philosophy of Robert Goodin and the French sociology of Alain Touraine. 
Such wide-ranging concurrence is impressive. Certainly, if these authors 
were to meet to discuss green politics they would find plenty of scope for 
disagreem ent. But none w ould have any problem  with the idea that 
values and normative principles are at the core of a distinct green political 
identity. Accordingly, each of these approaches represent versions of what 
I have termed the 'value identity’ interpretation of green politics.
I certainly agree that greens do things differently because of the values to 
which they express com m itm ent and that there are certain political 
positions that are consistently taken by greens which they regard as 
underw ritten by values. Nevertheless, the central argum ent of my thesis 
is that the value identity interpretation of the relationship between values 
and green politics is seriously m isguided and does not survive close 
scrutiny. Value identity approaches make for rather restrictive depictions 
of the scope of green politics and set up impossible param eters for 
assessing green experience. For those who are broadly sympathetic to the 
aims and objectives of green politics, it constitutes a recipe for political 
pessim ism.
My contention is that value identity approaches are inadequate because 
they operate from a basic m isunderstanding about what sort of things 
values and norm ative principles are. As a consequence of this basic 
m isunderstanding, these approaches are not in a good position to deal 
with the sorts of issues, tasks and problems that green political actors 
typically face. Indeed, the analysis pursued in this thesis suggests that 
many of the typical problems faced by green parties and organisations are 
either a direct result of, or are significantly exacerbated by the habit of 
thinking that green politics represents a distinctive value paradigm.
The assumption of value identity is typically accompanied by a number of 
other claims. Each of these approaches posit that the green value paradigm 
is internally coherent, and that those who adhere to the green system of
4values do so on the basis of conscious choice. An even more significant 
accompanying assum ption is that social change can be characterised in 
terms of movement towards (or away from) standards of green rationality. 
In this view, social conflict is understandable in terms of conflict between 
adherents of the green value paradigm  and those who adopt different or 
opposing standards of rationality. These assum ptions am ount to rather 
strong conceptions of value rationality and the capacity of academic 
analysts to discern the implications of green values. Each of them offer 
versions of the green claim that a different set of social arrangements will 
result from increasing adherence and com m itm ent to the alternative 
value paradigm. These analyses support the contention that green politics 
is a politics of conversion, and that the success of green politics can be 
assessed in terms of the extent of conversion. This applies regardless of 
w hether or not these theorists are sym pathetic to the green political 
project.
Greens are by no means the only political actors who have interpreted 
their own activities in terms of commitment to basic values. Max Weber, 
who has had a significant influence on the conceptualisation of values 
and politics, had m uch to say about political m ovem ents of his time 
which based their political actions upon an ’ethic of ultimate ends’. Weber 
was keenly interested in the effects of action based upon values. But he 
certainly would not accept that the proposed 'new structures of society' 
would come about as the consequence of 'doing politics differently'. His 
reason for not doing so is straightforward. Weber viewed all claims to 
rationality  w ith a certain irony. According to W eber, any form of 
rationally purposive action produces unanticipated results. This is more 
than an assertion that we can never fully know the results of our actions. 
Systematic engagement in particular kinds of rational behaviour can be 
shown to lead to particular sorts of unintended consequences. The iron 
cage of formal rationality is the best known of many examples of this 
dynamic in Weber's writings.
Within this general conception of social action, there is a particular type of 
unintended consequence associated with value rationality that is of 
interest in this thesis. According to Weber, '....it is not true that good can 
follow only from good and evil only from evil, ....often the opposite is
5true’ (Weber 1958a: 123). Action consciously undertaken on the basis of 
value rationality frequently produces results that are hardly in keeping 
with such rationality, and which may even be the opposite to those that 
are intended. This dynamic can be identified as a 'perverse effect'.1 Some 
parallels to this theme can be found the work of contem porary social 
theorists who have taken up them es of N ietzsche and Foucault. In 
particular, the work of Jeffrey Minson (1985; 1993) and William Connolly 
(1987; 1991) are useful here. Both authors have questioned the wisdom of 
grounding political action on fundam ental ethical principles. The results 
of such action are often quite different to what is bargained for.
Minson has concentrated on what he calls the 'eccentricity' of political 
action that is derived from  fundam ental ethical principles. He is 
concerned to trace a num ber of characteristic problems that arise from 
basing political action first and forem ost upon 'foundational' ethical 
principles. For Minson, '(i)t is not the (abstract) content but rather the 
deploym ent of ethical categories and principles as an ultim ate and 
c o m p re h e n s iv e  e v a lu a t iv e  y a rd s tic k  w h ic h  c h a ra c te r is e d  
foundationalism, and which renders these categories politically eccentric' 
(Minson 1985: 150-1). He draw s our attention to the serious pitfalls of 
attaching political claims to ’non-negotiable' norm ative principles. These 
pitfalls are evident particularly when this non-negotiability involves a 
p rin c ip led  refusal to trea t p ractical consequences as re levan t 
considerations. Minson argues, for instance, that many highly normative 
approaches to politics actually make it easier for opponents to undermine 
substantive political claims (1985: 156-7). H ow ever, this relation is 
characteristically ignored by those for whom the principle is sacrosanct, 
because such practical considerations should not override m atters of 
principle. He pursues this argum ent with reference to the political 
activities of both sides of the abortion debate (1985), and to the issue of 
sexual harassment (1993).
1 This term is attributable to Raymond Boudon. I have used it in a similar way to Herbert 
Kitschelt (1989: 5) with respect to green parties.
6Connolly argues that any regime of ethical identity m ust at some stage 
deal with 'the problem of evil' (1991: 1-8).2 That is, somewhere along the 
line it becomes clear to those who adhere to ethical identities that their 
experience is out of kilter with the normative interpretation of the world 
they espouse. This discordance usually requires some sort of explanation. 
Such exp lanations take on g rea ter im portance  the g rea ter the 
comm itm ent to and investm ent in an ethical identity. Connolly argues 
that strongly held ethical identities exhibit strong tendencies tow ard 
establishing categories of deviance in order to cope with the disparity 
between norm ative ideals and reality. Thus, when norm ative rationality 
is not fulfilled, or when obstacles to value-based action are encountered, 
such difficulties tend to be attributed to the obverse of the normatively 
rational (i.e. evil, the irrational, subversive forces) that has some sort of 
'other' existence (1991: 8). For example, the tem ptation that is confronted 
by the puritan Christian is attributed to the devil. The everyday obstacles 
to a comm unitarian utopia can be attributed to the inherent selfishness 
and imperfection of members. In such circumstances, those committed to 
ethical identities typically refuse to recognise that the 'other' is itself the 
product of the construction of ethical identity. They are blind to the 
circularity built into their definitions of identity.
Regarding the more lim ited range of issues pursued  in this thesis, 
Connolly 's form ulation provides another way of approaching the 
possibility of perverse effects. One possible implication is that problems 
experienced by groups attem pting to implement normative rationality are 
likely to be interpreted as evidence of the 'normative other'. Thus, the 
problem s, tensions and difficulties that are acknow ledged can be 
considered as direct products of value-based identities. This is a suggestion 
to be pursued in the course of this thesis.
U nfortunately, m ost standard  treatm ents of values and norm ative 
rationality in the fields of political science, sociology and social theory 
have ignored the theme of unintended consequences and perverse effects.
2 As such, Connolly appears to treat any construction of identity as having an ethical 
dimension.
7In contrast, more prom inent Weberian notions of value choice and value 
conflict are w oven into the fabric of value identity  approaches. 
Accordingly, m ost of the academic literature about values and green 
politics adopts a noticeably unironic view of values and value rationality. 
But the phenomena of unintended consequences and perverse effects are 
highly relevant to the study of green politics. According to Herbert 
Kitschelt, 'the pursuit of a new form of organization in ecology parties 
produces results that are (not) in agreem ent with the intended logic of 
constituency representation ' (1989: 5).3 The core green constituency 
identified by Kitschelt is that which regards itself as committed to green 
political principles. Kitschelt's research contributes to a growing body of 
evidence about green groups and organisations which place a high priority 
on norm ative commitment and integrity. Such groups seem to be greatly 
susceptible to particular types of tensions and difficulties including 
som etim es b itter and destructive internal conflicts and entrenched 
political frustration. These effects are clearly not desirable from the point 
of view of activists themselves. If green political identity is defined in 
terms of values then there are good reasons to suspect that the problems 
experienced by these groups are closely linked to the intensity of their 
norm ative identity.
I have followed a rather different methodological path in order to pursue 
some of the same themes as those suggested by Weber, Minson and 
Connolly. Unlike Minson and Connolly, who approach these issues via 
the terminology of ethics, morals and principles, I have come to consider 
these questions from a background of political science and sociology where 
values are the pertinent concept. In order to find a framework that could 
support a more ironic treatm ent of values, however, it was necessary to 
cast further afield from the standard political science and sociological 
literature. The material I have found most useful has been the work of 
British social psychologist Michael Billig, who has investigated the 
rhetorical use of attitudes, opinions and values in the context of political
3 The entire quote is 'the pursuit of a new form of organization in ecology parties produces 
results that are in agreement neither with a logic of party competition nor with the 
intended logic of constituency representation'.
8argum ent. This work has grown out of an internal critique of social 
psychological research techniques, bu t has far w ider im plications, I 
believe, for the ways in which we can think about the political context of 
norm ative discourse. In Billig's account, values are perhaps the most 
flexible, am biguous, and at times dow nright contradictory elements of 
rhetorical discourse. This way of conceptualising values suggests 
significant problem s for any attem pt to identify political categories in 
terms of values.
Methodologically, this thesis starts from Billig's contention that values are 
rhetorically ambiguous. This observation is also significant for earlier 
w riters on rhetoric such as Kenneth Burke (1969) and Chaim Perelman 
and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969). From these materials I have attempted 
to construct an alternative framework within which it is possible explore 
the relationship betw een values and politics. I have term ed this the 
'rhetorical approach ' to values. U nder such a fram ework, values are 
discernible when they are articulated in discourse. The articulation of 
values, therefore, is considered as behaviour rather than the cause of 
behaviour. In draw ing this line, I eschew a favourite device of much of 
the standard social scientific literature which attempts to diagnose values 
that underlie actors’ behaviour and orientations.
The central focus of this m ethodology is the investigation of 'good 
reasons' in political discourse. The rhetorical dim ension of political 
discourse is based upon the relationship between 'orators' who make 
rhetorical claims, and 'audiences' to whom these claims are addressed. 
Audiences are particularly significant. The nature of an audience, whether 
it be simply imagined by the orator or actually existing, defines the range 
of 'good reasons' that can be effectively deployed. Having identified an 
audience, the next key question of a rhetorical approach is what 
constitutes a 'type of good reason' with respect to that audience. Values 
can be considered as one much utilised ’type of good reason', as can facts, 
practicality, self-interest, aesthetics and tradition. This gives us a rather 
different and highly useful sense of the term 'norm ative rationality'. 
According to a rhetorical perspective, scientific arguments are constructed 
in terms of technical rationality because these are the type of reasons that
9will be adm itted by a scientific audience. In the same way, there are many 
claim s constructed in term s of norm ative rationality  because such 
argum ents are deemed admissible for particular audiences. This provides 
a fram e for analysing the place of norm ative rationality in political 
discourse w ithout assuming a baseline standard for such rationality.
The next methodological element of the rhetorical approach is to compare 
the rhetorical weight of different types of reasons. In this thesis, the 
particu lar question I ask is how do norm ative reasons compare to 
technical, practical and self-interested reasons. When norm ative reasons 
consistently outrank other types of reasons, this is a state of affairs that I 
refer to as 'norm ative prim acy ' or 'value prim acy '. (W ithin this 
framework, it would also be possible to identify 'technical primacy' or 
'pragmatic prim acy’). The final component of this approach, building on 
the previous elements, is the investigation of the political consequences of 
privileging a particular type of reasoning. In this thesis, I restrict my 
attention to the consequences of normative primacy. Like Minson, I am 
interested in investigating contexts in which norm ative reasoning is 
privileged.
An intriguing set of issues arises in circumstances where norm ative 
rationality  overrides other types of reasoning. The key insight that 
emerges from a rhetorical approach is that the rhetorical efficacy of values 
is largely a function of their ambiguity. A central question that is pursued 
in this thesis regards w hat happens w hen values, as inherently  
am biguous constructs, are expected to provide the basis for the 
establishment and maintenance of organisational boundaries, the conduct 
of decision-making and the resolution of conflict. These are sites where it 
is possible to discern a range of unintended consequences and perverse 
effects of normative rationality.
The thesis can be divided into two parts. The first part, consisting of 
Chapters 1 to 4 is a theoretical and methodological discussion of the 
relationship between values and green politics. My concern in this half of 
the thesis is to show why it is not feasible to identify the basis of green 
politics, or any type of politics for that matter, in terms of a distinct value 
rationality. I develop the rhetorical fram ework and m ethodology for
10
understanding  the political significance of values, and show how this 
framework can be applied in order to understand a number of key features 
of green politics.
Chapter 1 reviews the academic literature on green politics with a view to 
establishing the background and common threads of value identity 
approaches. Much of this literature deals w ith the characteristic new 
middle class location of support for green politics. Value identity accounts 
offer more plausible connections between green styles of participation, 
political preferences and social location than explanations constructed in 
term s of interest. I outline the w ays in which various theoretical 
approaches have identified green politics in terms of values and sketch a 
num ber of associated elements of the value identity thesis. The chapter 
concludes with an outline of some features of green politics in which the 
value identity thesis starts to fray around the edges. In particular, the 
prevalence of internal conflict within green parties and organisations is a 
strong indication of the weaknesses and blind spots of value-based 
approaches.
Chapter 2 attempts to demonstrate how the various approaches that share 
value identity assumptions come to regard values as the sort of thing that 
can be used to distinguish social actors and processes, and suggests reasons 
why this image of values is m isleading and problem atic. Analytical 
schemes of value distinction stum ble across a great many examples of 
political action which are anomalous. Value identity approaches are not 
in a position to recognise the am biguity and flexibility of norm ative 
discourse. However, these are features which should be regarded as central 
to the way in which values are actually deployed in political debate. This 
ambiguity of political values is dismissed by value identity approaches as 
indicative of value deviance, inconsistency or irrationality.
In Chapter 3, I provide an alternative fram ework for thinking about 
values and their role in green politics that takes into account ambiguity 
and flexibility. I argue that values should be considered as rhetorical 
m aterials that are deployed in the context of political argum ent. This 
chapter develops in more detail the rhetorical approach outlined above.
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In Chapter 4 the focus returns to green politics. The main purpose of this 
chapter is to identify the parallels between activist and academic 
characterisations of green politics. Values occupy a privileged place in 
much green political literature, overriding reasons such as efficiency, 
practicality and self-interest as good reasons advanced in justifying or 
criticising political action. From the rhetorical interpretation of the role of 
values it is possible to re-interpret much of the established knowledge 
about green politics. In particular, I argue that the characteristic new 
middle class location of green support can be seen in terms of the social 
distribution of specific rhetorical skills and capacities. As such, the green 
movement provides the 'raw materials' for a politics of value primacy.
In the second part of the thesis, consisting of Chapters 5 to 7, I apply the 
concepts developed in the previous chapters to some examples of the 
practice of green politics. I am particularly concerned to draw attention to 
the unintended consequences and perverse effects of green normative 
rationality neglected by value identity approaches. Throughout these three 
chapters, my focus moves from microscopic to macroscopic. At the 
microscopic level is an investigation into the rhetorical use of values by a 
network of Australian green political activists. In this case study I cover 
the details of specific debates between greens involved in this network, 
and address some of the more general issues that arise from green value 
rationality and primacy. At the macroscopic level I raise a number of more 
general issues that arise from treating green political activity as primarily 
an expression of normative rationality.
One interesting feature of this case study is that it draws from quite a new 
source of data - that of on-line computer conferences. It is reasonable to 
assume that this medium of communication will become increasingly 
important as a space for political discussion and debate, and as a means of 
transmitting and accessing information. The environmental movement 
has been at the forefront of utilising this means of communication. The 
material for this case study is drawn from a particular conference which 
provided a forum for discussion and debate about the prospective 
formation of a nationwide green party. As I explain in Chapter 5,
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electronic conference m aterial provides a com prehensive record of 
discourse, thus lending itself to rhetorical analysis.
The bulk of Chapter 5 is spent outlining the political context for the 
discussions among Australian greens. These discussions revolve around 
the appropriate  lim itations to party  m em bership and the design of 
organisational structures. I intend to demonstrate the centrality of values 
and value rationality in these discussions. From this exposition it is 
apparent that the implications of green values are highly ambiguous and 
contradictory in the context of these debates. This material provides strong 
evidence against the contention that green politics operates according to a 
coherent set of values, and questions the validity of assuming a rationality 
of green values.
In Chapter 6 I focus on some of the more general problems that are created 
or exacerbated by the rhetorical reliance these Australian greens place 
upon values. Fairly fundam ental issues including  the draw ing of 
boundaries around a green party, and resolving conflict where it arises are 
found to be especially difficult to manage when participants regard the 
prospective organisation first and foremost as an attem pt to embody green 
norm ative principles.
Chapter 7 is concerned with extrapolating from the Australian case study 
to a more general discussion of the vulnerabilities associated with the 
faith in value rationality. In this discussion I suggest that the characteristic 
cleavage between fundamentalist and realist approaches to green politics 
can be seen as a direct product of a value-based identity. I argue that value 
identity approaches are ill-equipped to make sense of fundi-realo conflict, 
because they share the problematic assumptions about values that are key 
factors in the creation and perpetuation of the fundi-realo distinction. At 
the end of this chapter I canvas the substantial limitations of a value-based 
approach to green politics, highlighting what I regard as characteristic 
areas of vulnerability when values are regarded as the foundation for 
political action. These investigations into the unintended consequences of 
green value rationality lead to the conclusion that the political emphasis 
on value change and conversion is substantially m isplaced, and that
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shared green values are a problematic basis for co-ordinated, sustained 
political action.
The em pirical m aterial used in this thesis leans tow ards a greater 
em phasis on those values that draw  upon them es of participatory 
democracy, and less emphasis on the specifically ecological content of the 
green value repertoire. Nevertheless, I do not think it is feasible, as Robert 
Goodin (1992) does, to regard participatory themes as analytically separate 
from ecological themes. Goodin distinguishes between green theories of 
value (reasons to protect nature) and green theories of agency (reasons to 
favour radical participatory politics). In his framework, ecological values 
are essential to the identity and conduct of green politics, whereas 
participatory values may be desirable but are not essential. This thesis is 
certainly sym pathetic to Goodin's aims to question the em phasis on 
decentralised participatory democracy in the practice of green politics. 
Unlike Goodin, however, I do not believe that the problem  is one of 
distinguishing between first and second division values. Green activists 
typically refuse to make this separation as they regard participatory and 
ecological values to be closely interconnected. Ecological m etaphors are 
frequently used to bolster participatory themes, and vice versa. For this 
reason I do not regard it as feasible to make any such demarcation, given 
the methodological concern in this thesis to explore the implications of 
the ways greens themselves conceptualise value politics. Instead, the 
problems I perceive stem from conceptualising green politics as a project 
of implementing green value per se.
Chapter 8 sum m arises the argum ents of the thesis and concludes by 
suggesting how the insights gained from the rhetorical approach suggest a 
more ironic view of the relationship between values and politics. This 
analysis supports the suspicions held by Weber, Minson and Connolly 
about the pitfalls and dangers of placing excessive weight upon 'ethics of 
ultimate ends' in politics.
The problems associated with the rhetorical privileging of values are not 
necessarily endemic or inevitable in green parties and organisations. 
U ndoubtedly, particular green organisations vary significantly in the 
degree to which they are prone to the problems I discuss. It is quite
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possible that the dynamics identified are more applicable to newer 
'greener' organisational settings, and are less characteristic of more 
experienced parties. My point is sim ply that the rhetoric of the green 
m ovem ent has provided the 'preconditions' for value primacy, and the 
kinds of problems associated with it. As such, green parties provide some 
of the best contem porary sites to explore the perverse effects of value- 
based politics.
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Chapter 1: Green Politics and the Value Identity Thesis
The emergence of the green movement as a significant force in the politics 
of western democracies has raised many substantial questions for social 
theorists and social scientists. Attempts to explain the emergence of green 
politics have sought to establish appropriate ways of characterising this 
phenom enon. M uch of the literature, therefore, is concerned with 
identifying w hat is different about green politics, and how it can be 
recognised and distinguished from other political projects. Since about 
1980, a conventional wisdom has emerged which covers a wide range of 
theoretical approaches. This conventional wisdom suggests that the most 
appropriate  way of identifying green politics is in term s of values. 
Participants in the green m ovem ent are regarded as possessing shared 
value commitments that distinguish them from the rest of the political 
landscape, and that lead them to adopt particular orientations, lifestyles 
and forms of political action.
The first part of this chapter shows that the apparent plausibility of value- 
based interpretations of green politics is related to the weaknesses of 
interest-based explanations. While it is true that there are characteristic 
sociological patterns of green support, these patterns do not easily lend 
themselves to interest-based interpretations of the content and style of 
green politics. Values are seen as providing the m issing link between 
social location and green orientations. The range of theoretical approaches 
that adopt this conventional wisdom is certainly impressive. W hatever 
their differences on other points, there are rem arkable sim ilarities 
between theorists as diverse as Ronald Inglehart, Alain Touraine, Mary 
Douglas and Robert Goodin regarding the role they attribute to green 
values and value rationality. This chapter outlines the variety of value 
identity approaches that have emerged and highlights their common 
ground on a number of issues.
This standard  picture of green politics carries w ith it a num ber of 
assumptions about the nature of green values, including the presumption
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that green values are coherent, and that shared values imply shared 
interpretations of these values. The final part of this chapter demonstrates 
the lim itations of these assum ptions. I argue that the most striking 
problem s w ith standard  value-based accounts can be found in the 
experience of green parties and political organisations. There are a 
substantial num ber of grey areas in which the im plications of green 
values are highly ambiguous, and raise more problems than they solve in 
relation to the day to day political dilemmas faced by greens.
1.1. The Distinctiveness of Green Politics
The term 'green politics' is used in this thesis to refer to an amalgam of 
political orientations that have their organisational expression in green 
parties. Although environmental issues are characteristically at the centre 
of these concerns, green politics has a far wider scope. In this wider sense 
of the term, green politics encompasses much the same territory as what 
have also been identified as new social m ovem ents, i.e. environm ent, 
anti-nuclear, peace, feminist, indigenous peoples and sexual identity 
movements. However, green politics should not be considered as simply 
the aggregate of all these m ovem ents. Activists from the first three 
m ovements typically form the core of the green movement. These are 
what Jan Pakulski (1991) refers to as 'eco-pax' movements, and are each 
characterised by highly universalistic claims. There is a high degree of 
overlap with respect to participation in these movements. The last three 
of this list exist far more independently of the green movement. Greens 
are generally supportive of the aspirations of the 'identity' movements, as 
well as some claims associated with the 'non-institutionalised' socialist 
movement. However, identity aspirations are supported in terms that are 
compatible with an overall universalist approach to politics, rather than 
emphasising the particularist element of these movements.
Hence, the word green is used because it has become the most widely 
accepted label which is attached to this package of orientations and forms 
of participation by activists themselves. If the term 'rainbow' had acquired 
such w idespread acceptance I would have been just as happy to use this 
term. However, it has been the green banner under which most attempts 
to articulate the 'new politics' amalgam have been cast, and the term
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'green politics' invokes a slightly sharper focus than the umbrella terms 
m ost frequently found in the academic literature, namely 'new politics' 
(Dalton 1984), 'left-libertarianism ' (Kitschelt 1988; 1989) and 'new social 
movements' (Cohen 1983; Offe 1985). This slight difference in emphasis is 
inconsequen tia l in the follow ing d iscussions regard ing  political 
participation and social characteristics, such that the term s are used 
interchangeably.
1.1.1. New Politics, New Social Movements, New Demands, New
Parties
One of the most common academic labels for locating green politics has 
been the term  'new politics'. W ithin the political science tradition, the 
recognition of new styles of political participation stems from an initial 
in terest in ex traparliam entary  p ro test activity w hich was initially 
described as 'unconventional' and 'outside the political system ’ (Kaase & 
Marsh 1979). In fact, the initial form ulation of new politics by political 
scientists such as Barnes, Kaase, Dalton and Marsh was directed more 
towards styles of participation than to the content of political demands. 
H ildebrandt and Dalton contend that the common denom inator of new 
politics is the em phasis on access to the means of political decision­
making, regardless of the ends (H ildebrandt & Dalton 1978). Concerns 
ranging from opposition to U.S. m ilitary intervention in Vietnam to 
environm ental pollution and abortion, were in terpreted  as dem ands 
relating to participation in the political system.1
N otw ithstand ing  the em phasis placed upon political participation, 
increasing attention has been paid to interpreting the issues that are 
advanced via new politics. New politics issues have been defined in 
contradistinction to class-based politics, which has been identified as the 
principal electoral cleavage of postwar western democracies. New politics 
issues, therefore, are those which do not fit into a class-based framework,
1 Thus, ethnolinguistic issues in Belgium and tax revolts in Denmark were considered to be 
new politics mobilisations because of their articulation through extraparliamentary 
protest (Hildebrandt & Dalton 1978).
18
and are not resolvable through the same corporatist m echanisms that 
have been a prom inent feature of the postwar decades. Environmentalism 
is a typical example of such an issue. It is regarded as im portant by these 
political scientists because of both the 'unconventional' forms of political 
action adopted and because it cannot easily be made to fit a class-based 
fram ework.
A broader stream of sociological interest in new social m ovements has 
dealt w ith the emergence of these new styles of participation and new 
issues in a w ider social and cultural context. A lthough there is debate 
about the degree to which this collection of movements can be called new, 
the commentaries on their political developm ent have much in common 
with the new politics accounts. Theorists such as Alain Touraine (1981), 
Jürgen Habermas (1981), Jean Cohen (1983; 1985) and Claus Offe (1985) 
em phasise the novelty of forms of political participation that have 
emerged in response to problems arising from the delimitation of postwar 
politics in industrialised welfare states. The restriction of the political 
agenda to issues of technocratic m anagem ent and the encroachment of 
state techniques of m anagem ent into the realm  of civil society are 
regarded  as problem atic developm ents. These changes foster new 
demands to expand the scope for participation in the political sphere and 
to protect civil society from state intervention. The issues and political 
demands raised by new social movements reflect dissatisfaction with the 
side effects of the compromise between labour and capital that marks 
postwar welfare capitalism. Green concern, in this account, emerges as the 
detrim ental effects of the headlong pursu it of economic growth and 
technological innovation become apparent. These issues tend to be 
indigestible within the fram ework of conventional politics because by 
questioning political goals such as economic growth, movements threaten 
the existing bases for political legitimation. At least in the short term, new 
social movements occupy a marginal location with regard to institutional 
politics.
Closely related to these innovations in political participation and 
dem ands, many western industrialised countries have w itnessed the 
emergence of new political parties and groupings that clearly fit the bill as
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formalised expressions of new politics and new social movements. Many 
of these parties, particularly those that have been established since the late 
1970s, have adopted the label 'green'. The closure of institutional political 
channels to innovative dem ands is a prom inent theme of the literature 
that deals with the emergence of green parties. Kay Lawson, for example, 
argues that environm entalist organisations and parties demonstrate that 
traditional political parties are not the flexible 'linkage' mechanisms they 
once were, and are no longer able to represent and articulate emergent 
political concerns (Lawson 1988). Similarly, both Alan Scott (1990) and 
Herbert Kitschelt (1989) identify corporatist procedures of decision making 
betw een governm ent, unions and business as unresponsive to new 
politics demands. The emergence of new political parties has been a key 
developm ent of the 1980s. These institu tional accounts regard this 
emergence as a reaction to the m arginality of new politics issues, as 
partic ipan ts in new  m ovem ents experienced the lim itations and 
frustrations of political action based upon extra-parliam entary protest 
(Frankland & Schoonmaker 1992; Papadakis 1984).
Central themes raised by these parties cover the same spectrum of issues 
that have been articulated by the new social movements. In his study of 
the program m es of European green parties Thomas Poguntke identifies 
ten charac te ristic  elem ents includ ing : env ironm en ta lism ; anti-
n u c le a rism ; classical liberalism  (support for abortion, divorce and 
m inorities); se lf-d e te rm in a tio n  (a lte rn a tiv e  lifesty le , in d iv id u a l 
autonom y); fem inism ; partic ipa to ry  dem ocracy; leftism  (w o rk e r 's  
participation, societal control of economic processes, egalitarianism ); 
support for the Third W orld (redistribution  from N orth  to South); 
unilateral disarmament and opposition to missile deploym ent (Poguntke 
1989).2
2 Of the fifteen parties from twelve countries studied by Poguntke, twelve green parties 
demonstrated at least seven out of the ten characteristics. Kitschelt’s category of left- 
libertarian parties is more inclusive than Poguntke's green parties. Kitschelt includes the 
'New Left' parties that emerged in Scandinavia, France and the Netherlands in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. An example of this type of party is the Danish Socialist Peoples' 
Party. Poguntke's list of programmatic features could easily be applied to these New Left 
parties.
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Researchers into green parties and new social m ovem ent organisations, 
have identified another area of novelty, namely, the organisational form 
which these groups characteristically adopt (Kitschelt 1989; Müller- 
Rommel 1990). Often this organisational form is explicitly designed as an 
alternative to the structure of traditional parties and organisations in 
order to counter their exclusionary practices and barriers to participation. 
The new parties, as described by Kitschelt in his study of German and 
Belgian green parties, a ttem pt to create struc tu res derived  from 
decentralised, libertarian and participatory principles. This, of course, is a 
further m anifestation of the 'unconventional' forms of political action 
th a t have been iden tified  as features of new  social m ovem ent 
organisations. Innovative organisational structure and procedures also 
serve to indicate that greens are not content sim ply to establish 
themselves as new players in a well established game of politics. They 
show that greens are also intent on changing the rules.
1.1.2. Social Characteristics of Green Support
Perhaps the best developed and most utilised tool of both social theory 
and social scientific research, particularly throughout the 1970s and early 
1980s, was explanation in terms of social-structural location. It is not 
surprising that this tool has been extensively applied to the phenomena of 
green politics. Investigations into the social bases of green political 
participation eventually turned up a rem arkably consistent story. The 
picture was quite blurred if one was looking at general support for social 
m ovem ents and favourable o rien tations tow ards the issues they 
promoted. However, sociological patterns became som ewhat clearer in 
attem pts to explain participation in m ovem ent activities or voting for 
green political candidates. It has been clearest of all when focused upon 
the membership of green political formations.
Of the m ovements covered by the green um brella, the environm ental 
movement has been the most widely investigated. A num ber of early 
studies of the broad constituency of the environm ental movement did 
not reveal much in the way of distinctive socio-demographic patterns of 
support (Buttel & Flinn 1976; Van Liere & Dunlap 1980). Van Liere and 
Dunlap's review article (1980) concluded that demographic variables were
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of lim ited utility in explaining environm ental concern in the United 
States in the 1970s. Of the possible explanatory variables suggested, only 
age and education appeared to be of any significance, and this significance 
was moderate at best. Van Liere and Dunlap interpreted the general low 
level of explanation for environm ental concern as indicating that such 
concern was distributed widely and evenly throughout U.S. society. To 
suppo rt this contention they cited am biguous associations between 
income and environmental concern, and negligible relationships between 
occupational prestige and environmental attitudes.
Other analyses, however, showed that the dismissal of social location of 
green politics was premature. When certain crucial distinctions within the 
m iddle class are made, significant structural patterns become apparent. 
Am ong the first of such studies was Frank P ark in ’s research into 
participants in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in Britain 
in the 1960s. Parkin (1968) identified a specific fraction of the middle class, 
namely those employed in welfare and creative professions, as the basic 
constituency of CND. He made the distinction w ithin the professional 
middle class between welfare and creative professionals and 'commercial' 
professionals engaged in the production and distribution process (Parkin 
1968: 180). He also reported that three quarters of m iddle class CND 
activists were em ployed by public sector or non-profit organisations 
(Parkin 1968: 189). Basically, the cluster of occupations that Parkin terms as 
welfare and creative, has since been labelled the 'social-cultural' sector, or 
the 'reproductive sector'. It includes such occupations as academics, social 
service providers, arts and culture professionals, journalists and clergy.3
The profile identified by Parkin has been confirm ed more recently. 
H anspeter Kriesi's investigations into public attitudes to new social 
m ovem ents in the N etherlands found that participation  in higher 
education and employment in social-cultural occupations had the largest 
effects upon mobilisation potential for these movements in general. Each
3 See Brint (1984) for a detailed discussion on drawing the boundaries of the new middle 
class and the social-cultural sector.
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of these effects was m ultiplied when combined with age (Kriesi 1989).4 
Jorgen Goul Andersen's analysis of the social bases of environm ental 
su p p o rt in D enm ark repo rted  tha t em ploym ent in the 'public 
reproductive' sector for non-m anual employees is of the same order of 
im portance as age and education in accounting for differences in 
environm entalism  (Goul Andersen 1990b). In Australia, Pakulski's study 
of Tasmanian green movement participants, and Papadakis’ research into 
support for environm entalism  confirm the distinctive profile regarding 
age and education (Pakulski 1991: 182; Papadakis 1993: 166).
Studies of the social profile have also highlighted categories of the 
population who are outside the scope of green politics. Kriesi investigated 
participation  in the Dutch peace m ovem ent and found significant 
occupational barriers were present.
no large employer, no protective agent, no computer specialist, and 
virtually no farmer and no unskilled worker have ever participated in 
the peace movement, while more than half of those engaged in other 
social and cultural services, half of the traditional professionals, more 
than a third of the medical personnel, and more than a fourth of 
teachers have done so. In other words, there seem to be class-specific 
barriers to a heavier involvement in the peace movement (Kriesi 1989:
1096).
The developm ent of green political parties, particu larly  in Europe 
provided researchers with a new source of material. Research into green 
party voting has initially concentrated on the German Greens. Müller- 
Rommel reported that the support base for die Grünen in 1982 was 
constituted overwhelmingly by people under the age of 45. There was an 
over-representation of green supporters from the ranks of those who were 
either currently studying at tertiary level, or who had already achieved 
tertiary qualifications (Müller-Rommel 1985). Bürklin (1987), and Müller- 
Rommel (1989) found sim ilar over-representation of young, highly 
educated voters among supporters of die Grünen throughout the 1980s.
4 He also reported significant influence for the variable 'parents without religious 
affiliation'. Religiosity is not a variable that has been used consistently in studies relating 
to green participation, although where it has it has been generally found to be significant. 
However, we would expect that its importance in the Netherlands is amplified due to the 
religious pillarisation of Dutch society.
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Bennulf and Holmberg's analysis of 1988 Swedish Election Study data has 
provided some detail in terms of occupational categories (Bennulf & 
Holmberg 1990). Occupational groups over-represented amongst Swedish 
Green Party voters included 'm iddle white-collar' and 'professionals/ 
m anagers '.5 Green Party voters were slightly more likely to be in public 
sector employment, and were younger and more highly educated than the 
electorate as a whole.
Research into membership of green organisations and political parties has 
brought these social and demographic contours into sharpest relief. This 
research confirms the broader findings regarding age and education, and 
enables a more fine-grained account of the labour force location of 
m ovem ent participants. Cotgrove and Duff's analysis com pared the 
labour force locations of British environm entalists to the profile for the 
general public. They found the members of two prom inent national 
environm ental organisations were d isp roportionate ly  em ployed in 
service, welfare and creative occupations, or were studying. Workers in 
manual occupations and housewifes were under-represented (Cotgrove & 
Duff 1980: 342). This evidence led them to regard the occupational setting 
as crucial in accounting for environmentalism, particularly the distinction 
between market and non-market oriented workplaces.
The most thorough study of this kind was undertaken by Rüdig, Bennie 
and Franklin who surveyed 4000 members of the British Green Party. A 
clear pattern of age distribution showed that those under the age of 45 
were over-represented in party membership, whereas all age categories 
over 45 were under-represented. Over half the m em bership reported 
holding a tertiary degree compared with just 7% of the total British 
population. Regarding those presently employed, professionals accounted 
for half the total of green party  members. Correspondingly, m anual 
w orkers, clerical and sales workers were heavily under-represented 
categories (Rüdig, Bennie & Franklin 1991). Only a quarter of members
5 With regard to sector of employment, Bennulf and Holmberg reported that 35% of Green 
voters were employed in health care and education, compared to 20% of all voters. Only 
22% of Green voters were employed in primary or secondary industry, compared to 33% of 
the electorate (Bennulf & Holmberg 1990).
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were employed by a private firm or company in comparison to over half 
the general population.6
1.1.3. Interpreting the Social Bases
Although the findings reveal substantial convergence regarding the social 
characteristics of green support, they present a num ber of problems of 
interpretation under standard social-structural explanatory frameworks. 
None of the key variables of age, education and location within the 
professional middle class had previously played large explanatory roles in 
political sociology, while the variables that had dom inated political 
sociology, such as class, ethnicity and religious affiliation, were of 
tangential significance to the study of social m ovem ent participation. 
Membership of a specific class, ethnic or religious category could be easily 
linked to the notion of interest, as attitudinal and voting preferences of 
these categories could be interpreted as expressions of the interests of that 
category. The variables associated with movement participation did not 
easily lend themselves to interest-based accounts.
Some commentators on the German Greens have attem pted to interpret 
the findings relating to age and education as evidence of a form of 
interest-based determination of green support. The analyses of Jens Alber 
and W ilhelm Biirklin focused upon the substantial levels of green 
support from social categories not in paid employment. Alber described 
the typical Green supporter in the early 1980s as young, highly educated 
and unem ployed, as the labour m arket was not able to absorb the 
increased num bers of graduates which had been fuelled by rapidly 
expanding higher education and the baby-boom generation (Alber 1989). 
According to Biirklin, this oversupply created a significant category of 
voters who were not adequately 'socially integrated' and this lack of social 
integration accounted for their anti-establishm ent political orientations 
(Biirklin 1987). Alber contends that green party support should be treated
6 Interestingly, 19% of members identified themselves as self-employed, compared to 10% 
of the population (Rüdig, Bennie & Franklin 1991: 27). Although the study does not provide 
details of the scope of this category, it is likely that in includes occupations such as cottage 
craft production and self-sufficient farming.
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as a tem porary phenom enon, a 'phase-specific constellation of factors 
(that) has resulted in cohorts graduating from university with blocked 
mobility chances, becoming a negatively privileged acquisition class' (1989: 
200).
Both authors have been criticised for ignoring contradictory indications 
from their own evidence, in particular their failure to deal with the 
substantial and increasing proportions of green supporters who were in 
paid employment (Kitschelt 1988; Papadakis 1988). Papadakis (1988: 446) 
also notes, with regard to Alber, that a higher proportion of German 
Green supporters were em ployed than Christian Democrat and Social 
Democrat supporters. Apart from these weaknesses, Alber and Bürklin 
also neglected the concurrent emergence of green constituencies beyond 
W est G erm any w here the labour m arket conditions were not so 
unfavourable for the young tertiary educated.
An alternative basis for interest derived accounts of green politics shifts 
the focus to the specific location of green support within the paid labour 
force. These interpretations contend that green politics reflects the specific 
interests of an occupational or class category. Initially, some Marxian 
w riters characterised environm entalism  in term s of m iddle class 
protection of class privilege in universalist guise (Enzensberger 1974). 
However, as Robyn Eckersley points out, such critiques ignored the crucial 
d istinctions w ith in  the m iddle class (Eckersley 1989: 210). More 
commonly, it has been the concentration of public sector employment that 
has attracted variations of class interest argum ents. Rolf Gerritsen, for 
example, argues that the increased influence of environmentalism in the 
public policy arena facilitates redistribution of occupational power and the 
expansion of employment opportunities for members of the new middle 
class (Gerritsen 1990). This argument resonates with earlier discussions of 
the 'New Class' (Bruce-Briggs 1979) or the 'professional managerial class' 
(Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich 1979) in which the interests of public sector 
em ployees in professional service occupations were linked to the 
maintenance and expansion of the knowledge-based welfare state.
However, these accounts that attem pt to link participation in green 
politics with occupationally defined interest are som ewhat problematic
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in terpretations. Goul A ndersen is critical of the new class interest 
argum ent, noting the tenuous connections between the issues articulated 
by the environm ental m ovem ent and the vaguely defined interests 
a ttribu ted  to the new  class (Goul A ndersen  1990a: 103). O ther 
commentators have similarly pointed out that the claims made by new 
social movement participants are not claims made on behalf of the new 
m iddle class. Any element of particularism  in green politics involves 
claims made on behalf of other categories, which bear little relation to 
identifiable new middle class interests (Eder 1985; Offe 1985). In fact, many 
green political claims fit very uncom fortably w ith the interest-based 
argument. As Philip Lowe and Wolfgang Riidig observe.
The demands of radical political ecology for fundamental changes in 
industrial society do not accord with this model. The financing of the 
welfare state is dependent on continued economic growth - why should 
it be in the interests of those who work within it to demand the end of 
economic growth and a halt to major technological projects? (Lowe &
Rüdig 1986: 522).
Robyn Eckersley extends this point to suggest that in term s of the 
definition of interest offered by the class interest hypothesis, the core 
participants in the green movem ent are well aware that through their 
actions and demands they are 'quite deliberately seeking to "bite the hand 
that feeds them ’" (Eckersley 1989: 222).
Contrary to the above analyses that stipulate that the new middle class is 
well placed to pursue its interests, Cotgrove and Duff claim that the 
political marginality of green politics reflects a peripheral location in the 
occupational structure.
environmentalism is an expression of the interests of those whose class 
position in the non-productive sector locates them at the periphery of 
the institutions and processes of industrial capitalist societies. Hence, 
their concern to win greater participation and influence and thus to 
strengthen the political role of their members (Cotgrove & Duff 1980:
341).
This m arginality is reflected in the alienation from decision-making 
e x p erien c ed  by em p lo y ees in the  n o n -p ro d u c tiv e  secto r. 
Environm entalists' interests, according to Cotgrove and Duff, lie in 
challenging the dominance of the industrialist interests that occupy the
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central economic and political locations. In a similar vein, Claus Offe has 
interpreted the evidence regarding who does not participate in new social 
m ovem ents according to a sim ilar distinction. He observes that 'the 
classes, strata, and groups that are penetrated least by the concerns, 
dem ands, and forms of action of the "new" paradigm  are exactly the 
"principal" classes of capitalist societies, namely, the industrial working 
class and the holders and agents of economic and administrative power' 
(Offe 1985: 835). On this basis, Offe suggests that it is the absence of 
structural imperatives, defined as location in the principal classes, that 
enables new social movement supporters to adopt universalistic political 
orientations.
These interpretations are framed in term s of where new m iddle class 
in terests do not lie. Similarly, political scientists such as Dalton and 
Ing lehart have argued  that engagem ent in new  politics reflects 
corresponding disengagement from the constraints of class-based politics. 
According to Dalton, members of the new m iddle class, and the better 
educated are freed from the traditional social bases of the party system and 
are subsequently more likely to be influenced by new political concerns 
(Dalton 1984: 107). Inglehart’s theory of postmaterialism is similarly built 
upon the contention that those who have had their immediate needs for 
economic security satisfied during adolescence and early adulthood are 
free to address political issues that arise from the pursuit of quality of life 
(Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1990). Because these conditions have been more 
prevalent for postwar generations than those born before 1945, there is a 
m arked concentration of new politics support am ong the younger 
generation. Education, according to Inglehart, serves as a good indicator of 
formative affluence, but is not significant in its own right.
The simple correlation between formative affluence and new politics is 
not the only way of accounting for the significance of age and education. 
According to Goul Andersen, ’it seems more likely that it is the exposure 
to the political struggles and political mobilisation during formative years 
that is the relevant intervening variable between generation and values' 
and that this exposure is 'linked to knowledge and thus to education 
which may also as such affect consciousness of distant problems such as 
ecological problem s’ (Goul Andersen 1990a: 106). Offe asserts that the
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constituency of new social m ovements is draw n prim arily from 'those 
who have the easiest cognitive access to the particular nature of systemic 
irrationalities or those who are the most likely victims of cumulative 
deprivations' (Offe 1985: 850). Eckersley's interpretation is essentially the 
same: 'the class least likely to be constrained from pursuing remedial 
action is the new class .... by virtue of its high education and relative 
autonom y from the production process’ (Eckersley 1989: 221). Tertiary 
education, argues Eckersley, enables people to adopt universalistic 
perspectives and conceive of society as a whole. The green constituency, by 
virtue of this capacity, engages in what Alvin Gouldner (1979) has termed 
a 'culture of critical discourse'.7
There are still some attem pts to re-integrate these findings into familiar 
interest-based frameworks. Andre Görz (1985) and Andrew Dobson (1990), 
for instance, regard the green constituency as politically marginalised and 
suggest on this basis that all marginalised categories in industrial society 
have a stake in prom oting green change, rather than being tied to 
protection of the old order. These are attempts to salvage some of the logic 
of revolutionary socialist positions, even though the carrier of the 
em ancipatory role is no longer the w orking class but the 'mass of 
disaffected non-w orkers' (Görz 1985: 35). Such a version of social- 
structural interpretation relies on the use of the term 'marginalisation' to 
fudge the significant difference between the young, educated, articulate 
m iddle class who do participate in the green movement, and the long­
term unem ployed and retrenched older workers who do not have the 
same cultural resources at their disposal and who do not participate to any 
great extent.8
7 Eckersley departs from Gouldner's usage in crucial respects. According to Gouldner, both 
the 'technical intelligentsia’ and 'humanist intellectuals' engage in the culture of critical 
discourse. Eckersley plays down the role of the former, claiming that they are too heavily 
implicated in industrialism to adopt a sufficiently critical stance (1989: 222). It is unlikely 
that Gouldner would endorse Eckersley's equating of the relative absence of structural 
constraint with the absence of structural interests.
8 According to Kriesi, the unemployed are under-represented in new social movement 
activity (1989: 1106).
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To summarise, Inglehart, Dalton, Offe, Eckersley and Goul Andersen all 
claim that green political participation is facilitated by the relative freedom 
from the structural constraints of industrialism, while Cotgrove and Duff 
emphasise the structural m arginality of green participants. Either way, 
however, these analyses are not considered by these authors as complete 
accounts of green politics. These in terpretations all place significant 
em phasis on characteristics which greens, for w hatever reason, are 
considered not to have, and the variation between them centres around 
whether this absence signifies deficiency or freedom. Nevertheless, the 
placement of so much analytical weight upon the absence of particular 
characteristics makes for a somewhat fragile basis for explanation, and this 
is generally recognised.
Cotgrove and Duff, for instance, are m indful of the need to find other 
ways to supplem ent their account which emphasises the relative absence 
of structural interest. Put simply, how do environmentalists come to be in 
'peripheral' middle class occupations rather than in those locations which 
are central to capitalist production? It would be implausible to suggest that 
their intra-class location is a result of generational inheritance. Nor is it 
plausible to suggest that environm entalists choose peripheral locations 
out of self-interest. Cotgrove and Duff suggest therefore that 'there are 
strong grounds for concluding that values are a major factor influencing 
occupational choice' (Cotgrove & Duff 1980: 343) and that 'those who 
reject the ideology and values of industrial capitalism are likely to choose 
careers outside the market-place' (1980: 344). Once again, this line can be 
traced back to Parkin, who argued that social and cultural occupations in 
the non-profit sector are 'sanctuaries' protecting those who inhabit them 
from implication in the capitalist system (Parkin 1968: 187).
For Dalton and Inglehart, the link between the absence of interests and the 
presence of values is virtually definitional. Value-based politics is the sort 
of politics you have when you don't have interest-based politics.9 The
9 Unless postmaterialist needs such as self-actualisation and autonomy are treated as 
interests, in which case no distinction can be made between values and interests. One could 
argue that Inglehart's use of the Maslovian framework of developmental needs dissolves 
the distinction. Needs can be portrayed in terms of both values and interests.
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inverse relationship between class interests and norm ative commitments 
is also a feature of sociological approaches (Crook, Pakulski & Waters 1992: 
147). Robyn Eckersley puts a finer point on this argument. It is the space 
opened up by this relative absence of interest in class-based politics that 
provides the opportunity for adopting a value-based politics. This is not 
an opportunity that all those in the position to do so (i.e. the new middle 
class) necessarily take up, as significant num bers of this sociological 
category still adopt self-interested political orientations (1989: 222-3). A 
common feature of all these accounts is that new politics, postmaterialist 
or green value orientations are regarded as the standard  expression of 
value-based politics.10
1.1.4. Interpreting Movement Motivations
A rather different route to an account of green politics in which values are 
contrasted to interests stems from critiques of the resource mobilization 
approach to the study  of social m ovem ents. Resource m obilization 
emerged as a reaction to depictions of collective action that emphasised 
subjective grievances and feelings of alienation. Resource mobilization 
studies attem pt to account for the existence and activities of various 
m ovem ents in term s of organisation, resources and opportun ities 
(McCarthy & Zald 1977).* 11 In this context, the action of social movement 
participants is not derived from structurally defined interest, but from 
interests defined psychologically, such as goal achievement and personal 
gratification.
These are the shared interests of m ovem ent participants. Due to this 
emphasis on explanation in terms of objectively defined rational interests, 
resource mobilization theorists have not been methodologically disposed 
to take notice of the norm ative claims m ade by social m ovem ent
10 This is particularly noticeable in Inglehart's scheme, and he has been criticised for 
neglecting other forms of 'non-materialist' value based politics (Savage 1985; Flanagan 
1987).
11 The target of resource mobilization's critique of subjectivism is the 'collective behaviour' 
approach exemplified by theorists such as Smelser and Gurr, in which mass movements are 
treated as manifestations of irrational behaviour.
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participants (Papadakis 1993: 30). Jean Cohen argues that this interest-based 
approach has ignored crucial issues such as how participants construct and 
recognise their individual and collective interests and how they define 
their goals. Resource mobilization approaches thus neglect the factors 
which give rise to collective identity, consciousness and solidarity of social 
movements (Cohen 1985: 685). These self-understandings often contradict, 
and are even explicitly constructed to combat the standards of rationality 
and definitions of success assumed by resource mobilization theorists. A 
num ber of com m entators have argued that this strategic and tactical 
em phases of resource m obilization needs to be com plem ented by 
consideration of the norm ative content of social m ovem ent claims 
(Cohen 1985; Jamison, Eyerman & Cramer 1990; Papadakis 1993).
1.2. The Value Identity Thesis
Values, normative self-understandings and moral claims, therefore, have 
come to occupy a pivotal place in theoretical conceptions of green politics. 
In this section, I detail the main ways in which values have been woven 
into such accounts. Although there are a num ber of significant points of 
difference between these various accounts, my main concern is to build a 
picture that emphasises the similarities between them in terms of how 
they conceptualise the relationship betw een values and politics. A 
conventional wisdom  has emerged that green politics can be feasibly 
identified in terms of value commitments and value rationality. Two 
broad categories of the value identity thesis can be distinguished. The first 
of these is what I have termed 'attributional' approaches, which cover the 
value change fram eworks of Ronald Inglehart, Stephen Cotgrove and 
Lester Milbrath, and the cultural theory of Mary Douglas and Aaron 
Wildavsky. The second category is that of 'transformational' approaches, 
including much of the new social movement literature, particularly Alain 
Touraine and Jean Cohen, as well as various attem pts to develop a 
specifically green political theory undertaken by Murray Bookchin, Robyn 
Eckersley and Robert Goodin.
1.2.1. Attributional Approaches
Attributional approaches to green politics are those that have developed 
w ith in  the trad itio n s of em pirical political science, sociology,
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anthropology and social psychology. Values are understood as objectively 
identifiable attributes which distinguish political actors from one another. 
The types of research problems that have prom pted the development of 
these approaches include accounting for political behaviour, voting 
behaviour, the emergence of new parties in established party systems and 
the analysis of political preference formation. In distinguishing between 
value systems, researchers typically (but not necessarily) regard their own 
typologies as 'value neutral'. Attributional approaches generally eschew 
expressing preference for one set of values over another, in order to claim 
a certain objectivity of research methods.12
1.2.1.1. Value Change
Perhaps the most common form of attributional accounts are those in 
which values are treated as measurable variables via techniques of survey 
m ethodology. Indiv iduals are assum ed to 'hold ' values or value- 
orientations, and are distinguishable from one another by virtue of the 
values they possess. Green politics, in these schemes, is associated with a 
particular type or cluster of value-orientations. The most well-known of 
these approaches is Ronald Inglehart’s tw o-tiered typology of values 
(Inglehart 1977; 1981; 1990). Postmaterialist values are distinguished from 
m ateria list values on the basis of ind iv idua l needs which are 
hierarchically ordered. Materialists seek to fulfil lower order needs of 
economic and physical security. Postmaterialists, having had these needs 
fulfilled, are motivated by higher-order needs such as 'self-actualisation', 
and ind iv idual autonom y. Inglehart claims that the m ateria lism / 
postm aterialism  value dimension is becoming more significant as the 
importance of class-based political cleavage recedes. This is due to the fact 
that postw ar industrial societies have been successful in meeting the 
material needs of large proportions of their populations (Inglehart 1987).
This framework offers a neat conceptual means of locating and explaining 
phenom ena associated with green politics. Environm entalism , support 
for the w om en’s movem ent and the anti-nuclear movement are clearly
12 Of the approaches outlined in the following section, Milbrath is an obvious exception to 
the norm of value neutrality.
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identified by Inglehart as manifestations of postm aterialist values. Thus, 
green politics is a political expression of a w ider conflict between value 
orientations endem ic to industria lised  dem ocracies. According to 
Inglehart, green issues encapsulate the tension between the two types of 
values because they highlight 'questions of whether one gives top priority 
to economic growth or the individual's right to self-realization and the 
quality of life’ (Inglehart 1990: 332). His operationalisation of values in 
terms of materialism and postmaterialism has become a standard feature 
of m any value-based accounts of environm entalism  and green politics 
(Pierce et al. 1987; Rohrschneider 1988; W atts & W andesforde-Smith 
1981).13
The same structure, locating green politics as an expression of a newly 
emergent, coherent set of values counterposed against an established 
value system, is adopted by Lester Milbrath (1984) and Stephen Cotgrove 
(1982) in their models of dom inant and alternative paradigms. Milbrath 
adopts a framework of describing environmental politics that is similar to 
Inglehart's. He uses the labels 'New Environmental Paradigm ' and the 
'Dominant Social Paradigm ' to distinguish the opposing value systems 
(Milbrath 1984). M ilbrath posits three criteria to distinguish between 
adherents of the respective paradigms: how they perceive the condition of 
the environm ent; w hether they believe social im provem ents can be 
facilitated through either better technology or 'basic change' in the way 
society is organised; and whether or not they agree that there are limits to 
growth (1984: 43-45). This value typology is explicitly constructed around 
the claims of the environm ental movement, but is also intended to be 
read as covering far more political concerns than issues of pollution and 
environm ental degradation. M ilbrath's paradigm atic fram ework also 
covers issues such as democratic participation, economic organisation and 
lifestyle preferences (1984: 35-39).
A closely related, though more com prehensive theoretical attem pt to 
identify green politics on the basis of values is provided by Stephen
13 Although it has been subject to criticism from some others who regard values as 
significant (Cotgrove & Duff 1981; Goul Andersen, 1990b).
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Cotgrove in Catastrophe or Cornucopia. Cotgrove contends that the 
demands of the environmental movement m ust be regarded as part of a 
more fundam ental oppositional stance tow ards the ’values of the wider 
society' (Cotgrove 1982: 9). The conceptual device of the paradigm, adapted 
from Thomas Kuhn’s investigations into the developm ent of scientific 
knowledge, is used to frame the analysis of contrasting values. Cotgrove 
suggests that the notion of paradigm  is appropriate because, according to 
Kuhn, paradigm s determine what sort of phenom ena are recognised as 
facts, as rational, as problems and as valuable. Environm entalists, as 
subscribers to an alternative value paradigm, regard forests, species and 
ecosystems as intrinsically valuable and the construction of huge dams as 
irrational and norm atively unjustifiable. By contrast, developers and 
industrialists adopt the contrasting standards of the dom inant value 
paradigm  which lead them to argue that such developm ent is morally 
justified by the imperatives of wealth creation and stewardship of natural 
resources (Cotgrove 1982: 26-7). The conflict between environm entalists 
and industrialists is first and foremost a conflict between value systems 
rather than between sociologically defined groups.
These paradigm s are oppositional in that the core values of the two 
paradigm s are irreconcilable. In common w ith M ilbrath, Cotgrove 
contends that the scope of paradigm s is not lim ited to environm ental 
conflict, but comprehensively covers broader social, cultural, political and 
economic issues.
What is being argued then is that what differentiates 
environmentalists is a complex of beliefs about the nature of industrial 
society, about the effectiveness and desirability of many of its core 
institutions and values. Their world-view differs markedly from the 
dominant view. It constitutes an alternative paradigm, with different 
beliefs about nature and man's relations with his environment, about 
how the economy can best be organized, about politics and about the 
nature of society (Cotgrove & Duff 1980: 340).
12.1.2. Oppositional Cultural Identity
Cotgrove adopted the idea that green values are inextricably connected to a 
basic worldview from the political anthropology of Mary Douglas and 
Aaron Wildavsky. For Douglas and Wildavsky, this is an insight that not 
only applies to activists in the green m ovem ent, but is universally
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applicable to social actors. The basic tenets of cultural theory that have 
em erged out of D ouglas' w ork are that values have a sym biotic 
relationship with the structure of social and political authority, and that 
there is a finite number of viable societal forms. Therefore, there is a finite 
num ber of viable value systems that both support particular societal forms 
and reject the values associated with the alternatives that are not chosen 
(Douglas & Wildavsky 1982).14
One of this limited num ber of viable ways of life is defined variously as 
'sectarianism ' or 'egalitarianism ', and it is w ithin this category that 
cultural theory locates green politics. Egalitarianism, in this framework, 
denotes a cultural preference for strong commitments to the maintenance 
of community in conjunction with the absence of internal differentiation 
of role and status within the comm unity.15 Egalitarian culture is defined 
in contradistinction to individualist, hierarchical and fatalist cultural 
values. Cultural theory also stipulates that particular societies can be 
defined in terms of which culture (or cultures) are in the ascendancy, and 
which are marginal. According to Douglas and W ildavsky, egalitarian 
culture occupies a peripheral location in western industrial societies, such 
that egalitarians in these societies take a fundam entally oppositional 
stance tow ard the dom inant organisation of authority  and associated 
values of the centre. Egalitarians are opposed to the principles of 
organisation of the centre, namely hierarchy and individualism .16 Instead 
they value a radical egalitarian  partic ipation-based  on vo lun tary  
involvem ent.
14 This finite number has varied throughout the development of cultural theory. While 
originally limited to four categories constructed from two dichotomous dimensions (grid and 
group), a fifth category has been added more recently which is defined in terms of 
withdrawal from 'the coercive social involvement in which the other four social beings, in 
their different ways, are caught up' (Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990: 10).
15 In Douglas’ terms, they are high on the group dimension and low on the grid dimension.
16 The centre is defined according to a 'compromise' between the values of hierarchy, as 
evidenced by the ubiquity of bureaucratic structures, and individualism, as evidenced by 
the importance of the market.
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Thus, cultural theory's depiction of egalitarianism covers the same range 
of political orientations as new social movements and green politics. In a 
later article, W ildavsky argues that viewing environmentalists in this way 
helps us understand  the political alliances they form. In other words 
environm entalist sym pathy tow ards the gay com m unity is explained 
because the gay m ovem ent is 'an tiestab lishm ent and .... reduces 
differences am ong people' (W ildavsky 1987: 15). Thus, according to 
W ildavsky, political preferences can be deduced from an overall cultural 
fram ew ork defined in terms of support for or opposition to dom inant 
institutional arrangem ents.17
1.2.2. Transformational Approaches
In transform ational approaches, green politics is understood as a (or the) 
manifestation of progressive or emancipatory forces in industrial societies. 
The explicit norm ative identity that greens articulate is evidence of their 
alignm ent w ith these forces. Green activists are regarded as being 
com m itted to a particular type of norm ative rationality and it is this 
com m itm ent that p rim arily  d istinguishes them  as political actors. 
M ethodologically, the transform ational fram ew ork views greens as 
positive and progressive actors, and their opponents, where identified, as
17 This cultural theory approach has resonances in other depictions of green politics. 
According to Hans-Joachim Veen, 'the Green milieu', is markedly detached from the 
dominant societal structures, and is most readily identifiable as a 'community with a 
common way of thinking' (1989: 33). It is this common way of thinking, rather than any 
social structural characteristics that sets greens apart and serves to build and maintain a 
coherent identity. The notion of oppositional identity is also employed by Jan Pakulski 
(1991), who argues that social movements should be defined primarily in terms of the type 
of social and political organisational forms they oppose. For any movement, unity in the 
sphere of ideas is facilitated by 'shared opposition to, or even outright rejection of, 
institutions and practices perceived as distorted, corrupt, or neglectful of the affirmed 
central value-standards' (Pakulski 1991: 61). In his framework he identifies the eco-pax 
movements (i.e. environmental, peace and anti-nuclear movements) as anti-bureaucratic, on 
the basis of their resistance to centralisation and regulation. Pakulski, unlike Wildavsky 
and Veen, does not enter into speculation about the connections between these political 
orientations and a distinct cultural way of life. He emphasises that commonality of 
oppositional orientation does not in any way imply a shared positive and substantive 
political orientation. For this reason, many of the later comments about the value-identity 
thesis regarding value rationality and implementation do not apply to Pakulski.
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negative and resistant to change. Value neutral analysis, therefore, is 
rejected, but claims to objectivity are retained.
12.2.1. New Social Movements
New social movements are conceptualised as social forces that are moving 
in the direction of truer m anifestations of autonom y, participation and 
more undistorted forms of democratic deliberation, in opposition to the 
expansion of social forms and rationalities that give rise to practices of 
domination. A predom inant and som ewhat emblematic theme that has 
em erged has been the description of conflict articulated by social 
movements as one of civil society versus the technocratic or bureaucratic 
state (Cohen 1985; Touraine 1985). Alain Touraine was among the first to 
pursue this theme.
Today, social movements can have no other aim than the very existence 
of social life against the growing technocratization of society and 
against the system of rules, decisions, and information which leave no 
room for exchange, discussion and communication, because they permit 
the concentration of power within the apparatus (Touraine 1977: 41).
Touraine is concerned with identifying the transform ative potentials of 
social action in terms of the extent to which particular actors are in tune 
with the transition from industrial to post-industrial society. He sees such 
promise in the proliferation of ecological and anti-nuclear groups who 
have called into question the technocratic culture of expertise. In fact, the 
French anti-nuclear movement of the 1970s provides much of the basis 
for his interpretation of new social movement potential (Touraine 1981; 
Touraine 1983).
Cohen's characterisation of new social m ovem ents places greatest 
emphasis on the historical task of democratisation, and she clearly regards 
the eco-pax movements as at the forefront of contemporary efforts to open 
up more democratic spaces in both civil society and existing political 
institutions. Although she notes the existence of anti-modern elements in 
the peace and ecology movements, she is confident that by and large these 
m ovem ents are at the forefront of efforts to develop a more 
com m unicatively rational society. These m ovem ents are of interest 
because 'many features of the ecological problematic could be assessed in
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term s of a dem and for a com m unicatively re in terp re ted  ethic of 
responsibility regarding development and investm ent’ (Cohen 1983: 98). It 
is these features that define the sociological significance of these 
m ovem ents.
Habermasian critical theory is clearly a significant influence upon Cohen’s 
interpretation of green politics, even though Haberm as himself regards 
the green m ovem ent as predom inantly  a defensive reaction to the 
colonisation of the life-w orld (H aberm as 1981). Cohen, how ever, 
interprets the norm ative rationality of the new social m ovements as a 
more positive manifestation of the transform ative agenda of Habermas' 
project.
I would argue that the telos of movements is not simply the defense of 
strengthening of informal, familial or small-scale private networks of 
autonomous social relations. Rather, their most important democratic 
potential is the creation of new public spaces, of additional democratic 
forms, and the restructuring or revitalization of old ones (Cohen 1983:
111 ) .
Greens, therefore, are characteristically identified in term s of their 
adherence or commitment to the new normative rationality in these new 
social movement accounts..
I.2.2.2. Green Theory
Robyn Eckersley, one of the most significant contributors to the rapidly 
growing body of green political theory, once described green politics as 'a 
practice in search of a theory' (Eckersley 1987). Almost without exception, 
attem pts to articulate such a theory locates the essential ingredient of 
green politics in a distinct worldview that is defined in contrast to a 
dom inant worldview. There is now a wide range of theoretical writing 
about green politics, and I do not intend to discuss all significant 
contributions to this literature.18 For the purposes of this discussion, I will 
restrict the scope to four prom inent authors who between them cover a 
wide range of ecopolitical theory: Murray Bookchin, who was probably the
18 Notable contributions not covered include John Dryzek, Andre Görz, the ecofeminist 
strand of green theory and the 'deep ecology' of authors such as Devall and Sessions.
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first p roponent of a specifically ecological political analysis; Andrew 
Dobson, whose text Green Political Thought has been widely utilised; 
Robert Goodin, who has attempted to bring green politics into the ambit of 
conventional Anglo-American political philosophy; and Robyn Eckersley 
who has sought to locate green politics in relation to other forms of 
emancipatory political theory. Many of the details of these approaches are 
examined throughout the course of this thesis, and it is hardly necessary 
to provide comprehensive accounts at this point. For the moment, my 
intention is to dem onstrate the definition of green politics in terms of 
values and normative identity.
Andrew Dobson’s exposition of green political theory is organised around 
the contention that 'Green politics self-consciously confronts dom inant 
paradigm s', by which he m eans the 'political, social and scientific 
consensus that has dom inated the last two or three hundred years of 
public life' (Dobson 1990: 5). Such a project is an explicitly normative one, 
as not only does Dobson regard it as necessary for a green political 
perspective to describe the political world, it m ust also be capable of 
prescribing and motivating political action as a result of its diagnoses 
(1990: 12). According to Bookchin, the em ergent practice of ecological 
politics is identified as 'the consciousness and sensibility that will help us 
achieve ....eminently desirable goals' (Bookchin 1982: 19). This ecological 
sensibility is not only appropriate to evaluating the relationships between 
hum anity and nature, but is also a necessary standard  for evaluating 
relationships between humans. This sensibility encapsulates values such 
as wholeness, diversity, spontaneity and in terdependence which are 
systematically filtered from dom inant modes of thought. An ecological 
sensibility is counterposed against hierarchy, which Bookchin identifies as 
the root of contemporary ecological and social crises.
In seeking to articulate the theory that green political practice has been 
searching for, Robyn Eckersley (1992) has m arked out the basis of an 
ecocentric (ecology centred) perspective which stands in contradistinction 
to the anthropocentric (human centred) underpinnings of conventional 
political theory  and practice. An ecocentric w orldview  is w hat 
differentiates the more radical exponents of green politics from the rest of 
the political landscape, including the anthropocentric assum ptions of
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m oderate environm entalists. Finally, Robert Goodin describes green 
politics as a 'fundam ental challenge to the existing political order' (1992: 
13) informed by a 'single moral vision' which he terms a green theory of 
value (1992: 14). Both Eckersley and Goodin argue for the introduction of 
ecological criteria into political decision-making, and contend that such 
criteria should be based upon a fundam ental norm ative premise. In 
Eckersley's case, this premise is the moral consideration of non-hum an 
entities, while Goodin's green theory of value is founded upon the 
contention that 'naturalness' is intrinsically valuable.19
Each of these expositions of green theory, therefore, presents green politics 
as a way of perceiving the w orld that is qualitatively different from 
'mainstream' worldviews. There are im portant differences with respect to 
the way in which the normative kernel of green politics is characterised by 
green theorists. However, I am more concerned to draw  attention to the 
overall similarity in form of argum ent in which a new green normative 
o rien tation  is constructed  as a com prehensive alternative  which 
challenges established political modes of operation.
1.2.3. Value Identity and Rationality
The conventional wisdom can be summarised as the claim that greens are 
distinguishable as political actors by virtue of the values they hold or to 
which they are committed. To pu t it another way, values serve as an 
analytical tool that can be used to identify and distinguish green politics. 
Thus, postm aterialism  contrasts w ith m aterialism ; (Inglehart) the 
alternative environm ental paradigm  is the antithesis of the dom inant 
paradigm  (Cotgrove, Milbrath); the egalitarian culture is counterposed 
against the dominance of hierarchy and individualism  (Wildavsky); new 
social m ovem ents constitute one project of society against another 
(Touraine); green politics confronts dom inant paradigm s (Dobson). 
Perhaps the 'paradigm atic ' outline of opposing w orldview s is that 
provided by Cotgrove.
19 Eckersley regards Goodin's thesis as anthropocentric because it maintains a clear-cut 
distinction between humanity and nature.
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Table 1.1: Cotgrove's Counter-paradigms
D o m in a n t P a r a d ig m A l t e r n a t i v e  E n v ir o n m e n ta l  
P a ra d ig m
Core Values Material (economic growth) Non-material (self- 
actualisation)
Natural environment valued as a 
resource
Natural environment 
intrinsically valued
Domination over nature Harmony with nature
Economy Market forces Public interest
Risk and reward Safety
Rewards for achievement Incomes related to need
Individual self-help Collective/social provision
Polity Authoritative structures: (experts 
influential)
Participative structures: (citizen/ 
worker involvement)
Hierarchical Non-hierarchical
Law and order Liberation
Society Centralised Decentralised
Large-scale Small-scale
Associational Communal
Ordered Flexible
Nature Ample reserves Earth's resources limited
Nature hostile/neutral Nature benign
Environment controllable Nature delicately balanced
Knowledge Confidence in science and 
technology
Limits to science
Rationality of means Rationality of ends
Separation of fact/value, 
thought/feeling
Integration of fact/value, 
thought/feeling
Source: (Cotgrove 1982: 27)
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I wish to suggest that this use of values to distinguish green politics 
produces a characteristic form of political analysis that cuts across the 
theoretical and methodological boundaries that separate these various 
approaches. The most significant feature of this conventional wisdom is 
that green politics constitutes a form of norm ative or value rationality. 
O pposing value system s or paradigm s are regarded  as supporting  
divergent and incommensurate standards of rationality. W hat is rational 
to greens is patently  irrational to their opponents, and vice versa 
(Cotgrove 1982: 82; Thompson, Ellis & W ildavsky 1990: 22-3). The types of 
political action that greens engage in, and the range of concerns that 
constitute the green agenda are in te rp re ted  under value identity  
fram ew orks as being derived from core values. A dherence to these 
general values, therefore, implies adherence to the particular preferences 
associated with green politics.
This theme is pursued from a num ber of different angles. Value change 
researchers look for attitudinal consistency that reflects more general 
value orientations. C ultural theorists argue that specific political 
preferences are derived from normatively defined ways of life. Both new 
social movem ent and green theorists attem pt to define the overarching 
rationality  that b inds together the diverse concerns of the green 
m ovement. All agree that greens do w hat they do because they are 
committed to a distinctive value rationality.
1.2.4. Value Coherence, Choice and Change
From this baseline of value identity and rationality, a num ber of other 
analytical tendencies are comm only found across the spectrum  of 
attributional and transform ational approaches, including the contention 
that the green value package is internally coherent, that social actors make 
a choice to be (or not to be) green, and that social change can be monitored 
in terms of the extent to which social arrangem ents are reflections of 
green norm ative rationality. A typical form ulation of coherence is 
provided by Eckersley.
The special appeal of ecology is that it offers a means of tracing the 
interconnections between the multifaceted crises facing the world 
today, ranging from pollution, resource depletion and species extinction
43
to poverty, disease, social and economic injustice, alienation and 
political oppression. At the same time, it lends itself to a powerful 
critique of the status quo as well as a constructive vision of an 
alternative future (Eckersley 1987: 96-7).
Bookchin asserts that it is 'the unity of my views - their ecological holism, 
not merely their individual components - that give them a radical thrust’ 
(1982: 3). The assum ption that the green value paradigm  is internally 
coherent is not restricted to transform ational approaches, it is also an 
essential ingredient of attributional m ethods. W ildavsky, for example, 
offers a highly constrained picture of political coherence.
Preference formation is much more like ordering prix fixe from a number 
of set dinners or voting a party ticket. Only those combinations that are 
socially viable, that can cohere because people are able to give them 
their allegiance, to share their meanings, may be lived. Some things - 
accepting authority while rejecting it - just can't be done (Wildavsky 
1987: 4).
The conceptual device of opposing  parad igm s best exem plifies 
assum ptions of coherence. The elements of the respective paradigm s 
complement and reinforce each other, while scepticism about particular 
elements leads to a questioning of the whole paradigm. The survey-based 
analyses of Inglehart and Milbrath are also organised according to the 
assum ption of coherence. The only value packages treated as significant 
for analytical purposes are the poles of the value dimensions they identify. 
Though large proportions of respondents do not fit into the polar 
categories, they are treated as in-between, either as fence-sitters, or as en 
route from one pole to another, and are thus not recognised as analytically 
significant.20
Another characteristic assum ption of value identity approaches is that 
green political actors have made a conscious choice to adopt green values. 
Wildavsky contends that 'the major choice made by people (or, if they are 
subject to coercion, made for them) is the form of culture - shared values
20 At least 50% of respondents in any survey using the postmaterialist index cannot be 
categorised as either materialist or postmaterialist. In Milbrath's surveys, at least 60% of 
respondents characteristically do not fit into either the vanguard or rearguard categories. 
Inglehart suggests that his 'Mixed' category is subject to cross pressures from each side 
(1990: 76), while Milbrath refers to the 'undecided middle’ (1984: 57).
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legitimating social practices - they adopt' (Wildavsky 1987: 6). The same 
point is made polemically by Bookchin, who asserts that '(t)he social 
horizon presents the starkly conflicting prospects of a harm onized world 
with an ecological sensibility based on a rich commitment to community, 
m utual aid, and new technologies, on the one hand, and the terrifying 
prospect of some sort of therm onuclear disaster on the other' (Bookchin 
1982: 18). In this frame, as in cultural theory, there are no other choices 
available, 'neutrality' is not an option.
Part and parcel of the language of paradigm s to frame analyses of green 
politics is the Kuhnian notion of 'paradigm  shift' as an appropriate way of 
conceptualising social change. Due to the divergent implications and 
rationalities of antinomic paradigms, large scale change in the perceptions 
and norm ative orientations in industrial societies produces radically 
different consequences in the same way that scientific paradigm  shifts are 
though t to reorient the conceptual fram ew orks of particu lar sub­
disciplines. Thus, in Inglehart's discussion, broad shifts in the proportions 
of materialists and postmaterialists in any society will be associated with 
fundamental social changes (1990: 333). Political change is characterised by 
M ilb rath  as a m atter of chang ing  the balance betw een the 
environm entalist vanguard and the rearguard , anticipating that the 
former will grow and the latter will shrink (Milbrath 1984: 61). Using 
rather different language, but charting much the same direction, Touraine 
locates social movements as the protagonists of conflict 'whose stake is the 
social control of the main cultural patterns' (Touraine 1985: 754), and that 
these conflicts highlight the teleology of historical development.
Inglehart, Milbrath and Touraine, at the end of the day, regard such 
cultural change as unidirectional. H ow ever, in some of the other 
accounts, the model of change is more akin to the W eberian image of 
'struggle betw een the gods', the outcome of which is never settled 
(Brubaker 1984). Douglas and W ildavsky’s general fram ew ork for 
conceptualising political conflict and change holds that established social 
and political form ations are constantly subject to challenges from 
competing value systems. Social stability, they argue, is attributable to the 
fact that 'the upholders of the present constitution were able to win the
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debate thus far and to muster public agreement to the supporting beliefs 
and values' (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982: 89-90).
1.3. Questioning the Value Identity Thesis
The previous section presented an inventory of analytical tendencies that 
are typically associated with value identity approaches. Not all of these 
points necessarily apply to all authors I have discussed. For instance, 
Goodin does not make any claims for the necessity of value choice (except, 
perhaps, for a moral claim), and Cohen does not attem pt to portray 
political conflict in terms of competing value systems. It should be stressed 
that the nub of my critique is concerned with form of analysis which the 
value identity  thesis, considered as an 'ideal type', most commonly 
supports, rather than the content of particular examples. Reference to 
specific theorists are made in as much as they provide examples of the 
ideal type of value identity analysis. It is quite possible that other parts of 
the work of these writers do not fit so well with the ideal type, but it is not 
my intention to evaluate their work as a whole. The pervasiveness and 
substantial lack of reflection regarding value identity assumptions are the 
key points I wish to highlight.
The critique of value identity approaches presented in this thesis hinges 
on questioning a particular assum ption that is rarely, if ever, m ade 
explicit, but which is extremely significant. The identification of green 
politics in terms of values, and the associated conceptions of value 
rationality , rest on an assum ption that shared values entail shared 
interpretations of these implications. If any two actors are identified as 
sharing commitment to participatory values for instance, then they are 
treated as being committed to the same thing. This may seem to be a 
rather trivial point to make, but it goes to the heart of the value identity 
thesis. My contention is that this assum ption regarding the shared 
in terpretations of values is not w arranted  as it rests on a serious 
misconception about the role of values in politics. If this assum ption is 
not warranted, then the analytical use of values to make distinctions is 
underm ined. There are a num ber of points at which this assum ption 
looks somewhat frayed. These are instances where the implications and 
interpretations of green values are notably ambiguous.
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1.3.1. Content of the Green Paradigm
The different versions of the value identity thesis have much in common 
regarding the content of the green value paradigm. Elements that appear 
in almost every version outlined above include ecology, diversity, self- 
realisation, participatory democracy, com m unity, social justice, non­
violence and autonomy. However, different authors draw  the boundaries 
around green politics in different places. Goodin, for example, is at odds 
w ith  alm ost all of the o ther approaches over the inclusion of 
participatory-dem ocratic  values w ithin the core of green identity . 
Touraine and W ildavsky differ considerably with regard to the inclusion 
of alternative lifestyle perspectives. These academic differences reflect 
diversity among greens themselves over what is and what is not essential 
to green politics.
The accounts of the basic principles that unify the worldview of greens 
and contrast it to the dominant worldview, also vary considerably. Goodin 
regards the valuation of nature as the glue that holds the package together, 
while Inglehart describes the link in terms of individual self-actualisation. 
W ildavsky posits the levelling of differences as the core concept while 
Cohen emphasises the development of autonomy and democracy. At the 
very least, it is easy to identify significant grey areas where the different 
characterisations potentially  conflict. One thorny area concerns the 
autonom y of individuals. In Cotgrove's descriptions and in Wildavsky's 
models of political culture, individual freedom appears as an element of 
the dom inant paradigm  manifest by the emphasis placed upon economic 
self-interest. Yet we have seen how Inglehart and new social movement 
theorists em phasise the centrality of indiv idual self-realisation and 
autonomy to the green perspective. While the claim could be made that 
self-interest and self-realisation are conceptually distinct, it is a distinction 
which is highly prone to blurring. Where is the line to be drawn between 
legitim ate p u rsu it of ind iv idual autonom y and selfish pu rsu it of 
ind iv idual interest? In which paradigm , for instance, w ould the 
consumption of artistic and cultural services be located?
Ambiguities are also present within the suggested green value packages. 
Bookchin, Dobson and Eckersley all regard both diversity and holism as
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central to the green perspective. Individuals should be viewed in the 
context of the inter-relationship with each other and their relationship to 
the whole which they are part of. This image of interdependence is 
in tended to counter the atom ising perspective prom oted by liberal 
individualist patterns of thought. However, the compatibility between 
holism and diversity on this issue hardly lessens the possibility of 
contradiction in other contexts. How, for example, should greens regard 
dissent within their own ranks - as a legitimate expression of diversity, or 
as something that jeopardises unity of purpose?
The claim that green politics constitutes a coherent value paradigm  is also 
difficult to square with the observation that participants in the green 
m ovem ent are ideologically diverse. Com m entators on the German 
Greens such as H ülsberg (1988), Parkin (1989) and Scott (1990) have 
provided detailed accounts of the breadth of ideological diversity in the 
party. Ideological positions range from splinter groups of the German 
radical left to 'pu re ' greens who focus alm ost exclusively upon 
environm ental issues. The relationship betw een common values and 
ideological diversity is generally unexplored.21
1.3.2. A m biguous Im plications of Green V alues
If the value identity framework is to be useful, a good test would be to 
apply it to the accumulation of green political experience over the past 
twenty years. At first glance there are a number of contexts in which green 
experience can be framed in terms of incompatible values. Cotgrove's 
depiction of irreconcilable value frameworks appears to be appropriate for 
describing d isputes over environm entally  destructive developm ent 
proposals, pollution, nuclear power, the deployment of NATO weapons.
How ever, this is far too sim plistic a fram ew ork to cope w ith the 
developments that have occurred in green politics over the last decade. It 
is m uch rarer than was the case ten years ago, for instance, for
21 An alternative interpretation is that the construction of green identity in terms of values 
is an attempt to bypass some of the problems posed by this ideological diversity. This idea 
is pursued in Chapter 4 below.
48
developm ent interests to argue their case solely from economic and 
technically rational grounds while greens argue theirs solely from 
ecological criteria. Indeed, it is doubtful that this was ever really the case. 
Green debates have become far more complex and sophisticated as new 
forms of arguments and tactics have emerged over the course of time. The 
forestry industry attempts to portray itself as environmentally responsible. 
The emergence in Australia of 'ecologically sustainable development' as a 
politically contested term, for instance, challenges the value paradigm  
model (Papadakis 1993: 129). Even if one regards use of the term as a mere 
sm okescreen for business as usual on the part of governm ents and 
developers, why do they find it necessary to dress up their actions using 
ecological terminology? If Cotgrove's contention of divergent rationalities 
applied, there would be no need to do so.
Value identity models purport to offer criteria for judging whether or not 
certain political actors, actions, processes, structures and decisions are 
consistent with green value rationality. It is not hard to find ambiguous 
situations in which these frameworks are not very helpful. One obvious 
example is size of the welfare state. On the one hand, the welfare state in 
its bureaucratic guise is exactly the type of large scale centralised decision­
making structure which is recognised by Cohen, Bookchin and Wildavsky 
as a threat to autonomy and identity an d /o r social solidarity. On the other 
hand, cutbacks to welfare state spending are criticised because they are seen 
as having a detrimental effect on social equality. Both social equality and 
individual autonomy are elements of the same value system, but can be 
used to support conflicting evaluations.
In the A ustralian  context another good exam ple is the issue of 
immigration. Immigration may be regarded positively by greens in that it 
increases cultural diversity and may help to alleviate inequalities between 
Australia as a first world country, and the third world. Green values can 
also be seen as implying that Australia should reduce its population as a 
way of reducing environm ental damage. While it may be possible to 
logically separate overpopulation from im m igration by arguing that 
population may be reduced by means other than restricting immigration, 
such an argum ent is far rem oved from A ustralia's dem ographic and
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political circumstances in which it is clear that reducing immigration will 
have an imm ediate impact upon the rate of population growth. Value 
identity perspectives are of little use in navigating through this debate.
The evaluation of engagem ent in established political processes and 
institutions is another case in point. Greens are usually identified as being 
committed to participatory democratic values, but it is not clear whether 
involvem ent in election campaigns, form ation of political parties and 
negotiations with established political parties are consistent with such 
values or not. Some Australian activists have branded political parties 
and elections per se as contrary to green values (Martin 1989; Salleh 1987). 
Indeed, among green theorists there are significant differences over such 
issues. Dobson, for instance, expresses doubts about the green credentials 
of die Grünen (1990: 5), and questions w hether any engagem ent in 
institutional politics is consistent w ith green principles. On the other 
hand, Cohen wholeheartedly supports the participation of die Grünen in 
the parliam entary arena.
1.3.3. The Pervasiveness of Normative Conflict
Another cause for concern regarding the value identity thesis relates to 
the experiences of green organisations. If green values are regarded as 
having inherent political implications relevant to political organisation, 
then it is reasonable to suggest that this would be apparent in bodies 
greens themselves have initiated. At first glance, this may well seem to be 
the case. Certainly, green party structures are very different to those of 
other parties. However, there are continual questions raised within tnese 
parties regarding the degree to which such structures actually reflect green 
values.
The experience of European green parties, and the German Greens in 
particular, has been characterised by significant and often debilitating 
internal conflict. The high profile of this conflict, compared to internal 
conflict in other political organisations and parties is in part a consequence 
of the openness of green deliberations that is valued as part of the ideal 
political process (Frankland 1989).
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N evertheless, the degree of conflict has often been recognised by 
participants themselves as debilitating and energy-sapping. The internal 
dynamics of the German Greens have been the most widely documented 
to this point, w ith the most recent accounts being offered by Parkin, 
H ülsberg, Kitschelt, Poguntke and D oherty.22 Poguntke observes that 
'(t)he image of the German Green Party is marked by an almost masochist 
obsession with internal political conflict' (Poguntke 1990: 30), which has 
deflected attention and energy away from bread-and-butter environmental 
issues. Parkin (1989) devotes well over half her chapter on the German 
Greens to outlining internal cleavages, and the problems that stem from 
them. The view emerging from these studies is that internal conflict in 
die Grünen reached a point in the late 1980s in which the party 's 
performance was severely affected. Failure to overcome the 5% hurdle in 
West Germany in the 1990 elections has been interpreted as a reflection on 
the internal state of the party.23 Conflict has proven problematic for other 
green parties in Europe. The British Green Party w itnessed the 
culmination of internal struggles in 1992 when its most credible public 
figures were ousted (The Independent, 16 Septem ber 1992). Similarly, 
infighting in the French green electoral organisation, Les Verts, has been 
identified as an obstacle to effectiveness and as off-putting to potential 
sympathisers (Prendiville & Chafer 1990: 201).
From the literature available, it is possible to draw  together a num ber of 
common themes that have been recurrent in such internal conflict. One 
of the most significant recurring themes involves internal party structures 
and decision-making processes and attem pts to implement decentralised 
mechanisms of grassroots, participatory democracy. Such debates have 
been noted in the British Green Party (Byrne 1989), Ecolo in Belgium
22 Some of the seeds of later conflicts had been recognised much earlier by Papadakis 
(1984).
23 Indeed, Poguntke argues that internal division ensured that the Greens were unable to 
react to the issue of unification (1990: 31). Kitschelt argues that the response of the Greens 
during the election campaign was perceived as arrogant and insensitive to the aspirations 
of East Germans, and that significant portions of the green constituency rejected the 
parliamentary leaders' interpretation of unification as a return to chauvinistic nationalism 
(1991: 134-5).
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(Deschouwer 1989; Kitschelt 1989), Les Verts in France (Prendiville 1989) as 
well as in die Grünen. Efforts to create and im plem ent radically open 
democratic structures are also experienced as restricting the party's capacity 
for concerted action and are frequently resisted to some degree. The issue 
of centralisation of power within the party has proved problem atic in 
Britain. The debate over structure has also spilled over into conflict over 
the role of prom inent figures in the party which preoccupied the German 
Greens in the mid 1980s.
The m ost significant common denom inator underlying the conflicts in 
the various parties has been that between fundam entalism  and realism. 
As Brian Doherty demonstrates, this conflict is generalisable despite large 
differences in the ideological content of the actual debates (Doherty 1992: 
95-6). In Germany, for instance, the debate cross-cuts distinctions between 
ecosocialists and pure ecologists, with both groups displaying realist and 
fundam entalist tendencies. In Britain, w here there is no significant 
ecosocialist tendency within the green party, the debate has been just as 
heated in the early 1990s.24 Many of the disputes in French, Italian and 
Belgian parties have also taken this form. It is difficult to characterise 
fundi-realo conflict in non-normative terms, as purely a tactical split. At a 
fairly basic level, this cleavage involves disputes over the interpretation of 
green political values: fundam entalist positions are characteristically 
articulated as the refusal to compromise green principles.
Finally, we can note an interesting m anifestation of the difficulty of 
squaring a value-based green identity with the practical experience of 
green parties. Those who have stud ied  the operation  of green 
organisational structures are sceptical of claims of green value rationality. 
According to Kitschelt, the norm ative green political vision is not an 
appropriate basis for judging the development of green political parties, 
because 'the prom inence of perverse effects shows that the parties’
24 Until 1989, according to E. Gene Frankland (1990), factionalism did not threaten to 
splinter the party because of its extremely weak electoral position. The newly-acquired 
credibility that resulted from polling 15% in the European elections of 1989 may have 
worked against such marginality, but Rootes (1991) argues that the British Green Party’s 
marginality was still significant in the aftermath of these elections.
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political practice does not directly reflect their m ilitants' political 
discourse' (Kitschelt 1989: 74). Similarly, Doherty (1992: 95) contends that 
the radical participatory democratic ethos that supposedly binds greens 
together is the m ost significant source of internal tension between 
fundamentalist and realist approaches.
1.4. Conclusion
In the following chapters I wish to suggest value identity approaches have 
got it halfway right - values are crucial to any understanding of green 
politics, and interest-based analyses typically ignore or underestimate the 
significance of values. What I wish to take issue with is the way the value 
identity approaches have misconstrued the role of values in politics. I will 
argue that it is the assum ption that values are tools for m aking 
distinctions that is at the heart of the problem of the mismatch between 
theories of green value identity and political experience. Now, it is hardly 
the case that these areas of value ambiguity outlined above have been 
peripheral issues in the growth and development of green parties over the 
past decade. These examples, I contend, highlight the most problematic 
features of the value identity thesis. My critique of the value identity 
thesis is based upon the contention that values are necessarily ambiguous, 
and that attempts to define any political phenomena on the basis of values 
are seriously misguided.
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Chapter 2: Value Distinction and Ambiguity
The problems raised in Chapter 1 are part of a more general set of issues 
that arise from the practice of using values as analytical tools to make 
distinctions between social and political entities. The language of value 
rationality, consistency, choice and conflict is well entrenched in many 
areas of social and political theory. In this chapter, I deal in turn with 
attributional and transformational approaches, exploring the background 
to their respective epistem ologies of values and value rationality. 
Particular attention is paid to the ways in which these approaches 
'diagnose' the norm ative character of actors, structures and processes. 
Having done this, the chapter then explores the ways in which these 
m ethodological approaches deal w ith the 'em pirical noise' that is 
produced as a consequence of value diagnostic techniques. Researchers 
encounter noise in expressions of values which do not fit their conceptual 
schemes. The cost of employing these techniques of value distinction is 
the inability to acknowledge the am biguity and contestation of value 
usage. I conclude this chapter by suggesting a num ber of reasons why this 
value ambiguity should be taken more seriously.
2.1. Attributional Approaches
In social scientific literature, values have been commonly conceptualised 
as objectively identifiable attributes of individuals, groups, societies, 
nation states and institutions. Attributional approaches are based on a 
num ber of assumptions most commonly associated with the work of Max 
Weber, even though this attention to Weber is notably selective. The 
work of Parsons and other functionalists also represents most clearly a 
particular style of distinctive value analysis (and interpretation of Weber) 
which has rem ained influential. Often, these ways of thinking about 
values have been combined with a third element. The conception of 
values as predictive variables reinforces the notion that political 
phenomena can be identified in terms of values. It also means that values 
can be thought of as personal attributes in the same way as ethnicity, class
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or gender. This section also considers the more general question of how 
values are used as means of identification in social sciences, and explores 
how  prob lem s genera ted  by value c lassifica to ry  schem es are 
characteristically dealt with.
2.1.1. The Weberian and Functionalist Background
W hen considering the use of values as analytic m eans of m aking 
distinctions, any discussion of this sort m ust take into account the 
influence of Max Weber's writings. Weber did not provide a theoretically 
neat conceptualisation of values and their role in social processes. Indeed, 
as commentators have pointed out, his writings about values are notably 
unsystem atic (Brubaker 1984; Turner & Factor 1984). Rather, the reason 
W eber serves as an im portant reference point is that m any of the 
conceptions about the nature of values that pervade sociological and 
political science literature can be found in, and sometimes directly traced 
to, his work. This applies particularly to the notions of irreconcilable 
values, value rationality and the 'necessity' of value choice.
Weber regarded value conflict as extremely significant. Value conflict is 
no trivial m atter because, as Brubaker notes, it involves 'conflict over 
fundam ental, all-embracing conceptions of the nature and meaning of 
life' (1984: 68). In speaking of an 'irreconcilable death-struggle' between 
values, Weber was acutely aware of the history and legacy of religious- 
political conflict in Germ any, regarding them  as conflicts between 
u ltim ate  'Weltanschauungen ' . He was em phatic that there is no 
overarching rationality , scientific or otherw ise, according to which 
conflicting Weltanschauungen can be reconciled.
Weber regards value orientations as internal dispositions, such that the 
figure of the consciously acting subject is pivotal. Indeed, Weber considers 
the conscious adoption of value orientations from a store of available but 
irreconcilable alternatives as a positive indication of moral character.
The shallowness of our routinized daily existence in the most 
significant sense of the word consists indeed in the fact that the persons 
who are caught up in it do not become aware, and above all do not wish 
to become aware, of this motley of irreconcilably antagonistic values.
They avoid the choice between "God" and the "Devil" and their own
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ultimate decision as to which of the conflicting values will be 
dominated by the one, and which by the other (Weber 1949: 18).
If and when such a value choice has been made, actions can be interpreted 
in term s of value rationality. Value rationality, defined in relation to 
'ethics of u ltim ate ends', comes in as m any varieties as there are 
normative worldviews. Different value worldviews are likened by Weber 
to railway switchmen that 'determined the tracks along which action has 
been pushed by the dynamic of interest' (Weber 1958b: 280). In other 
words, values have a significant influence on the definition of interests.
It is not hard to see how such a conceptualisation of values could be 
translated into the technology of value distinction that characterises 
attributional approaches, particularly  when run in tandem  with the 
Weberian methodological ethic of value neutral social scientific analysis. 
Nevertheless, W eber's w ritings on values w ould not appear to fit so 
comfortably with contemporary techniques of value distinction without a 
good deal of selective interpretation. A num ber of common features of 
value research are incompatible with Weber's Verstehen m ethodology.
In the first place, Weber did not suggest that value conflict could defined 
in terms of dimensionally opposing worldviews. Any pair of normative 
worldviews may be considered as incommensurate, but Weber does not, 
for the most part, formulate typologies of logical opposites in order to get a 
handle on value conflict. Rather, according to Brubaker, the propensity for 
and intensity of value conflict is exacerbated by the perpetual generation of 
new norm ative w orldview s. The capacity to 'create' novel value- 
orientations increases with the loosening hold of traditional religious 
orientations (Brubaker 1984: 69). In essence, it is the crowding of the space 
of value judgem ents, rather than a tendency tow ards polarisation, that 
Weber regards as problematic. The conditions for value conflict, therefore, 
are historically contingent, as the various competing value orientations 
are products of specific historical circumstances.
An even more significant point to keep in mind is that when Weber talks 
about value rationality, he is making reference to rationality from the 
social actor's point of view. For instance, if a person undertakes fasting in 
order to achieve enlightenment, Weber is claiming that such an action is
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rational only in as much as that person believes that enlightenm ent can 
be achieved through fasting. Weber is not m aking any claim, however, 
about whether fasting is really the best method to adopt given that ones' 
ultimate end is enlightenment. The rationality of the action is not in any 
sense an objective rationality, because the ultimate ends are not amenable 
to rational calculation. Indeed, Calvinists and Catholics engage in quite 
different m eans to achieve salvation, both of which W eber w ould 
consider as norm atively rational, but Calvinist strategies are patently 
irrational to Catholics, and vice versa. Weber's stance is best highlighted 
when we consider the strong theme of unintended consequences that 
runs through his writings on rationality. Unintended consequences arise 
through the pursuit of rational means in order to achieve ultimate ends 
such as salvation, or a more just redistribution of wealth. In 'Politics as a 
Vocation’, Weber stresses that some means adopted out of norm ative 
rationality, produce consequences that are not helpful to the cause.
You may demonstrate to a convinced syndicalist, believing in an ethic of 
ultimate ends, that his action will result in increasing the opportunities 
of reaction, in increasing the oppression of his class, and obstructing its 
assent - and you will not make the slightest impression upon him. If an 
action of good intent leads to bad results, then, in the actor’s eyes, not he 
but the world, or the stupidity of other men, or God's will who made 
them thus, is responsible for evil (Weber 1958a: 120-1).
This 'ironic' treatm ent of the role of values was lost in the translation to 
postwar functionalist sociology and anthropology. In contrast to Weber's 
own treatment, notions of value choice, conflict and rationality adopted by 
functionalists became abstracted and universalised .1 In this respect it is 
worthwhile to briefly visit the work of Talcott Parsons for two reasons. 
Firstly, because he played a central role in the introduction of Weberian 
concepts into American social theory, and secondly because, more than 
perhaps any other theorist of that time, he endeavoured to systematise the 
concepts of value choice, conflict and rationality. The work of Mary
1 Clyde Kluckhohn (1951: 417) suggested in his influential article that some values should 
be considered as universal, in the sense that they transcend cultural differences.
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Douglas provides another example of such systematisation, and we shall 
return to the legacy of her efforts later in this section .2
In contrast to Weber, Parsons was less inclined to view value conflict in 
term s of historical contingencies, and more inclined to locate such 
contingencies in terms of abstract frameworks. His analytical categories 
were developed with the expressed intention of m apping the moral 
universe, such that any instance of value conflict could be located .3 
Parsons representation of the moral universe in terms of dimensional 
space is by far the most ambitious of such schemes in that it attempts to 
categorise the com ponents of social action in term s of fundam ental 
'com pass po in ts '. Actors m ake value choices betw een antinom ic 
alternatives. One cannot sim ultaneously  pu rsue  instrum ental and 
consum m atory ends in the same sense that one cannot travel east and 
west at the same time. In this way, the interpretations of value conflict 
and choice are even more fundam ental than those found in Weber's 
work.
In functionalist schemes, the implications of values in any specific context 
are, in principle, deducible. Parsonsian analysis of value rationality, 
therefore, is notably less ironic than W eber's, in that the notion of 
un in tended  consequences does not fit too com fortably w ith this 
assumption of deducibility. That is not to say that Parsons is oblivious to 
the possibility that there may be clashes between applications of particular 
values. However, when such clashes are apparent, he argues, they are 
a ttribu tab le  to the effects of extensive structu ra l d ifferen tia tion .4
2 Interestingly, cultural theorists claim that ’the spirit of (Weber's) work is highly 
consonant with ours', but that his work is deficient in that in his efforts to classify "styles 
of life" he 'ends up with as many ways of life as there are groups in society' (Thompson, 
Ellis & Wildavsky 1990: 171), i.c. he was too attached to socio-historical contingencies and 
therefore neglectful of the opportunity to organise his observations into universal 
typologies.
3 In doing so, Parsons came up with a very idiosyncratic scheme of values, in that his 
conception of values is somewhat different and more abstract than those of other 
functionalists. In this context, I am not so much concerned with the content of Parsonsian 
values as much as I am with the analytic strategies facilitated by his framework.
4 Parsons argues that there is a certain degree of flexibility, or 'degrees of freedom' 
inherent in the application of values because they are often applicable in a wide variety of
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U ltim ate ly , P arsons w orks from  a conception  of theore tically  
unambiguous relations between values and action, and in so doing, offers 
a particularly strong reading of the concept of value rationality.
Values, (or value com m itm ents in Parsonsian term s), are not only 
attributes of individuals, but of functionally differentiated elements of 
social systems. Maps of the value universe are as applicable to analysis of 
whole cultural systems as they are to the analysis of interactions within 
families. Value conflict takes place between elements that occupy different 
locations in the dimensional space of social systems. There is tension and 
conflict, for example, between economic agents acting in accordance with 
universalistic and perform ance values, and agents concerned with 
articulating the particularistic and qualitative values of the societal 
community. At the most general level, Parsons also regarded it as feasible 
to diagnose the value character of whole societies, in particular, that of 
American society (Parsons 1991). This theme was not as prom inent as 
other aspects of his work on values.5 N onetheless, the idea of 
differentiating countries and societies on the basis of value orientations 
was one which was enthusiastically taken up by comparative political 
scientists of the time.
A particularly influential social scientific project of the 1960s involved 
linking the normative orientations of citizens with institutional political 
arrangem ents. Researchers such as Lipset and Alm ond and Verba, 
contended that widespread adherence to certain political values, as distinct 
from their opposites, would be reflected in citizens' preparedness to
contexts, due to processes of differentiation. For example, the implementation of Christian 
value commitments has produced a range of applications which could be considered in 
certain contexts as incommensurate with each other. Parsons regards Christian 
fundamentalism as a reaction to this process of differentiation, in that fundamentalists 
seek a return to a dedifferentiated sphere in which such degrees of freedom are reduced or 
eliminated. However, for Parsons, modern social systems are capable of operating 
successfully with higher levels of flexibility due to the compartmentalisation brought 
about by differentiation, and fundamentalism represents abnormal reactions arising from 
greater levels of social stress (Parsons 1968: 153-157).
5 Indeed, his ’Tentative Outline of American Values' (1991) was only published 
posthumously.
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support corresponding political arrangem ents. Thus, individual value 
orientations and political structures were symbiotically related. Changes in 
either elem ent induced corresponding changes in the other. Such a 
fram ework underpins Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture in which 
the viability of national dem ocratic institutions is dependent on the 
degree to which citizens are prepared to participate in these institutions. 
As they pu t it, 'each kind of polity - traditional, authoritarian  and 
democratic - has one form of culture that is congruent w ith its own 
structure' (Almond & Verba 1963: 34). In identifying the 'civic culture' as 
consistent with stable democratic institutions, they can also claim that 
deviations from the civic culture create political cultures 'incongruent 
with an effective and stable democratic political system' (Almond & Verba 
1963: 496).
These features of the broadly Parsonsian treatm ent of value choice, 
conflict, rationality  and functional symbiosis are also evident in the 
cultural theory framework, although W ildavsky and his colleagues wish 
to distance themselves from the specifics of Parsons' conceptual armory 
(Thompson, Ellis and W ildavsky 1990: 183-188). As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, cultural theorists argue that there is a limited number of 
'viable' ways of life. Each of these ways of life have a normative core - a 
preference for certain social arrangem ents over others - each, therefore, 
has its own norm ative rationality. Egalitarians are logically obliged to 
adopt certain cultural practices, regardless of whether or not they think it 
is rational (recalling W ildavsky's dictum that 'some things - accepting 
authority while rejecting it - just can’t be done'). Accordingly, standards of 
rationality are determined by the functional requirements of a way of life. 
As w ith Parsons, there is no room for the irony of un in tended  
consequences. Either one affirms one's way of life by acting in accordance 
w ith its norm ative rationality, or one jeopardises it by w eakening 
commitment to its values.
2.1.2. Values as Variables
The final im portant element of attributional approaches, absent in both 
Weber and functionalist theorists, is the treatm ent of values as causal
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variables in m odels of social explanation.6 Techniques based on this 
assum ption have been most extensively deployed in the field of social 
psychology. The attributional character of values is most clearly apparent 
in these frameworks. Individuals can be categorised according to value 
dispositions in the same way that they can be categorised in terms of sex, 
age, ethnicity, occupation or religious affiliation. Values are regarded as 
causal influences, and as such are treated in the same way as occupational 
status, ethnicity and level of education in these psychological models. A 
clear articulation of the reasons for conceptualising values as independent 
variables is provided by Milton Rokeach as part of his attem pt to 
systematise the subject m atter in The Nature of Human Values.
Values are determinants of virtually all kinds of behavior that could 
be called social behavior - of social action, attitudes and ideology, 
comparisons of self with others, presentations of self to others, and 
attempts to influence others. Boiling all these down to a more succinct 
theoretical statement, it can perhaps be stated that values are guides 
and determinants of social attitudes and ideologies on the one hand and 
of social behavior on the other (Rokeach 1973: 24).
In order to demonstrate the explanatory power of values, Robin Williams 
cites a num ber of psychological studies of the postw ar era which have 
show n that differences of values betw een ind iv idua ls influence 
behaviour such as cheating on examinations, occupational career choices, 
juvenile delinquency and choice of friends (Williams 1979: 23). In political 
science research, values have long been m arshalled as relevant causal 
variables in the prediction of voting and political attitudes and behaviour.
Values as variables are generally measured through the technology of the 
social survey. Social surveys constructed from attitudinal items have 
value choice, conflict and rationality built into the survey instrument. 
Respondents choose between alternatives that are indicators of values. 
Different value orientations are usually defined by the survey design as 
incom m ensurate or antinomic. Particular survey items are attem pts to 
specify the implications of general values with regard to particular issues.
6 Parsons in particular cannot be regarded as being sympathetic to the conceptualisation of 
values as variables and as personal attributes (Parsons 1960: 469).
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If, for example, an individual has a general value orientation of tolerance, 
we would expect him or her to exhibit favourable attitudes towards a 
particular cultural minority.
In the field of value research, there has been a considerable range of 
interest stretching from sociological interest in cultural and social systems 
to psychological research into individual values and value systems. 
Nevertheless, there has been a high degree of conceptual cross-fertilisation 
between the two streams. Williams (1979) certainly regards it as feasible to 
integrate the insights of Rokeachian social psychology with functionalist 
sociology. Much earlier, Almond and Verba used attitudinal survey data 
in an attem pt to m easure participatory  values, having argued that 
concepts of political culture provided a way of linking micro level of 
individual attitudes to the macro level of national political systems 
(Almond & Verba 1963: 32-4).
The same combination of Weberian, functionalist and social psychological 
elem ents can be found in the attributional fram eworks of Inglehart, 
Cotgrove and Milbrath. Milbrath's conception of values comfortably takes 
on board all the above elements, and he apparently  sees no need to 
articulate and justify this conception of values, as it seems to be the taken 
for granted m ethod one uses for investigating value conflict and change. 
Inglehart draws more explicitly on The Civic Culture in Culture Shift, and 
the latter work can be read as an attempt to resurrect many of the concepts 
and m ethods used by Almond and Verba.7 Cotgrove combines cultural 
theory's interpretation of value rationality with a survey methodology 
concerned w ith  locating env ironm enta lists and industria lis ts  on 
norm ative dimensions.
7 In particular, the final chapter can be read as ’an update on Almond and Verba, 30 years 
on’. The statement that ’the available evidence indicates that the values and cultural 
norms held by given peoples are a major influence on whether or not democratic institutions 
are viable’ (1990: 432) is a reprise of classical political culture themes.
62
2.1.3. Techniques of Value Distinction
At this point it is w orth re-em phasising the im portance of making 
distinctions in terms of values to a ttribu tional analysis. To identify  
contem porary American society in term s of com m itm ent to values of 
democracy and freedom, is to contrast it to other societies (e.g. the Soviet 
Union, Mexico, pre-revolutionary America) which are not characterised 
by these values. The point in claiming that security is a central value for 
m aterialists, is that it is not for postm aterialists. If one asserts that the 
environm entalist vanguard are concerned about the welfare of future 
generations, one is also claiming that the anti-environmentalist rearguard 
are not. Such claims cannot be m ade w ithout calling into being these 
corresponding judgements, and these demarcations are necessary if value 
distinctive analysis is to have any purchase. How, then, do attributional 
analysts go about diagnosing which values are held by particular actors?
W illiams suggests that '(p)relim inary clues m ay be obtained from 
testimony: individuals are able, to some extent, to tell w hat values they 
hold' (1968: 285). Evidence for discerning the value orientations held by 
individuals, groups or institutions can be gleaned from the articulation of 
preferences, from people saying what they prefer and why they prefer it. 
Most attributional approaches assume some capacity on the part of social 
actors to articulate their value orientations.
This, at first glance, appears to be a plausible way of proceeding. Robert 
Bellah et al's (1985) investigation into cultural orientations of middle class 
America contains a wealth of testim onial m aterial about values. The 
authors presented a series of individual portraits based on in-depth 
interviews in which the interviewees were draw n to articulate and reflect 
on their lives in terms of the values they lived by (Bellah et al. 1985).8 
Although all interviewees were draw n from m iddle class locations, the 
study highlighted considerable variety in preferences, lifestyles and social 
circumstances. In Bellah et al's first chapter, four portraits were selected in 
order to provide an indication of this variety. Brian, a successful business
8 The limitation to the middle class is significant. It is doubtful that the assumption that 
respondents could articulate their own values could be made beyond this category.
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manager, told of his career-oriented lifestyle in the corporate big league 
and his newfound commitment and priority given to his family. Joe, a 
civic leader and self-described American patrio t, spoke of his deep 
commitment to the civic life of the small city in which he has lived all his 
life. Margaret, a psychologist and therapist, portrayed herself as someone 
who encourages her clients and those around her to reach new levels of 
self-understanding in order to make freer choices in life. W ayne, a 
professional political activist, defined his activity in terms of the struggle 
for em pow erm ent of the powerless, which was expressed through his 
heavy involvement in tenant organisations.
These portraits provide the opportunity to make the sorts of distinctions 
characteristic of attributional value analyses. The frameworks of cultural 
theory and the culture shift typology of Inglehart could be easily applied to 
these examples. Both of these theoretical frameworks appear to capture 
significant features of these variations in terms of their value dimensions. 
If we take Inglehart's typology, for instance, Margaret the therapist would 
be emblematic of the postmaterialist category, as she clearly articulates the 
themes of self-actualisation and fulfilment of non-physiological needs. 
W ayne the activist, we w ould im agine, also com fortably fits the 
postm ateria list profile as indicated by his involvem ent in social 
movements. On the other hand, Joe, for whom the terms God, country 
and community have particular valence could be considered as a typical 
m aterialist. He is a long way rem oved from Inglehart's depiction of 
postm aterialism  and is outw ardly  critical of m any of the priorities 
espoused by people such as Margaret. Only Brian would seem difficult to 
place in either major category, given his apparent em phasis on self- 
fulfilment combined with his lifelong pursuit of material well-being.
W ildavsky and his collaborators m ight be tem pted to claim an even 
clearer categorisation. In the cultural theory scheme, Brian would appear 
as an individualist par excellence. Joe, given his attachm ent to the 
trad itions of Church, town and corporation seem s unam biguously 
committed to a hierarchical way of life. Wayne, on the other hand, offers a 
model of the egalitarian culture, symbolised by his involvement in tenant 
unions and the Campaign for Economic Democracy. Only Margaret would
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be difficult to categorise, as cases could be m ade for her adherence to 
individualist or egalitarian culture.
However, the material collected by Bellah and his colleagues also raises 
questions about such neat categorisations. The individualist is one of 
cultural theory's basic categories, while the egalitarian culture is presented 
as a stark contrast to the themes of self-help and autonomy espoused by 
individualists. Yet according to the authors, W ayne 'waxes passionate 
about how the freedom of individuals is limited by current economic and 
political arrangements' (Bellah et al. 1985: 25). Nor can Joe be regarded as 
unsym pathetic to ideals of personal freedom and autonomy, although he 
offers a rather different interpretation of these terms to those found in 
both the cultural theory and culture shift frameworks. For Joe, according 
to Bellah et al, indiv idual freedom  is p redicated  upon com m unity 
involvem ent (Bellah et al. 1985: 170-1). His civic participation, and his 
stress upon the benefits of political participation also appear to fit the 
image of politics captured by Inglehart’s concept of postmaterialism.
Inglehart and W ildavsky, of course, could easily claim that Joe's notions 
of civic v irtue are quite different to the em phases upon political 
participation typical of new social movements, and that Wayne is clearly 
not supporting m aterialist or hierarchical worldviews. However, in both 
cases, the question rem ains as to why Joe and W ayne use language 
normally associated with the adherents of opposing values and ways of 
life. As we shall see below, both theorists have recourse to techniques of 
value distinction that rely upon non-testim onial sources of evidence, 
such that these questions do not m atter greatly. For the moment, 
however, I will continue to explore some of the fuzzier features of value 
testimony.
Consider an example highly relevant to Inglehart's distinction between 
m aterialism  and postm aterialism . It is clear that Inglehart regards 
participants in the eco-pax movements as postm aterialists. One of the 
central planks of the campaigns of peace and anti-nuclear movements was 
that the build-up of nuclear arsenals constituted a serious threat to 
security (Rochon 1988). Such a claim, however, is clearly anomalous in 
Inglehart's typology based as it is on the assumption that postmaterialist
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needs for security have been met, and that it is materialists who are most 
concerned about the achievement and protection of security. This results 
in a rather bizarre interpretation of opposition to nuclear weapons, in 
which the anti-nuclear activists' recourse to the value of security must be 
interpreted as a 'cover' for other more im portant motivations such as self- 
expression.
Now we could interpret the anti-nuclear example as a problem specific to 
Inglehart's typology. However, it is also possible to identify seemingly 
anom alous claims according to any fram ew ork of value distinction. 
Michael Billig (1991) provides an example from his studies of British 
National Front literature. As evidenced by its hostility to the presence of 
people of non-white ethnicity in Britain, the National Front are generally 
regarded in public discourse as purveyors of intolerant and prejudiced 
values. Such a diagnosis could be draw n from both postw ar social 
research, typified  by figures such as A llport and A dorno, and 
contem porary lay understandings (Billig 1991: 133-4).9 Yet, once again 
there is evidence of values being deployed in direct contradiction to these 
conventional interpretations. Billig cites an article from the organisation's 
national newsletter that sets out to argue, not only that the NF is not 
prejudiced, but that the 'multiracialist' critics of the Front are the ones 
who are 'really' prejudiced because they have not considered the relevant 
'facts' about non-white im m igration outlined elsewhere in the article 
(Billig 1991: 122-3). It is highly unlikely that this interpretation would be 
supported by any academic value typology.
Of course, such anomalies need not particularly concern Inglehart, because 
he does not ultim ately rely upon direct value testim ony in order to 
discern basic value dispositions. Similarly, W ildavsky and his colleagues 
are not prepared to give a free rein to testimonial evidence, for they are 
well aware that there are some who will claim a particular norm ative 
orientation who clearly cannot be adm itted as such in the terms of 
cultural theory frameworks. In any case, there are other reasons for not
9 Some more recent examples include (Sullivan et al. 1981; Flanagan 1987).
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attaching too much weight to testimonial evidence. Many attributional 
approaches claim that social actors hold values regardless of whether they 
are actually expressed. Indeed, one of the lim itations of testimony that 
Williams identifies is that individuals may not necessarily be aware of, or 
capable of articulating their value orientations (Williams 1968: 285). 
According to Milbrath, ’people in the rearguard and the vanguard may 
not perceive themselves as such; that is beside the point' (Milbrath 1984: 
23). Thompson, Ellis and W ildavsky assert that '(t)he extent to which 
individuals are aware of providing support to their way of life depends on 
their level of cultural consciousness' (1990: 2-3). If values are regarded as 
cultural universals, then the language used to depict these values would 
be secondary to the alleged m eanings. O ther form s of diagnostic 
technology are therefore required in order to reveal the character of 
hidden value orientations. Williams offers a list of suggestions regarding 
the supplem entation of testimonial evidence.
Further evidence may come from systematic study of choices of objects 
and actions, either in "natural" behavior or in various kinds of tests, 
interviews, and experiments. Research may chart indications of 
directions of interest as shown by cultural products as well as by 
behavior directly observed. Content analysis of verbal materials is 
often a suitable technique in this connection: identification of implicit 
assumptions in social discourse often reveals values not otherwise 
readily discovered (Williams 1968: 285).
As we have already seen, the technology of the survey has been a widely 
utilised method for diagnosing values. One of its attractions is that it does 
not altogether elim inate testim onial evidence, but rather shapes and 
constructs it to fit predefined analytic grids. The key element of all such 
surveys is that choices of some sort are forced. Respondents choose 
between a set of alternatives, but it is the researcher who ultimately must 
set the param eters of such choice.10 Survey items are constructed to 
represent particular instances of more fundam ental value conflict. In 
Inglehart's surveys, respondents are presented with a finite list of possible 
value orientations and asked to choose between them. In this way, the
10 This is true regardless of whether the dimensions are defined a priori (e.g. Inglehart, 
Milbrath), or using techniques such as factor analysis after the data has been collected 
(Cotgrove).
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impossibilities, irrationalities and inconsistencies of value dispositions are 
created by the survey instrum ent a n d /o r  the interpretation of the data 
collected. Respondents cannot be both m aterialist and postm aterialist, 
vanguard and rearguard, catastrophists and cornucopians.
The same point is reached in the non-survey techniques of value 
distinction. The investigation of behaviour or textual analysis in order to 
d iscern  u n a rticu la ted , h idden  value p rio ritie s  relies upon  the 
identification of situations in which the actor is forced to choose, or is 
regarded as having chosen between two courses of action that represent 
incom patible value dispositions. One such test case, according to 
Wildavsky, is AIDS related attitudes and behaviour.
The more hierarchical the group, I hypothesize, following cultural 
theory, the more it minimizes technological danger as the price of 
progress while maximizing fear of casual contact with people who 
have AIDS.... Conversely, egalitarians tend to grossly overestimate 
the dangers from technology.... while minimizing the dangers from 
casual contact with carriers of AIDS (Wildavsky 1987: 15).
AIDS, therefore, provides a litmus test for the choices people have made 
between egalitarianism and hierarchy. Wildavsky is claiming further that 
having both an attitude of faith in technology and a positive attitude to 
AIDS sufferers constitutes a problematic mixture of ways of life. Such an 
unviable mix between distinct value categories is an example of 'empirical 
no ise’.
2.1.4. Accounting for Empirical Noise
The unreliability of testimonial evidence stems from the fact that it often 
does not neatly mesh with the imperatives of value distinction. Social 
actors make seemingly inconsistent or contradictory claims. From the 
perspective of those who are engaged in the project of making value-based 
distinctions, this ambiguity need not matter. It may be, to some degree, 
irritating to the researcher who has to cope with data which can make 
categorisation a m ore onerous task. However, W ayne's espousal of 
individual freedom or Joe's articulation of the importance of democratic 
participation can still be regarded as the sort of empirical noise that is part 
and parcel of the social researcher's lot. Inglehart's survey instrum ent
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would not pick up the testimonial type of noise, such as Joe's espousal of 
participatory politics, or the anti-nuclear activist's concerns about security. 
When presented with this battery that forces a choice, it becomes clear 
where individuals such as Joe and the anti-nuclear activist would stand, 
as they would have to weigh the values of democratic participation and 
freedom  of speech against those of physical and economic security. 
H ow ever, value surveys often produce a different form of noise. 
Researchers concerned to demonstrate the robustness of their analysis are 
not usually content to place to much weight on any particular simulated 
choice. More often than not they prefer to spread the weight over a series 
of decisions. Consequently, the more items that are designed to tap a 
particular choice of values, the more it is likely that respondents will 
make more inconsistent and noisy choices.
There are a num ber of well known studies in which researchers interpret 
the noise as sufficient evidence that large proportions of respondents do 
not operate according to coherent packages of values.11 However, in other 
contexts, empirical noise may not matter terribly much to those doing the 
research. Cultural theorists methodologically ensure that they avoid noise 
as much as possible by limiting their discussion of empirical examples to 
those they regard as fitting neatly into one of their categories.12 Among 
those who deploy survey techniques, Inglehart and Milbrath both have a 
high level of tolerance for noisy data, as their analyses proceed despite the 
fact that over half of their respondents do not fit their respective schema. 
In their view, their categories are good enough to chart large-scale shifts in 
value systems at the national level.
Nevertheless, there are a num ber of occasions where noisy data are 
recognised as requiring some sort of attention, and perhaps even some
11 Research undertaken by Converse (1964) into the coherence of belief systems is an 
example. This interpretation does not apply to the approaches dealt with in this thesis 
each of which regard values as central to definitions of green politics.
12 Given that they describe what they do in terms of empirical social science, cultural 
theorists can be criticised for failing to provide a methodology for testing their 
hypothesis, and for failing to specify the conditions under which their hypothesis could be 
found wanting. Wildavsky is also criticised for failing to provide the ethnographic 
evidence to support the claims that he makes (Laitin 1988).
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explanation within the terms of the analytical framework being used. A 
frequently adopted strategy for dealing with noise rests on the assumption 
that inconsistency is a form of ignorance, inadequacy or deviance.13 These 
abnorm al value dispositions, like other social scientifically defined 
abnorm ality , require some secondary explanation. It is noticeable, 
according to Rokeach, that people often go through life avoiding having 
to face up to inconsistencies of values. Rokeach sees the social scientific 
importance of studying values as one of revealing, or uncovering value 
preferences so that subjects may become more aware of their own basic 
value orientations. Having done so, they will then be able to identify and 
eliminate any incongruities that they may have.14
The practical implication of such findings (of inconsistency) is that the 
potential for increased self-awareness and change in the values, 
attitudes, and behavior of Americans - indeed, of all human beings - 
would be very great if it were possible to bring contradictions such as 
these to their conscious attention (Rokeach 1979: 331).
The onus, therefore, is on these inconsistent individuals to make the 
appropriate changes, and the social psychological techniques of value 
diagnosis can also be used to facilitate such change (Billig 1987). 
Admittedly, in the case of those who resort to blatantly deviant uses of 
values, such as the National Front, some social actors are probably beyond 
reform, but such deviants can be dismissed as social 'outliers'.
A nother strategy for dealing w ith inconsistency is to treat it as 
disingenuous, inasmuch as the purveyors of inconsistency will, sooner or 
later, be caught out. Thompson, Ellis and W ildavsky adm it that it 
som etim es does happen that adherents to one way of life use the 
normative language appropriate to a different worldview. They cite the 
example of anti-abortionists, who are located as supporters of hierarchical 
culture, articulating egalitarian values.
13 Much of the adverse reaction to Converse's analysis came from researchers who held 
that the greater the degree of ideological consistency, the healthier the polity, e.g. 
(Peffley & Hurwitz 1985).
14 An example of inconsistency cited here was ranking equality highly on the scale of 
values whilst preferring George Wallace for President in 1968.
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To use the core values of one's opponents in order to undermine those 
opponents and broaden one’s appeal is a path fraught with danger.
Witness, for instance, antiabortionists who attempt to discomfort their 
prochoice opponents and appeal to those on the fence by referring to the 
"equal rights of the fetus". By insisting on the equal rights of all, 
antiabortionists abandon (and hence undermine) their hierarchical 
commitments to the community's right to make distinctions among its 
members and its duty to regulate the morality of its members 
(Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky 1990: 263).
According to these authors, this noise is not at all problematic. This is 
because attempts to commandeer elements of a 'foreign' value system in 
order to bolster the claims of one's own culture are counterproductive. 
Similarly, Wayne's articulation of his worldview in terms of the freedom 
of individuals is ultimately untenable as it will undermine his own 
commitment to an egalitarian way of life. Both Wayne and the anti­
abortionists can be regarded as disingenuous and inconsistent in their 
appeal to the values of their cultural adversaries. Thus, the empirical 
noise that is a byproduct of schemes of normative categorisation can 
always be explained away as someone else's problem.
2.2. Transformational Approaches
Transformational approaches have adopted a similar analytical language 
of value rationality, change, conflict, coherence and consistency, albeit via 
quite different routes to those taken by attributional approaches. The 
common denominator of transformational social theory is the 
assumption that social action, processes and structures can be assessed in 
terms of movement towards, or fulfilment of a political rationality. With 
regard to green politics, there are three ways in which claims to rationality 
are advanced. The first is as a teleological rationality purporting to chart 
the movement of history, the second is in terms of a theoretically defined 
rationality against which political action should be assessed, and the third 
posits a formally logical rationality which purports to define the 
parameters of practical possibility.
2.2.1. The Rationality of the Green Movement
The teleological version is associated with new social movement theorists 
such as Cohen and Touraine. Cohen regards many of the new socio­
cultural orientations articulated by movement participants as indicative of
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a new layer of historical development (1983: 106).15 Touraine’s theory is 
overtly teleological. For each type of society there is only one social 
m ovem ent, and 'the' m ovem ent that leads the transition to a post­
industrial society m ust recognise the process in which it is engaged 
(Touraine 1983: 4). Thus, the anti-nuclear struggle may or may not be an 
expression of this m ovem ent - whether it is or not depends upon its 
capacity to perceive itself in such a way by being able to name the 
adversary of dom inant technocratic rationality.
The conception of an historical m ovem ent telos is notably 'idealist', in 
that progress tow ards new social arrangem ents requires the assent of 
historical actors. It is not, therefore, simply the expression of material 
forces. Touraine is em phatic that 'there is no class w ithout class 
consciousness' (1981: 68). For Cohen, m ovem ent solidarities are formed 
and maintained 'on the basis of communicating, reasoning publics' (1983: 
105). This 'reflexive' portrayal of social action places a great deal of 
emphasis upon the consciousness of actors, and their capacity to choose to 
be in tune with the historical direction of the movement.
The access of interpretation to identity is through the interrogation of 
forms of consciousness. This procedure can take the form of an 
examination of theories so long as the theories in question are those of 
the participants, produced for movements and, to an extent, within 
movements. While rarely up to the level of systematic social science, 
such theories or "ideologies" receive their importance precisely to the 
extent to which they help the crystallization of already-emergent 
identities (Cohen 1985: 666).
The approaches of Bookchin and Eckersley share much of the conceptual 
repertoire of the new social movement theorists, most notably the view of 
history in terms of the struggle between dom inant and emancipatory 
social forces. Both authors seek to cover a similar range of social issues 
and political projects in their discussions to that covered by new social 
movement theories. The main difference is that they each seek to locate 
the kernel of transformative potential in a specifically ecological core of
15 In this sense, she concurs with the Habermasian ideal of progress towards a more 
rationally legitimated social order that is predicated upon the already significant 
achievements of the west, and its preferability to other social forms when assessed against 
standards of rationality.
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green politics. Ecological interdependence, for Bookchin (1982), is the most 
appropriate template for efforts to transform the nature of social relations 
and political institutions, because ecological relationships are inherently 
non-h ierarch ical. Eckersley approaches the sam e p o in t from  a 
complementary angle, arguing that the environmental crisis brings to the 
surface of m odern industrial societies a corresponding 'crisis of culture 
and character’ which presents us with ’an opportunity for emancipation’ 
(1992: 17).16 According to Eckersley, the distinctiveness and novelty of 
ecocentric thought is not indicated by the social and political forms it 
criticises or supports. Ecocentric theory is significant because it offers a 
more encompassing basis for these justifications and critiques (1992: 31).
These green theorists are less concerned with charting an underlying 
historical trajectory, and more concerned to argue that an ecological 
ra tionality  should  be adopted in order to save the earth. It is this 
imperative for political action to be in tune with an ecological rationality 
that requires the consciousness and assent of social actors. Saving the 
earth is not only a matter of preventing the destruction of the earth's life 
suppo rt system s. The green project pu rp o rts  to be a project of 
emancipation from all forms of social domination.
Although there is a range of elements used to define this emancipatory 
logic or rationality, including socio-structural forces, economic conditions 
and the increasing scale of environm ental degradation, the norm ative 
component of these definitions is crucial. The consciousness and self- 
understandings referred to by Cohen, Touraine, Bookchin and Eckersley 
are normative. The social arrangements that are associated with the new 
or alternative rationality - whether they be greater democratisation of civil 
society, the dismantling of technocratic sources of power, or the abolition 
of hierarchical structures - are arrangements which reasonable people (i.e.
16 By locating herself within the same broad emancipatory tradition as the likes of Cohen, 
Habermas and Bookchin, the thrust of Eckersley's argument then turns to differentiating an 
ecocentric brand of emancipatory thought from these other manifestations. The points of 
divergence between ecocentric theory and critical theory are covered in Chapter 5, while 
the differences between her position and Bookchin's eco-anarchism are addressed in 
Chapter 7 of Environmentalism  and Political Theory.
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those w ithout vested interests in the status quo) would be expected to 
prefer on norm ative grounds. There may be significant differences over 
w hat constitutes an overarching normative standard, but all regard such 
criteria as part of the grounding for political analysis.
The other main exponent of a transform ative characterisation of green 
politics, Robert Goodin, is concerned to distance himself from all of the 
above formulations, expressing scepticism that the themes of domination, 
liberation and emancipation provide an appropriate umbrella for all the 
orientations (1992: 73-6). He regards some components that are usually 
included as part of the green package, including the preference for radical 
participatory democracy, as broadly desirable but nevertheless optional 
adjuncts to the core of the green project.17 This attem pt to draw  tighter 
boundaries around green politics, however, must be seen in the context of 
Goodin's wish to argue strongly for the logical coherence of the green 
package. By placing more stringent limits on what can be included in the 
package, he believes he is in a better position to argue for this coherence.
Even though he rejects emancipatory concepts, Goodin's version of green 
politics can be clearly considered as transform ative, inasmuch as he is 
wont to claim that the logic of the green theory of value is at work in 
social and political processes. This is a claim that is largely constructed in 
the negative. Goodin repeatedly stresses that political actors who defy the 
logic of a unified green program by picking some elements but not others, 
will find that their 'chickens will come home to roost' (1992: 172).
Still, if logic really is like that, then logical inconsistency will entail 
practical impossibility. If two things are logically incompatible, then 
any practical program that attempts to put them together is bound to 
come to grief. What is impossible in logic is (if we are operating with 
the right logic, one which actually maps the real world) impossible in 
the real world, as well. The inevitable consequence of inconsistent 
promises is incompatible policies (1992: 171-2).
17 Thus, Goodin regards only three of die Griinen's four basic principles as essential to the 
green project, namely ecological sustainability, social and economic justice and non­
violence. Grassroots democracy, he argues, should be considered as a subsidiary element 
(1992: 88).
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Goodin's version of green rationality is therefore largely constructed from 
what he regards as the dictates of analytical logic, rather than from any 
notion of historical telos. W hat he does share with the em ancipatory 
theorists, how ever, is a notion of green rationality  that contains a 
substantial norm ative component. Indeed, the moral component is the 
very foundation of logical coherence as '(w)hat.... m akes the green 
political agenda form a peculiarly tight package is the fact that all the 
elements within it are informed by a single moral vision’ (1992: 14). As 
with emancipatory theory, the green package requires the conscious assent 
of social actors, it will not come about w ithout w idespread political 
conversion. Thus, for Goodin, as for the other transformationalists, green 
moral consciousness is the essential foundation of green change.
The no tio n  of va lue  conflict, th e re fo re , is im p lic it w ith in  
transform ational approaches. Social actors, structures and processes are 
assessed in terms of whether, and to what degree, they are in tune with 
either transform ational forces, or the forces that resist transform ational 
rationality. Social conflict is always a conflict between normatively defined 
antagonists, between progressive and regressive forces, between those who 
accept and adopt the new political rationality, and those who would 
obstruct or ignore it. Normative choice, conflict and consistency, then, are 
just as much part of the vocabulary of transformational approaches as they 
are of attributional analysis.
2.2.2. Normative Diagnosis
A central analytical prerogative of transformational approaches, therefore, 
is the capacity to assess the character of political actors, structures and 
processes against standards of normative rationality. Cohen asserts that 
there is only one rational iden tity  'th a t is com patible w ith the 
organizational form and conflict scenario of movements today' (1985: 667). 
How, then, does one diagnose whether particular actors, structures and 
processes are in tune with this rational identity? Just as with attributional 
approaches, we can start by listening to w hat political actors, and green 
m ovem ent actors in particular, have to say about their norm ative 
orientations.
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Cohen claim s that new  social m ovem ent identities are frequently 
articulated by movement participants.
Indeed, many of the actors interpret their actions as attempts to renew a 
democratic political culture and to reintroduce the normative dimension 
of social action into political life. This is the meaning of self-limiting 
radicalism (Cohen 1985: 670).
But as with cultural theory, trust in testimonial articulations of values is 
rather lim ited and circumscribed. As Alan Cribb has noted, critical 
theorists such as Cohen reserve the right to override norm ative self­
interpretation from an objectively critical standpoint (Cribb 1991: 8).
T ransform ational approaches encounter the unreliab ility  of value 
testimony in two senses. The first is the same type of issue dealt with in 
the above section on attributional approaches. Political actors who are 
clearly beyond the bounds of progressive forces are liable to adopt 
elem ents of the green m ovem ent's norm ative language. New social 
m ovem ents are reg a rd ed  as em bodying  the logic of fu rther 
dem ocratisation through their calls for greater citizen participation in 
decision-making. If this is the case then calls for citizen initiated referenda 
that are made by a right-wing organisation such as the Citizens Electoral 
Council cannot be treated as authentic in the same way that the German 
grassroots democracy movement of the late 1970s would be. This type of 
noise corresponds with the supposedly disingenuous claims of anti­
abortionists, or the deviant use of norm ative language by the National 
Front.
H ow ever, an ad d itio n a l issue w hich is m ore to the fore in 
transform ational approaches is the persistence w ithin the green 
m ovem ent of political action that is not in keeping with its inherent 
rationality .18 This is a quite different type of noise, and transformational 
commentators demonstrate acute sensitivity to it. Goodin is concerned to 
separate the optional elements of green practice from the essential green 
identity. He regards the insistence some greens place on the elements such
18 This problem of noise is also somewhat relevant to attributional approaches with 
regard to their treatment of internal conflict between fundamentalists and realists, as I 
shall argue in Section 7.1.2. below.
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as ’w hole-earthism ’, spiritualism  and mysticism, and exem plary green 
lifestyles, as amounting to ’green heresy’ (1992: 78-83). Similarly, Touraine 
regarded the concerns within the movem ent to develop communitarian 
forms of actions and exem plary lifestyles as digressions from the 
movement telos. Touraine was keenly aware of currents within the anti­
nuclear m ovem ent which ran counter to his analysis, particularly the 
com m unitarian stream. As such, he was determ ined to resist w hat he 
regarded as a retreat into the counterculture (1983: 46-55). In Cohen's 
framework, the normative identity of some movement participants are to 
be taken more seriously than others, as she regards the fundam entalist 
faction of the German Greens as irrational and destructive (1985: 667). 
Similarly, Eckersley's project is to enhance the ecocentric character of the 
green movement by taking issue with the persistence of anthropocentric 
modes of thought within its ranks.
Thus, the focus for normative diagnosis in transform ational approaches 
has more to do with making distinctions within the category of social 
movem ent actors, than identifying movements in relief from the rest of 
the political environm ent. Transform ational theorists are concerned to 
argue for the correct or the best in terpretation  from a plethora of 
competing alternatives within movements. For this reason, testimony of 
value orientations cannot be accorded too much weight. Identification 
w ith  the green  m ovem ent is no t a su ffic ien t ind ica tion  of 
transform ational potential.
Given the presence of resistant elements among those who identify with 
the green movement, how do these theorists propose to distinguish these 
elements, if testim ony is problem atic? Theorists som etim es stipulate 
items or issues in which a forced choice is to be made. Eckersley (1992: 29), 
for instance, identifies 'litmus test’ issues, namely, hum an population 
grow th and w ilderness p reservation , w hich serve as a basis for 
d istingu ish ing  betw een ecocentric and an thropocentric  th o u g h t.19
19 According to Eckersley, '(t)he ecocentric stream of emancipatory thought is noted for its 
greater willingness to advocate not simply a lessening of the growth rate of the human 
population but also a long term reduction in human numbers' and its 'greater readiness to
77
However, this avenue is rarely pursued with any rigour. Most of these 
theorists do not make concerted attem pts to police their boundaries of 
green identity. As I argue below, the significance of these efforts to identify 
truer expressions of green rationality has more to do with accounting for 
m ovem ent failures. The resistant elem ents w ithin the m ovem ent are 
seen as significant when movement rationality is unfulfilled.
Transform ational theorists, like their a ttributional counterparts, are 
keenly aware of the presence and persistence of noise that afflicts efforts to 
apply  classifications of green politics in term s of values. But 
transform ational theorists are equally dismissive of the noise that they 
encounter, and they adopt similar strategies to deal with it. The most 
commonly adopted form of dismissal is analogous to cultural theorists' 
charge of disingenuity. Those who adopt green norm ative language 
inappropriately will not prosper, so the story goes. Goodin presents the 
case that green values m ust be considered as an indivisible, all-or-nothing 
package, and that non-green actors are behaving inconsistently if they 
attem pt to graft green elements on to non-green frameworks. As such, he 
offers the following w arning to those who w ould indulge in such 
practices.
There are grave implications for mainstream parties trying to steal the 
greens political thunder. They hope that, by adopting a few of the less 
demanding planks of the green agenda, they can buy off the greens. But 
if the green agenda really is logically as tightly unified as I have here 
been suggesting - if it really does all derive from one and the same 
theory of value, at root - then the strategy of piecemeal borrowing will 
be logically inconsistent as well as politically unacceptable (Goodin 
1992: 92-3).
For the m om ent, we shall leave aside the question of in w hat 
circumstances such actions would be considered politically unacceptable, 
and by whom, not to mention the penalties that would be incurred for 
such deviance .20 The significant feature of Goodin's statement is that the 
noise (adopting some green planks, but not others) is a problem for those
advocate the setting aside of large tracts of wilderness, regardless of whether such 
preservation can be shown to be useful in some way to humankind' (1992: 29).
20 Goodin does deal with these questions, albeit unsatisfactorily. See Section 7.3.3. below.
78
who produce it, and not a problem  for the analytical fram ework that 
defines it as noise. The same device is used to deal with the noise that 
em anates from  w ith in  the m ovem ent. Cohen claim s that '(t)he 
resurgence of quasi-religious fundam entalism s within the contemporary 
movements demonstrates, if negatively, the cost of evading the available 
new identity : irrationalism  a n d /o r  se lf-destruction ' (1985: 666-7). 
According to Robyn Eckersley, the privileging of anthropocentric forms of 
green politics to the detriment of ecocentric themes, argues Eckersley, will 
have counterproductive effects.
More generally, an anthropocentric framework is also likely to 
reinforce attitudes that are detrimental to the achievement of 
comprehensive environmental reform in the long run because human 
interests will systematically prevail over the interest of the non­
human world (Eckersley 1990: 74).
We can also trace the them e of 'no rm ative  therapy ' in some 
transform ational approaches. Alain Touraine’s sociological interventions 
in the French anti-nuclear m ovem ent of the 1970s took the form of 
attem pting to bring militants to correct consciousness regarding the real 
nature of their political action in a manner that was strikingly analogous 
to Rokeach's suggestions for normative re-education.21
To sum up, even though attributional and transformational approaches to 
green politics come out of very different analytical traditions, there are 
rem arkable sim ilarities betw een them  regarding  the im portance of 
diagnosing value orientations, and in the techniques used for doing so. 
Both types of approach are concerned to distinguish social actors according 
to the values they hold or to which they are committed. In doing so, these 
approaches encounter anom alous and am biguous norm ative claims, 
which are characteristically  accounted for in term s of norm ative 
inconsistency, irrationality or deviance.
21 Not surprisingly, Touraine's efforts were met with significant resistance from movement 
participants, as his own accounts testify (1983).
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2.3. An Alternative Reading of Value Ambiguity
At this point it is worth considering where value distinctive analyses 
leads us. Secure in the knowledge that some anti-nuclear activists and 
anti-abortionists are mistaken in their interpretations of values, or that 
the National Front is blatantly deviant in its claims, or that some political 
parties adopt green values fraudulently, we can sit back and wait for the 
irrationalities and inconsistencies of their positions to become apparent, 
and the ineffectiveness of political strategies based upon these claims to be 
brought home to them. Hopefully, they may become aware of the error of 
their ways (a process in which social scientists or transform ational 
theorists are well suited to assist), and change their behaviour accordingly. 
M ore pessim istically , they m ay continue to behave irrationally , 
confirming the power of non-rational motivations in the political process, 
or the difficulties involved in attem pting to norm atively educate the 
general public or a social m ovem ent constituency. Subsequently, we 
might turn our attention to why they persist in acting in such a way, and 
continue to lament the entrenched irrationality of politics.
In all these examples, the noise, however defined, is effectively excluded 
from serious consideration. My concern here is not to suggest more 
appropriate or plausible ways for dealing with empirical noise generated 
by distinctive value schemes. Nor is it my intention to offer further 
suggestions for how the normatively inconsistent are to be encouraged to 
admit the error of their ways. Such diagnoses, I believe, do not do justice 
to w hat is going on in these instances. They are blind to much that is 
interesting. In contrast, I wish to argue that the anomalous usage of values 
that is regarded as noise by value identity approaches should be considered 
as an indication of the ambiguity and contestation of values and 
normative discourse. In doing so I advocate an approach which places this 
value contestation and ambiguity firmly in the foreground of the study of 
values.
The National Front turns the accusation of prejudice against its accusers, 
the anti-nuclear movement contests the argum ent that nuclear weapons 
provide a basis for security. Anti-abortionists seek to counter arguments 
constructed on the basis of womens' rights. Apparently, both pro and anti-
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abortionists regard 'rights' as appropriate criteria in their argum ents. 
A pparent also is the National Front's professed lack of sym pathy for 
prejudice, which they share with their opponents, and the common 
concern with security shared by supporters and opponents of nuclear 
w eapons. In each exam ple, the sam e value su p p o rts  opposing  
interpretations. Security, rights and prejudice are part of a common 
political vocabulary in each of these disputes. The close connection 
betw een the norm ative language of each of these advocates and the 
language of the claims they oppose and contest indicates the ambiguity 
and flexibility of these values. W hat's more, the antagonists are not 
unaware of this flexibility. Each of these claims are made knowingly in the 
context of alternative claims made by opponents.
The examples above indicate that the interpretation of rights, security and 
prejudice are considered by the various protagonists as worth fighting 
over. In each case, an established norm ative interpretation is directly 
challenged. Certainly in two out of the three examples, the challenge has 
been successful to some degree. Established interpretations of the meaning 
of rights in the context of the abortion debate and the meaning of security 
in the debate about nuclear weapons have been rendered ambiguous. 
These examples draw  our attention to the historically constructed and 
contingent nature of value interpretations. An understanding of values as 
objects of political contestation subject to the contingencies of political 
change and debate can be contrasted to the assum ption of stable value 
in terp reta tions characteristic of a ttribu tional approaches. Such an 
approach, therefore, presents value ambiguity in quite a different light. 
Contestation of value interpretations is to be expected, and this m ust be 
taken into account in any understanding of political, social and cultural 
conflict and change .22
The ambiguous articulation of values is not limited to these combative 
contexts in which established interpretations are directly challenged.
22 Murray Edelman is one author who regards competing normative interpretations of 
specific events as definitive of politics. Events and issues that have political significance 
are those that evoke conflicting normative interpretations (Edelman 1988: 104).
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Wayne's justification for his political activities in terms of the protection 
of individual freedom is deviant in terms of many of the value distinctive 
frameworks, particularly that of cultural theory. According to Bellah et al's 
in te rp re ta tio n , w hich em phasises the o v erlap , co n tinu ity  and 
com m onality of A m erican m iddle class values, there is nothing 
surprising in such articulations, because Wayne the radical activist, in 
common with 'yuppies', psychotherapists and self-professed patriots 
shares a 'common moral language' of individualism  (Bellah et al. 1985: 
20). This raises the suggestion that shared values do not entail shared 
interpretations, as the commonly articulated values are deployed in a 
tremendously wide variety of contexts.
The case for taking value ambiguity seriously can be best illustrated if we 
consider those values which are prom inent in contem porary political 
discourse. Evaluative criteria such as freedom, democracy and hum an 
rights have generated a plethora of interpretations and continue to do so. 
A ttem pts to pin dow n the essential m eanings of these values have 
continually proven to be problematic. The problem s in defining these 
concepts, however, bear little relation to their political efficacy. It is 
possible to regard this very flexibility of interpretation as a mark of their 
'success' as basic values, as political claims continue to be formulated and 
reform ulated  in term s of these values. In late tw entieth  century 
international politics, few if any political actors publicly argue against the 
concept of hum an rights, though they will dispute its implications in 
particular circumstances. Such disputes, however, reinforce the political 
potency of the value, ensuring its status as som ething worth attaching 
political claims to. It is more plausible, for instance, to argue that the 
success of the value of hum an rights, exemplified by its incarnation as a 
United N ations Universal Declaration signed by most of the w orld’s 
nation states, rests upon its capacity to support a variety of interpretations 
rather than its descriptive precision. The political leverage of concepts 
such as human rights may well be a product of their ambiguity.
The crucial elements of all the examples that is overlooked in value 
identity approaches is that all these value claims are made in the context 
of political argument, and that in advancing these claims, the protagonists
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in these argum ents are attem pting to portray  their own stances as 
norm atively legitimate, often to the same audiences. Once these factors 
are taken into account, the ambiguity of value use no longer appears as 
the messy byproduct of imprecise language. Instead, it can be regarded as 
an expected feature of political discourse. The relationship between 
politics and values in such disputes is not that the antagonists in each of 
these disputes have different values, as Inglehart and W ildavsky suggest, 
but that the same values are used to support opposing stances. On this 
basis, attem pts to make definitive interpretations of the links between 
values and specific actions and events w ould appear to miss the point, 
particularly if they are made as part of an effort to resolve or avoid 
contentious interpretations.
By assuming the contingency and contestability of value interpretations, 
one need not claim that there is no stability, or that there can be no 
boundaries to the m eanings and in te rp re ta tions of values. Some 
interpretations appear as more acceptable than their alternatives, and 
others sink w ithout trace or are generally dism issed as outrageous. It 
would be generally considered unusual, for instance, to hear of physical 
torture being justified by reference to hum an rights, and it would raise 
more than a few eyebrows if the Catholic Church were to portray itself as 
an egalitarian organisation. But any such restrictions are indications of the 
historical and contextual contingencies of value usage and articulation 
that emerge out of social practice, rather than indicating the boundaries of 
essential m eanings of hum an rights and egalitarianism. The claim that 
the National Front is not prejudiced, and that its critics are, would seem to 
be just as eyebrow raising, yet it serves to emphasise that taken for granted 
normative interpretations are actually contested. It may be that the NF's 
interpretation is considered as outrageous by most people who recognise 
the term 'prejudice', and it also may be true that the Front would abandon 
this line if it doesn't catch on or attracts more damaging criticism from its 
opponents. However, such prognoses should not preclude the possibility 
that this inversion of prejudice could be taken more seriously by more 
people in differing social and political conditions.
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Thus, treating ambiguity of values as something to be expected does not 
rule out the identification  of taken for g ran ted , or established  
interpretations of values, but it serves as both an encouragem ent to 
investigate the conditions under which such establishm ent developed, 
and a rem inder that even the most established interpretations may be 
subject to contestation at some point in time. W hether or not particular 
in terpretations are contested or not, and if they are, under w hat 
circumstances and by whom, are worthwhile issues that can be further 
explored.
M any of the com m ents m ade in the above discussion of value 
inconsistency in political discourse are also applicable to the forms of 
n o rm ativ e  dev iance  w ith in  social m ovem en ts th a t concern  
transformationalists. If shared values do not imply shared interpretations 
of values, what does this tell us about processes of identity formation in 
social movements? Just as interpretations of hum an rights are politically 
contested in the international diplom atic com m unity, we can also 
consider values such as participatory democracy, autonomy and ecology as 
am biguous and politically contested within the green m ovement, and 
begin to describe emergent green value interpretations in the same terms 
of contingency and contestability.
Although most transformational approaches are generally mindful of the 
social processes involved in defining value implications, their accounts of 
such processes still carry with them the labelling of the different elements 
of m ovem ents as progressive or regressive, rational or irrational, 
enlightened or resistant. The suggestion that some interpretations of 
rights, democracy and autonomy are closer to a truth which is constantly 
being approached or revealed, and that some forms of political action are 
more in tune with an inherent logic, should be treated with the same 
scepticism  directed at a ttributional approaches that posit objective 
standards of value interpretation.
The questions I raise about transform ational value identity frameworks 
are of the same type that William Connolly raises in a more general way 
about the construction and maintenance of ethically derived identities. 
The transform ational form ulations elaborated above are instances of
84
'(t)he consolidation of identity through the constitution of difference' 
(Connolly 1991: 9). Connolly asks us to consider the side effects of these 
iden tity  constructions such as the invention  and pro liferation  of 
categories of deviance and techniques and therapies of intervention that 
are necessary to protect the integrity of identities. These tendencies are 
clearly evident in the above constructions of Cohen, Eckersley, Goodin 
and Touraine. One noticeable side effect, Connolly argues, is the tendency 
to suppress ambiguous instances that threaten the boundaries of identity.
If we take value ambiguity seriously, new light is shed on the problems 
identified in Chapter 1. Consider the seemingly paradoxical suggestion 
that greens identify themselves in terms of values as a device for dealing 
with their diversity. The existence of a common moral language among 
social m ovem ents, or w ithin particular social m ovem ents may be a 
means by which attention is deflected from the significant ideological and 
programmatic differences among participants. Consider also the possibility 
that value conflict is a consequence of defining one's political and social 
project in terms of shared values. If values are located at the core of 
identity, then this is sufficient reason to suggest that value interpretation 
constitutes significant stakes in internal political conflicts.
Such possibilities call for a methodological abandonm ent of using values 
as the basis of drawing distinctions between social and political categories. 
In doing so, however, many new analytical avenues are opened. Some of 
these possibilities have been explored under the rubric of genealogies of 
m orals and ethics. Genealogies trace the em ergence of ethical and 
norm ative categorisations and reveal the contingent and constructed 
features of normative abnormality (Connolly 1991; Foucault 1977; Minson 
1985). Typically genealogies seek to attack conventional or common sense 
normative categories by tracing the historical points at which ambiguities 
were buried.
I wish to pursue another path that is opened up by the acknowledgement 
of ambiguity. My interest, in contrast to the broadly historical focus of 
genealogies, is in contemporary settings where contestation over the use 
and application of normative categories is prevalent. As I demonstrate in 
C hapters 5-7, attem pts to establish green political parties provide
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appropria te  exam ples of settings w here there is m uch norm ative 
contestation. Values are both the tools and the objects of political conflict 
in this arena. Social scientists and transform ational theorists are not the 
only ones who speak a language of value choice, conflict and identity and 
so construct standards of value irrationality. These terms are prevalent in 
green political discourse as well. Just as in attributional value studies, 
green value discourse creates the empirical noise of inappropriate value 
usage and inconsistent behaviour. Just as in transform ational theory, 
much green political activity is regarded by other greens as normatively 
deficient. A question to be pursued in the latter part of the thesis concerns 
how greens in terpret the presence and persistence of the norm ative 
misfits that their categories create.
2.4. Conclusion
The main methodological point arising from this chapter is that it is 
w orthw hile suspending analytical standards of value rationality and 
consistency. French an ti-nuclear activ ists w ho w ish to critique 
technocratic decision-making and explore communal lifestyles, need not 
be regarded as inconsistent. Fundamentalist currents of social movements 
need not be construed as irrational. This is not to say that these activists 
will not strike problems in their attem pts to act on the basis of their 
norm ative ideals. As I will dem onstrate in the latter part of the thesis, 
there are characteristic frustrations and tensions that are associated with 
green normative identity. My point for the moment is that it is simply not 
necessary or helpful to trace these difficulties to the failure of participants 
to act in accordance with coherent normative frameworks. I would posit, 
on the contrary, that the political impact of the green movement has little 
to do with normative coherence. That is another argum ent to be pursued 
throughout the thesis. The task of the following chapter is to demonstrate 
that the ambiguity of value discourse can be harnessed to construct a 
rather different fram ework for analysing highly norm ative forms of 
political activity.
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Chapter 3: A Rhetorical Approach to Values
The purpose of this chapter is to suggest a methodology for analysing the 
political role of values that takes ambiguity and contestation seriously. In 
order to find an appropriate methodology, it has been necessary to go 
beyond the sociological and political science literature that deals with 
values, most of which is tied to one or other of the approaches outlined in 
the previous chapter. Weber's notion of the unintended consequences of 
normative rationality is an idea worth pursuing further, but such follow 
up has been scant. Similar frustrations with the analytical practices of 
identifying actors on the basis of their values, beliefs, attitudes or opinions 
have been articulated by Michael Billig in the field of social psychology. 
His questioning of these standard tools of social psychological research led 
to an interest in the rhetorical dimension of attitudes, opinions and 
values.
From Billig's investigations into the art of argumentative rhetoric, a 
rather different image of values is suggested to that which is characteristic 
of value identity approaches. From a rhetorical perspective, values 
constitute a powerful type of good reason that can be deployed in the 
articulation of argumentative claims. This conceptualisation of values is 
appealing because it treats the ambiguity and contestation of value 
interpretations as highly significant. As we shall see, a rhetorical approach 
even suggests that this ambiguity is a crucial rhetorical property of values.
The first part of this chapter is dedicated to developing some of the key 
concepts of a rhetorical approach, and exploring many of the theoretical 
insights contained in such an approach. The middle part of this chapter 
deals with the various ways in which values are juxtaposed against other 
types of 'good reasons' such as practicality and self-interest. The final 
section shows how insights from a rhetorical perspective can inform 
sociological investigations of political action. This prepares the 
groundwork for a different account of the relationship between values 
and green politics which I shall pursue in Chapter 4.
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3.1. The Rhetorical Approach
The central theme of a rhetorical approach is the investigation of practices 
of justification and criticism. These can be considered as key features of 
political communication and discourse. Over the past decade or so, there 
has been an increasing interest, apparent in the hum anities and social 
sciences, in the subject of rhetoric. In the United States, there has been 
interest in the role of rhetoric in the production of knowledge in the social 
sciences. An eclectic collection of work around this theme was published 
in 1987 (Nelson, Megill & McCloskey 1987). The term has also been taken 
up by Michael Billig as a key to the understanding of such things as 
attitudes, opinions and values (1987; 1991). Other authors such as John 
Shotter (1989) and Jeffrey Minson (1989) emphasise, in very different ways, 
the significance of rhetoric to the form ation of ethics. The common 
heritage of this approach includes K enneth Burke's A Rhetoric of 
Motives, which first appeared in 1950, and Chaim Perelman and Lucie 
Olbrechts-Tyteca's The New Rhetoric which was first published in French 
in the late 1950s and translated into English around a decade later.
The common concern of these writers has been to highlight the rhetorical 
dimension of all types of discourse. Thus, any discourse, be it conducted in 
the public  sphere, or restric ted  to the boundaries of scientific 
communities, workplaces and religious communities, involves rhetorical 
reasoning. Drawing upon the work of historians of science such as 
Thomas Kuhn, the contributors to the Nelson collection illustrate the role 
of rhetorical reasoning in the production of the knowledge of both the 
natural and hum an sciences and the dissemination of that knowledge to 
wider publics. Billig's analyses of the rhetorical dimension of discourse 
ranges from case studies of specific organisations such as the Young 
Conservatives and the National Front in Britain, to the investigation of 
everyday discourse and common sense.
3.1.1. Rhetoric and Argument
Central to the rhetorical approach is the assumption that rhetoric refers to 
all forms of justification and criticism. Rhetoric is not considered inferior 
to rational arguments. Thus, the investigation of rhetorical dimension of 
communication and discourse is not intended as a strategy to invalidate
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claims that are made. Nor is the object of the exercise to clear away the 
undergrow th of rhetoric in order to make a path for the bulldozer of 
rational reason. Rather, the revival in the study of rhetoric is part of a 
wider challenge to the superiority of objective, decontextualised standards 
of rationality . This is associated w ith a m ore general concern to 
rehabilitate pragm atic, contextualised and 'partial' forms of reasoning 
(Leff 1987; Toulmin 1990). This approach seeks to salvage the concept from 
the cliche of 'mere and em pty rhetoric'. This rehabilitative effort is 
directed against images of rhetoric as the ugly sister of rational forms of 
argum ent (McGee & Lyne 1987), or the country cousin of ethics (Minson 
1989). Rhetorical approaches instead treat claims to rationality as a 
particular 'topic' of rhetoric.1
In support of this project, authors such as Burke and Billig have 
reappropria ted  m any of the insights into political com m unication 
contained in classical treatises on the art of rhetoric, as elaborated by 
Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian. My scope of interest in this thesis is 
som ewhat more limited. The area of rhetoric opens up some interesting 
possibilities for considering values in terms other than those in which 
they are characteristically treated. To this end, I draw  m ainly from 
concepts elaborated by Burke, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and Billig, 
bearing in m ind that many of the ideas contained in these works can be 
traced back much further.
Rhetorical communication covers the ambit of criticism and justification. 
For every justificatory or critical claim that is made, an alternative claim is 
implicitly or explicitly acknowledged. Argum entative positions are not 
defined in a vacuum, but in relation to competing claims. Thus, it follows 
that in order to make sense of a particular position, knowledge of the 
alternative proposition(s) is crucial. The importance of the argumentative
1 The challenge is advanced by investigating the rhetoric of antirhetoric, namely the ways 
in which the case for dismissing alternatives to logic and scientific method are advanced 
rhetorically. By suggesting that the deployment of standards of universal truth and 
objectivity is itself a rhetorical practice, students of rhetoric are critical of such claims to 
objectivity in as much as they deny or forget that their claims are constructed rhetorically 
(Leff 1987).
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context of claims is underlined when we consider the difficulties of 
interpreting rhetorical discourse when the opposing position is not readily 
apparent. To the contemporary western ear, the claim that an infinite 
num ber of angels can dance upon the head of a pin sounds incredibly 
obtuse. It helps to know that such an argum ent engaged a competing 
claim that there was a limit to the num ber of angels, and that this 
conclusion had some serious theological implications regarding the extent 
of God's power.
The advancement of an argum ent involves advocating a position defined 
in contrast to alternative positions. However, this does not mean that 
alternative positions m ust already be articulated in o rder for new 
argum ents to emerge. The articulation of novel argum ents may well 
invent the opposing position at the same time. Novel argum ents may 
also be advanced against positions that previously have not been defended 
because they have been regarded as obvious, self-evident or as things 
which 'go w ithout saying'. These positions may only find active and 
articulate defenders once the initial challenge has been made. The 
suggestion that the sun and planets revolved around the earth required a 
defence only once it had been argued that all the planets revolve around 
the sun. One of the most significant achievements of the environmental 
movement has been its success in moving the goal of economic growth 
from the status of an indisputable political objective to one which now 
needs to be defended in many contexts.
3.1.2. Audiences
Rhetoric, as a form of communication, involves a speaker (or writer) and 
an audience. In order to em phasise the rhetorical dim ension of 
communication, I follow the lead of both Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
and Billig in referring to the speaker as an 'orator' who addresses an 
audience in the process of making argum entative claims. The audience 
occupies a central role in a rhetorical approach. Indeed, we can identify a 
num ber of specific settings in which orators and audiences regard their 
relationship as defined principally in terms of rhetorical performance. The 
orator's performance is judged within a set of relatively well known and 
well defined parameters that relate to the characteristics of each type of
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audience. Forums such as parliam ent, the courtroom  and the debating 
society spring to mind here. Of course, audiences are not limited to such 
settings, as any form of communication involves some sort of audience. 
They can range in size from one person to an international television 
audience of billions. Some audiences are constituted for no more than 
five minutes, whereas others persist for centuries.
At this point then, an im portant distinction needs to be made between 
w hat we m ight call the 'actual' audience who w itness the orator's 
addresses and the audience assumed or 'imagined' by the orator. The two 
may well coincide, and classical treatises on rhetoric em phasise the 
im portance of m aking accurate assum ptions about an audience. 
Nevertheless, a separation is w arranted. There may be, for example, 
circumstances in which the orator can at best only guess the nature of her 
audience. This is typified by the street corner orator addressing a fluid and 
variable public. However, even in settings in which an orator makes 
relatively safe and accurate assessments of his audience, the distinction 
between the actual and imagined audiences should still be made. The 
actual audience may react quite differently than the orator may have 
hoped. Communication between an orator and an audience may enable 
the orator to adjust her assumptions in reaction to audience responses.
As both Perelm an and Olbrechts-Tyteca and Billig argue, in order to 
prepare the groundwork for persuading an audience, it is necessary for the 
orator to establish commonalities between herself and the audience. The 
communicative priority of any orator, according to Kenneth Burke, is to 
establish an identification with an audience (Burke 1969). The orator must 
indicate to the audience that he is 'one of them', 'on their side', or 'has 
their in terests at heart'. Relations of com m onality can be defined 
according to characteristics such as place of residence, political affiliation, 
ethnicity, gender, recreational hobbies, language, generation or favourite 
TV show. The construction of an imagined audience identity may be 
limited to a particular occasion, such as in the case of a funeral eulogy, or 
it may draw upon well established constructions of identity such as nation 
or religion.
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By stressing the im portance of audience com m onality, the rhetorical 
approach does not ignore the heterogeneity of audiences. On the contrary, 
d iversity  w ithin audiences takes on m uch significance in shaping 
assum ptions about commonality. Differences between elements of the 
im agined audiences need to be taken into account in order to assume 
common characteristics. Inform ation about the range of diversity of 
audiences is therefore significant for orators in their attem pts to establish 
commonality. If one is speaking on industrial relations to an audience 
that includes both unionists and employers, the repertoire of good reasons 
m ight include economic growth, 'best practices', and the need to attract 
investm ent. We would expect the scope and content of the rhetorical 
repertoire, however, to be significantly different if the audience consisted 
of only one of these groups. Indeed, orators frequently address a number 
of audiences or sub-audiences simultaneously. These m ultiple audiences 
can create bo th  problem s and p o ten tia ls  for the o rato r. The 
parliam entarian ostensibly addresses both the parliam ent and the public, 
and to this we could add the press gallery and the parliam entarian’s own 
party as identifiable audiences in the mind of the orator. Orators need to 
be careful that in making connections with particular audiences, they do 
not inadvertently alienate others.
A significant type of im agined audience is that which Perelm an and 
O lbrechts-Tyteca call the 'universal audience'. Invocations of the 
universal audience are evident when the orator is concerned to deny the 
particularism of his claims. Phrases such as 'any reasonable person would 
agree', 'objective validity', 'hum an nature' and 'God's will' are forms of 
common sense appeals to audiences deem ed to be unencum bered by 
partia l perspectives. As Perelm an and O lbrechts-Tyteca pu t it, 
'(a)rgum entation addressed to a universal audience m ust convince the 
reader that the reasons adduced are of a compelling character, that they are 
self-evident, and possess an absolute and timeless validity, independent of 
local or historical contingencies' (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 32). 
The rhetorical force of such appeals, of course, depends upon the audience 
members' willingness to identify themselves as part of such a universal 
audience, rather than their capacity to reach the particular conclusions
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being proposed (this may require revelation or technical competence, for 
instance).
Universal audiences should be treated as historically and contextually 
contingent constructions in the same way as any audience defined in 
particularist terms. The appeal of argum ents invoking N ature, God or 
Truth are no less products of historical and social construction than 
appeals to national, sectional or class interests. There are countless 
examples in which these particularist categories, such as class, nation and 
religion, are characteristically 'universalised' by those who invoke them 
in order to bolster their arguments.
Having outlined some of the considerations to be taken into account by 
the orator in her im agination of an audience, there is an additional 
element that is integral to any rhetorical context. Not only are there those 
who are to be persuaded, there are also those who are located beyond the 
boundaries of persuasion: those who are to be ignored, alienated or 
provoked. These two components of the imagined audience are closely 
interconnected. Identification with an audience identity sim ultaneously 
constructs a category which is outside the bounds of that identity, a 
shadow cast by the light of identity. As well as paying attention to the ’we’, 
the audience to whom the orator appeals, the picture is not complete 
w ithout considering the rhetorical 'they' which is created at the same 
time. An audience identified as Australian invokes the state of 'non- 
Australianness'; an audience identified as 'concerned parents' calls into 
being those who are unconcerned. Even the most universalist constructs 
of audiences have in mind a contrasting category which collects the chaff 
once the w heat has been separated. Appeals to 'all reasonable people' 
suggests the possibility of unreasonable people who are beyond 
persuasion. Similarly, God's will is not intended appeal to those who are 
beyond redemption, while the term 'natural' alerts us to the existence of 
unnatural behaviours. Any construction of identity is sim ultaneously 
inclusive and exclusive.
Identification of the commonality that binds an audience defines the scope 
of rhetorical resources available to the orator. Billig uses the term 
'common sense' to denote a repertoire of shared standards of evaluative
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criteria that can be used in order to identify with or persuade an audience. 
The contents of this repertoire are what Billig refers to as 'the seeds of 
argum ents' that orators can draw  upon (1987: 196-7). The rhetorical 
deploym ent of common sense usually does not require justification, due 
to its taken-for-granted character.
Particular audiences are associated with particular repertoires of common 
sense. We might, for example, identify elements of the common sense of 
Seventh-Day Adventists, or of members of the Canberra press gallery, or 
of electric guitarists. Clearly, what is taken for granted by any one of these 
audiences will often be problematic or irrelevant to other audiences. In 
order to illustrate this feature, I will use the case of the anti-abortion 
activists as a useful example. Thompson, Ellis and W ildavsky describe 
their campaigners as attem pting to 'discomfort their prochoice opponents 
and appeal to those on the fence'. In setting the scene in this way, they 
inadvertently  draw  our attention to the fact that these activists are 
engaged in the activity of addressing a particular audience. This audience 
could be a parliam entary committee, or it may be a national television 
audience. Imagine a different context in which the anti-abortionists are 
speaking at a church meeting, in order to rally support for their political 
activities. We would not be surprised if no mention of rights was made in 
this context at all, and that arguments were draw n from themes such as 
church teaching or the word of God. Such arguments are the type which 
Thom pson, Ellis and W ildavsky w ould  consider consonant w ith 
hierarchical values.
Need this difference in normative language deployed in the two contexts 
indicate inconsistency, bad faith or disingenuity on the part of the right-to- 
life activists? Quite clearly, the two argum ents are directed tow ards 
different audiences in different argum entative contexts. Rather than 
focusing on the character of those advancing the arguments, this crucial 
difference suggests that it would be a good idea to pay more attention to 
the character of the audiences. Rather than gravitating to an analysis of 
the normative character of individuals and groups, a rhetorical approach 
shifts the focus of attention to the shared evaluative standards of 
audiences. For example, a particular individual may be employed as an
94
engineer, as well as being part of a church congregation, a shareholder in a 
public company and a member of a municipal council. As a result, this 
individual is potentially part of audiences constructed according to quite 
different assumptions.
If we adopt this audience-based focus, then the 'varying' behaviour of the 
anti-abortionists no longer appears as odd or perplexing. In both the public 
forum and the church meeting, the anti-abortionist argum ents draw  on 
standards of common sense. In the first case, the language of rights was 
used in order to appeal to the general public or policy makers, while in the 
second, a select range of themes was deployed in a setting in which the 
speakers could reasonably assume them to be salient. The language of 
rights may be less appropriate in the second setting than the language of 
Christian authority, but these Christian values are even more likely to be 
counterproductive when addressed to the general public, or when directed 
to an audience of policy makers. Audience diversity shapes the repertoire 
of common sense that can be used. The language of rights can be 
considered as useful precisely because it enables orators to address a broad 
and diverse constituency.
Appeals to common sense leave plenty of scope for rhetorical manoeuvre. 
The crucial element of Billig's argum ent is that common sense repertoires 
should not be regarded as internally coherent systems of thought. On the 
contrary, Billig suggests that it is worthwhile to think of any stock of 
common sense as containing numerous conflicting themes. Billig uses the 
term  'dilem m a' to denote contradictory them es that co-exist w ithin 
common sense rhetorical repertoires (Billig 1987: 207), and argues that 
dilemmas are embedded in language. The dilemmatic aspect of common 
sense is apparent in situations in which elements of the repertoire are 
used to support opposing evaluations. For instance, a parent may be faced 
with a choice between allowing and preventing their child to take part in a 
potentially  dangerous bushw alking expedition. On one side of the 
argument, caution and prudence could be drawn from parental common 
sense to justify not allowing the child to go. On the other hand, the 
encouragement of independence could be draw n from the same common 
sense repertoire. Within this parental repertoire, prudence may be given a
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rather different quality as over-protectiveness, and independence could be 
portrayed as recklessness. This 'double-sided' character of motives is a 
familiar resource to the professionally trained rhetorician, and is referred 
to by Kenneth Burke as the 'proving of opposites' (1969: 25). Instead of 
providing unam biguous solutions to dilemmas, common sense plays a 
significant role in the construction of dilem m atic circumstances. The 
sharing of a repertoire of common sense, therefore, is not in any way to be 
mistaken for consensus of interpretation.
3.2. Values and Rhetoric
Values loom particularly large in the discussion of rhetorical common 
sense repertoires for Billig and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. According 
to the latter authors, '(v)alues enter, at some stage or other, into every 
argum ent' adding that speakers 'appeal to values in order to induce the 
hearer to make certain choices rather than others and, most of all, to 
justify those choices so that they may be accepted and approved by others' 
(Perelman «Sc Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 75). Similarly, Billig contends that 
values 'constitute elements of common-sense whose truth or desirability 
is taken for granted' (Billig 1987: 210). Values, when they are used to 
establish com m onality w ith an audience, are a pow erful rhetorical 
device.2
3.2.1. The Rhetorical Ambiguity of Values
Shared values are key resources used to forge identity  and define 
commonality with an audience. Once again, such a formulation should 
not be mistaken as assum ing audience homogeneity. According to the 
rhetorical reading of values, shared values do not in any way imply 
political consensus. In fact, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca interpret the 
significance of shared values differently by arguing that the usefulness of 
shared values is a product of their generality. The rhetorical force of
2 Taken-for-granted values are, of course, not the only ways in which values are invoked 
rhetorically. An orator may argue why certain values should be considered more or less 
important than they are. However, in such circumstances, these values are not used as the 
means of identifying with an audience.
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values depends on 'their content not be(ing) specified; as soon as we try to 
go into details, we meet only the adherence of particular audiences’ (1969: 
76). It is worth quoting them at length.
It is thus by virtue of their being vague that these values appear as 
universal values and lay claim to a status similar to that of facts. To 
the extent that they are precisely formulated, they are simply seen to 
conform to the aspirations of particular groups. Their role is accordingly 
to justify choices on which there is not unanimous agreement by inserting 
these choices in a sort of empty frame with respect to which a wider 
agreement exists. Though this agreement is reached over an empty 
form, it is nonetheless of considerable significance: it is evidence of the 
fact that one has decided to transcend particular agreements, at least in 
intention, and that one recognizes the importance attaching to the 
universal agreement which these values make it possible to achieve 
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 76).
This is a long way from the image of shared values found in attributional 
approaches, and leads to some very different interpretations of the role of 
values in politics. As the passage indicates, simply invoking a shared 
value does not im ply  tha t an aud ience w ill agree upon the 
appropriateness of its use in a specific argum entative context. Consider a 
politician arguing for a health policy which gives more precedence to 
private rather than public provision of health services. This politician 
may choose to justify this policy to a public audience on the basis of its 
capacity to enhance the individual's freedom  to choose. Among the 
audience, however, there may be pro-choice campaigners who conclude 
that such a policy would limit the availability of low cost abortions. 
A lthough these elem ents of the audience may reject the particular 
interpretation, this does not mean that they dispute the desirability of 
freedom of choice.
A pplications of com m on sense values am ong com m unities and 
audiences should therefore be treated as contestable constructs rather than 
givens. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca illustrate the constructivist process 
by considering how the meanings of values are negotiated in political 
settings.
Ambiguous notions present the person who uses them with difficulties 
whose solution calls for a handling of concepts, for a decision on how 
they are to be understood in a given case. This decision, once agreed 
upon, results in a clarification of the notion in certain of its uses in 
which it can exercise the role of a technical notion. A notion seems clear
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enough so long as one sees no situation in which it would lend itself to 
differing interpretations. When such a situation arises, the notion 
becomes obscure, but after a decision as to its univocal application it 
will seem clearer than it was before on condition  that this decision is 
unanim ously  accepted, if not by everybody, at least by all the members 
of a specialized, scientific or juridical group (Perelman & Olbrechts- 
Tyteca 1969: 135, emphasis in original).
This implies that value interpretations are objects of political dispute, and 
that some form of decision-making is often required in situations in 
which m ultiple interpretations are problematic. Consider the context of 
nineteenth century American debates about slavery in which both sides 
deployed the value of freedom to support opposing positions. The state of 
Texas argued that it should be free to m aintain slavery. In cases in which 
am biguous in terpretations are resolved one way or the other, the 
resolution can be considered as a licensed in terpretation among the 
audience or community, whereas the defeated interpretation has been 
definitively ruled out. But such licensing and specification also has the 
potential to underm ine the rhetorical potency of a value a n d /o r  redraw 
the boundaries of the target audience.
If it has been unambiguously linked to a particular implication, policy, or 
decision as opposed to another, a value may lose its capacity to have any 
other m eanings and implications. For example, the tight connection 
between socialism and the state ownership of the means of production 
effectively tied the rhetorical effectiveness of socialism in public debate in 
the west to the fortunes of policies of state ownership. It is no coincidence 
that attem pts since 1989 to reinvigorate and rehabilitate the concept of 
socialism do so by arguing the independence of socialist ideals from state 
ownership (Hindess 1991).3 When a value becomes inextricably tied to a 
particular position, opposition to that position may be transform ed into 
opposition to the value. In which case, the value is no longer shared by 
the disputants.
If common sense is dilemmatic, this has significant ramifications for how 
we think about value systems. We should not assum e that common 
values constitute a coherent set of norm ative orientations. Far from it.
3 See the debates in the November 1991 edition of Econom y and Society.
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Value conflict, according to this reading, need not refer only to conflict 
between competing value systems or political ideologies, but as a dynamic 
that operates within value repertoires (Billig et al. 1988: 157). It is not 
unusual to find the co-existence of seemingly opposite value standards 
within a particular value repertoire.4 Billig and his colleagues illustrate 
the pervasiveness of dilemmas framed by the tension between equality 
and expertise in educational, health and social work organisational and 
occupational settings (Billig et al. 1988: Ch 5). Both expertise and equality 
are important elements of the value repertoires of social workers, teachers 
and health semi-professionals. Managers of superannuation funds face 
pervasive dilemmas between investment safety and the importance of 
high returns. It is not necessary to suggest that there is anything 
'inherently' contradictory in any of these pairings, just that they can be, 
and are frequently deployed on opposing sides of arguments. In other 
circumstances, both elements of these respective pairs can also be deployed 
on the same side of an argument.
3.2.2. Values and Other Types of Reasons
Under the rhetorical approach discussed above, values are only one type 
of rhetorical criteria deployed by orators. An interesting area of 
investigation, therefore, is the relationship between values and other sorts 
of 'good reasons'. By this I mean investigating argumentative contexts in 
which values are juxtaposed against other types of reasons. Values are not 
necessarily regarded as the best sort of reasons in numerous 
argumentative contexts. It is possible to identify a whole range of 
rhetorical commonplaces which can be drawn upon to 'devalue values'. 
The most prominent rhetorical competitors to values in contemporary 
political debate include criteria of technical rationality, practicality and 
self-interest.
4 Chapter 6 provides an illustration of this point, exploring implications of the co­
existence of the values of unity and diversity within the green normative political 
framework.
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3.2.2.I. Values and Technical Rationality
The rhetorical practices of the scientific method are built upon the 
superiority of facts and technical criteria as good reasons. Scientists do not 
publish journal articles on the basis of demonstrating that a particular 
conclusion is normatively preferable. Such reasons may at times be 
admissible, but only as supports for conclusive scientific evidence. In 
relation to values, a particularly influential element of scientific common 
sense has been the superiority of objective facts over values, in which the 
latter are deemed to be subjective and therefore not subject to verification. 
Alan Cribb (1991) has shown how this assumption provided the central 
plank for justifying the 'value free' approach to social sciences in general, 
and comparative politics in particular, during the 1950s and 1960s. Among 
the most strident expressions of the superiority of facts over values was 
the behaviorist treatment of values and normative commitments as the 
object of scientific investigation (Cribb 1991: 31-2). In a rather selective 
interpretation of Weber's dictum that value choices cannot be rationally 
justified, values are reduced to irrational expressions of emotional states 
that have no legitimate role in the formation of judgements.
This rhetorical image of technical rationality has had wide political 
applications. One familiar form stipulates appropriate modes of political 
decision-making in which decisions are taken dispassionately, on the basis 
of the facts at hand. Values get in the way of rational decision-making 
because they introduce non-rational or irrational elements into the 
decision-making process. This form of rhetoric is not restricted to 
audiences who are assumed to possess technical competence, if the orator 
establishes audience identity based upon trust in scientific and technically 
rational expertise. Another common way of juxtaposing facts and values 
is to claim that the latter are derived from, and subordinate to the former. 
The anti-nuclear movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s frequently 
used the rhetorical technique of presenting the facts about nuclear power 
and nuclear arms as sufficient basis for negative normative evaluation 
(Downey 1986).
In other rhetorical circumstances, however, facts are trumped by values. 
Three closely related ways of turning the tables are readily drawn from
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rhetorical repertoires. The most established of these is the commonplace 
that technical rationality  is associated w ith norm atively distasteful 
consequences. Commentators writing in the aftermath of W orld War II, 
such as Kenneth Burke, were particularly sensitive to the use of scientistic 
justifications of atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi regime. Nazi science 
provided a powerful image supporting the contention that science should 
not be granted the autonomy from values. Such examples are frequently 
used to justify the subjection of scientific practice to normative and ethical 
evaluation.
The image of technical rationality as good servant, but bad master, has 
been influential in social theory. In particular, critical theory has sought to 
keep technical rationality in check and ensure its integration into the 
more comprehensive project of hum an emancipation. Ian H unter (1992) 
observes contemporary expressions of this relationship between technical 
and norm ative reason in the language of critiques of bureaucratic 
practices. Deficiencies are identified  in term s of the bureaucratic 
abandonm ent of moral responsibilities associated with the headlong 
p u rsu it of technical efficiencies.5 Hence, the an tipa thy  tow ards 
dispassionate modes of decision-making, particularly in regard to issues 
such as the closure of hospitals and schools, and cutting the size of the 
public sector in general. Hard-headed rationalism serves as an indication 
of moral callousness rather than political responsibility, given that ethical 
considerations are explicitly excluded from the decision-making calculus.
More recently, the supposed amorality of technical rationality has been 
subject to sustained attack on the basis that facts and values cannot be 
distinguished from each other so easily. According to this rhetorical 
commonplace, values play a significant role in defining w hat can be 
considered as facts. Facts cannot speak for them selves, but m ust be 
m ediated through norm atively loaded language. Following this line it 
becomes possible to construe values as a more honest and authentic type 
of reason. Facts are suspect because they can be deployed as screens which
5 For a dassic example of this type of argument, see (Pusey 1991: 169-181).
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im properly conceal norm ative orientations. It can also be argued that 
claims to value neutrality are actually norm ative, regardless of whether 
this is acknowledged by those advocate it.
32.2.2. Values and Pragmatic Rationality
Another type of criteria regularly counterposed against values is that of 
practicality  or pragm atic  rationality . The circum stances in which 
argum ents based upon practicality could be expected to prevail over 
reasons derived from norm ative principles would cover a wide range of 
political contexts. Politically, a partially acceptable policy or statute that can 
be implemented and enforced may well be regarded as preferable to a 
policy w ith better norm ative credentials but less chance of effective 
implementation. The same type of calculation is a feature of settings in 
which it is necessary to form coalitions with other political actors in order 
to achieve a particular outcome. When such changes are interpreted as 
reducing the norm ative credentials, the practical evaluative criteria of 
'something is better than nothing' comes into play. One might argue that 
the bounds of what is to be considered ethical are set by perceived range of 
practicable possibilities.
Political decision-making is frequently shaped by the need to provide 
practical or workable solutions to conflicts which are highly charged and 
irresolvable in terms of values. In contexts where the clash of values is the 
heart of the political problem, practical criteria provide a means of taking 
the heat out of such conflicts. The pursuit of practical solutions to political 
conflicts between proponents of incompatible value claims may often 
necessitate compromise. Any achievement of such compromise signifies 
that 'peaceful' political outcomes have precedence over commitment to 
principles .6
6 Perhaps the paradigmatic case here is the unprincipled but practical mechanisms that 
evolved in response to the religious wars of seventeenth century Germany which brought 
into being the Prussian political-administrative apparatus with its 'amoral' reasons of 
state (raison d'etat) (Koselleck 1988).
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However, the rhetorical relationship between values and practicality can 
also work the other way. For instance, faithfulness to Christian moral 
principles may override considerations of practicality  in decisions 
regard ing  s tuden t access to inform ation about contraception in a 
denominational school. It is not difficult to imagine the circumstances in 
which integrity of these principles carries more rhetorical weight than the 
adm ission that such inform ation w ould in all likelihood reduce the 
incidence of teenage pregnancies and abortions. It is also w orth 
considering the negative image of com prom ise, in contrast to that 
presented above. Com promise is frequently associated with less than 
com plim entary connotations such as betrayals and surrenders. Anti­
pragmatic rhetorical commonplaces express distaste for 'doing deals' and 
'sell-outs’. Deal-m aking is distasteful precisely because norm atively 
principled positions are sacrificed for practical outcomes. Here, the refusal 
to com prom ise signifies the trium ph of one's conscience or value 
commitments over more practical considerations.
There is also a well established cultural link in the west in which practical 
reasons are regarded as 'worldly' tem ptations. These are precisely the 
kinds of reasons that the morally educated should regard with a high 
degree of suspicion, and perhaps eschew altogether. Weber identified this 
as a characteristic habit of the cultural category he called religious 
intellectuals.
It is the intellectual who conceives of the "world" as a problem of
meaning....As a consequence, there is a growing demand that the world
and the total pattern of life be subject to an order that is significant and 
meaningful. The conflict of this requirement of meaningfulness with the 
empirical realities of the world and its institutions, and with the 
possibilities of conducting one's life in the empirical world, are 
responsible for the intellectual's characteristic flight from the world 
(Weber 1968: 506).
Under such a framework, it is to be expected that practical modes of action 
will be found to be unethical, and that w ithdraw al from the realm of 
worldly action is the only possible way of living a life of principled 
integrity.
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3 .2.2 3 . Values and Self-interest
Another prom inent and long established rhetorical sparring partner for 
values is that of self-interest. Argum entative settings in which interests 
characteristically constitute better reasons than values are those where 
audiences are actually defined in term s of common interests. Where 
common interests constitute identity, it is unlikely that any other type of 
reason would take priority over the collective self-interest. In this sense it 
is not surprising that French farmers as a group, for instance, cannot be 
easily exhorted to place the 'well-being of the world's economy' ahead of 
their ow n in terests, seeing that the w hole pu rpose  of political 
mobilisation is the protection of their interests.
A related rhetorical commonplace in which self-interest trum ps values is 
that which portrays norm ative considerations as a luxury that cannot 
necessarily be afforded by those struggling to meet their material needs. 
Brecht’s one-liner of 'Erst kommt das Fressen, dann die Moral’ (first grub, 
then ethics) succinctly captures this commonplace, fitting neatly into the 
m aterialist fram ew ork of w orking class m ovem ent politics. Those 
struggling to make ends meet cannot be expected to place the interests of 
others ahead of their own. This form ulation is also expressed most 
famously in Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of hum an needs, in which the 
meeting of physical needs is an essential prerequisite for the pursuit of 
aesthetic and spiritual fulfilment (Maslow 1968).7
The most emphatic way in which self-interest takes priority over values is 
where appropriate norm ative rationality is derived from self-interest. 
Over recent years, many western democracies have witnessed the rise to 
prom inence of a political discourse based upon the assum ption that 
rationality  is fundam entally derived from self-interest. Neo-classical 
economics, and its political correlate of public choice theory, is hardly a 
novel form of rhetoric in this respect. The significant change over the past 
tw enty years has been the developm ent of new audiences that are
7 Maslow's theory is one of the main building blocks of Inglehart's distinction between 
materialism and postmaterialism.
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receptive to this form of rhetoric, particularly in the public sectors of these 
countries. These perspectives emphasise that the pursuit of self-interest is 
a highly ethical activity, and ultimately more ethical than the fruits of 
practices which restrain the free hand of market forces. In fact, normative 
preferences and interest-based rationality are synonym ous according to 
m any rational choice models. From this definition of rationality, values 
not derived from self-interest are among the m ost significant of the 
irrational factors that impede the development of rational forces.
The reversal of this hierarchy, in which norm ative criteria are clearly 
separated from, and given priority over self-interest is the defining feature 
of altruism. Altruistic themes in western societies are strongly shaped by 
Christian traditions. These influences can be easily seen in the political 
rhetoric frequently  adopted  by relig ious, ph ilan th rop ic  and non­
governm ent welfare agencies, all of which invoke the denial of self- 
in terest in order to help others as a 'good reason'. How ever, the 
commonplaces of altruism are hardly limited to contexts of earthquake 
relief and Salvation Army Christmas appeals. 'Ask not what your country 
can do for you, but what you can do for your country' presents the appeal 
to altruism in its clearest and most cliched form.
Politically, altruism  is regularly invoked through the accusation of 
selfishness. Employer groups criticise trade unions on the basis that the 
dem ands of the latter may be good for unions but bad for the whole 
country. According to this form of rhetoric, unions are morally culpable 
for their refusal to behave altruistically. Of course, such an instance may 
be dismissed as 'mere rhetoric', especially where altruism on the part of 
unions just happens to coincide with the self-interest of employers. 
Altruism  also enters political debate in the form of the reluctance to 
consider negotiatory politics as a legitimate exercise .8 The characteristic 
form here is that you cannot agree to give up w hat is not yours to give 
away, and that any preparedness to negotiate and comprom ise only 
constitutes a submission to the temptation of self-interest.
8 See Minson (1993: 205) for some examples of this juxtaposition in political philosophy.
105
Closely related to altruism is the rhetoric that claims made in terms of 
self-interest are m orally inferior to claims based upon w ider, or more 
universal interests. Universalist claims are presented as unencumbered by 
partial perspectives, and this 'im partiality' can, among other things, be 
equated with moral high ground, as working for the benefit of all is self- 
evidently better than prom oting the interests of the few. At times, this 
rhetorical form ulation has been used to different effect by intellectuals 
who take up the cause of particular groups. It can be a useful strategy to 
override the actual political claims of particular group when they appear 
to be out of kilter with the historical telos of that group as perceived by 
in tellectuals. For exam ple, Lenin contended tha t the p ro le ta ria t’s 
vulnerability to self-interested opportunism  was an indication of its 
inability to transcend economic concerns for ideal goals w ithout the help 
of a vanguard that could correctly perceive the trajectory of history (Sadri 
1992: 136).
3.3. Value Primacy
Thus, there is an abundance of rhetorical commonplaces available to 
suppo rt both positive and negative characterisations of norm ative 
reasoning in relation to other criteria. This serves as a further indication 
of the range of resources available from repertoires of common sense, and 
the ease with which it is possible to identify opposing themes. This 
treatment of good rhetorical reasons is by no means exhaustive. There are 
many other types of reasons that are powerful in particular settings, such 
as emotional sensitivity, aesthetic appreciation or fashionability. I have 
paid closest attention, however, to those types of reasons which frequently 
compete with norm ative rhetoric in political discourse. I should stress 
that there is nothing inherently incom patible about the relationship 
between values and facts or values and practicality. As types of reasons, we 
can just as easily find them working in tandem  as we can find them 
pulling in opposite directions in argum entative contexts. Nevertheless, 
the juxtaposition of values against  these other criteria are prom inent 
features of western philosophical, political and common sense traditions. 
Reinhart Koselleck has drawn attention to the historical circumstances in 
which politics and m orality became separated and pitted against each
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other in political discourse (1988: 11). The rise of the claims of scientific 
rationality in contrast to norm ative rationality can also be seen in the 
historical context of the project of challenging the religious foundations of 
truth.
These different rhetorical commonplaces are not equally useful with 
respect to particular audiences. An audience consisting of a professional 
association of engineers is unlikely to grant values priority over technical 
rationality. An Amnesty International conference, however, would attach 
substantially more rhetorical weight to norm ative reasons. Thus, it is 
feasible to characterise audiences in terms of the relative weight attributed 
to different types of reasons. 'Value primacy' characterises audiences for 
whom values assume overall priority over any other type of criteria.
From the above exposition, the m etaphor of a card game can be used to 
describe the relationship betw een different types of reasons. Value 
prim acy is the assum ption that values are alw ays trum ps. Under 
conditions of value primacy, norm ative criteria are not necessarily the 
only criteria, or 'suit', deployed in argum ents, and different suits can be 
combined to good rhetorical effect. If one can bolster an argum ent by 
claiming that 'this proposal is in keeping with our values, and has the 
added advantage of being practical to implement', then all the better. But 
when juxtaposed against any other suit, values win out. If something is 
technically useful, but normatively questionable, the latter consideration 
takes precedence. If getting something done occurs at the cost of violating 
a norm ative principle, then the cost is too high. If behaving ethically 
demands personal sacrifice then that is all the more reason to behave in 
such a way.
Minson has labelled such privileging as 'ethical foundationalism ', which 
he defines as the notion that ethical considerations always ground, and 
ideally override other considerations (1985: 149). This foundationalism is a 
way of perceiving the world in which all social structures, processes and 
activities are assumed to have a fundam ental norm ative character. The 
identification of norm ative character determ ines one's orientation 
towards any given phenomena. The question one m ust ask before any 
other is 'is this morally acceptable?' By a somewhat different route, then,
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we retu rn  to the im perative of m aking norm ative diagnoses and 
distinctions. The difference is that here the practice of m aking value 
distinctions, outside the academic context, takes on a greater significance 
as a pretext for political action.
3.3.1. The Rhetorical Use of Values as Techniques of Distinction
There are im portan t parallels, therefore, betw een social scientific 
constructions of knowledge about values and the norm ative knowledge 
that informs political activity. From such a foundation, both types of 
activity are concerned, albeit for different reasons, with developing the 
capacity  to d iagnose norm ative inconsistency, irra tio n a lity  and 
incompatibility. These ways of interpreting the social world share a faith 
in essential definitions of values, and the capacity of certain social actors, 
be they trained professionals or com m itted activists, to discern true 
manifestations and implications of these values.
Values, therefore, can be regarded as devices used in order to make 
distinctions between 'us', with whom the orator identifies, and 'them', 
the norm ative other. In some contexts, the norm ative other may be 
explicitly defined. This can be done in a number of ways. In contrast to the 
moral community identified by the orator, the other may take the form of 
those who are amoral (indifferent to values) or im m oral (have no 
values). Alternatively, the other may be constructed as having value 
standards which are defined antithetically in relation to the community of 
orator and audience. 'We', the supporters of free market competition can 
be contrasted to 'they' who prefer collectivist m odels of social and 
economic organisation. In this case, the orator wishes to evoke a negative 
assessment of the latter value. Collectivist values, in this example, are 
located outside the boundaries of normative common sense for the orator 
and audience, and are not available to be used to establish commonality 
except in a negative sense.
As with transformational approaches, but unlike attributional approaches 
to value analysis, these rhetorical value distinctions are not intended to be 
interpreted neutrally. They are used to make distinctions between good 
and bad, desirable and undesirable, legitimate and illegitimate. Inasmuch
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as making value distinctions constitutes a rhetorical practice we can also 
explore the construction of claims to knowledge about values such as who 
has them, where are they m anifest and w hat are their implications. A 
rhetorical investigation takes into account the argum entative contexts in 
which these claims are located.
3.3.2. Rhetorical Competence and Recognition
W hat sort of audiences are subject to definition prim arily in terms of 
values? Where are we likely to find audiences who regard values as better 
reasons than available rhetorical competitors? We might first consider the 
sectors of the population who we can reasonably assume will recognise 
particular rhetorical cues. The recognition of any rhetorical criteria is an 
acquired capacity that is not evenly distributed throughout populations. 
Indeed, the recognition of rhetorical repertoires can be closely linked to 
certain sociological characteristics. The most significant social indicator of 
such rhetorical training is tertiary education, where skills in criticism and 
justification are taught either directly, or indirectly in order to validate 
knowledge claims. Tertiary education is by no means the only or the most 
effective route by which rhetorical capacities may be acquired. Trade 
unions, religious organisations and voluntary organisations have all been 
instrumental in fostering a range of rhetorical capabilities.9
In addition, a well established finding of researchers who have attempted 
to define standards of attitudinal or ideological consistency is that any 
such consistency is strongly associated with tertiary education. A rhetorical 
in terpretation  of this connection is that the aw areness and use of 
h istorically  constructed  a ttitud ina l packages such as liberalism , 
conservatism, or new politics are learnt capacities. Once again, tertiary 
education need not be considered the only site where such packages are 
learnt, but the role of tertiary education in both the developm ent and
9 There may well be a case, however, for suggesting that tertiary education has taken on an 
even greater importance in relation to these other sites over recent years as indicated by 
the increasing tendency for elites in unions and religious bodies to acquire tertiary 
qualifications in order to be recognised as legitimate contributors to public political 
discourse beyond their own institutional settings.
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transmission of them, we would surmise, has increased as the reach of 
this sector has expanded .10
A part from , and in conjunction w ith  tertia ry  education , certain 
occupational locations provide more opportunities for the development 
of rhetorical skills. One could reasonably suggest that professional and 
w hite  collar em ploym ent p rov ides m ore o p p o rtu n ity  for such 
enhancement. Business managers, public servants, educational and health 
adm inistrators, science professionals, journalists, doctors and lawyers 
work in environments which require the capacity to advance and respond 
to justificatory and critical argum ents in the course of carrying out 
occupational roles.
Secondly, we should consider the social distribution of the rhetorical 
importance of values. In particular, we could consider the social locations 
where values are rhetorically more significant than interests or facts. 
Normative criteria take on greater rhetorical importance in certain types 
of white collar occupations than in others. Training and socialisation for 
engineering and scientific occupations characteristically places low priority 
upon norm ative reasoning compared to technical rationality. In other 
white collar locations such as industry and commerce, argum ents based 
upon interests carry more weight than, or subsum e those based upon 
values.
Other sectors of the white collar and professional workforce prom ote 
various com binations of rhetorical abilities. Those involved in the 
provision of medical services give greater latitude to forms of normative 
reasoning in combination with scientific and technical rationality. Trade 
unionists, welfare lobbyists and much of the public policy and community 
services sector combine norm ative and interest-based reasoning. Many 
areas of public sector em ploym ent also involve some scope for the
10 Such a prognosis is well supported by the empirical research referred to in the first 
chapter. The Political Action  tradition of Barnes, Kaase and Inglehart has attributed a 
great deal of significance to what they term 'cognitive mobilization' in their explanations 
of differing patterns of political participation. Similarly Converse found that the 'level of 
conceptualisation' correlated positively to the 'amount of political activity'.
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professional deploym ent of norm ative reasoning in conjunction with 
technical rationality, particularly in areas of policy development. Standard 
criteria for evaluating public policy such as equity, accountability, quality 
of service and public responsiveness have both technically rational and 
norm ative elements.
The types of professional and white collar em ploym ent in which 
norm ative reasoning is accorded a relatively high priority , I would 
suggest, include some forms of journalism, teaching, religious vocations 
and cultural production .11 In addition, there are im portant non-work sites 
that foster specifically normative rhetorical skills. Religious organisations, 
service organisations, political associations, voluntary welfare networks 
and other voluntary associations all serve as sites which encourage the 
developm ent of value-based reasoning. Furtherm ore, m em bership of 
such organisations, w ith the possible exception of some religious 
organisations, is predominantly middle class in western democracies.
The point I am driving at is the characteristically neglected observation 
that members of audiences who are likely to define themselves in terms 
of the values that they hold, should not be regarded as 'universal 
subjects', but as the products of particular ethical regimes and practices of 
form ation, to use the Foucauldian terminology. Those who habitually 
privilege normative criteria over other types of reasons can be regarded as 
an even more select type.
3.4. Conclusion: Contrasting Value Identity and Rhetorical Approaches
From this discussion we are now in a position to sum m arise the 
difference between value identity and rhetorical approaches to values in 
relation to a few key questions. The two approaches regard values as 
different types of things. Value identity approaches locate values as 
attributes of social actors, structures, processes and actions. A rhetorical 
approach, in contrast, regards values as ’good reasons' which are
11 Please note that this is not a claim that engineers are more practical, and that artists 
are more normative, it is a claim about the types of rhetorical reasoning that are accorded 
priority in these occupational locations.
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articulated and deployed by social actors in argum entative contexts. 
Shared understandings of the implications of values are the product of 
social construction and rhetorical argum ent rather than expressions of an 
essential value rationality.
A second point of contrast relates to the treatm ent of value claims. A 
rhetorical m ethod does not judge the validity  or otherw ise of the 
deployment of values, whereas the value identity approach maintains the 
right to define the range of appropriate application of particular values. 
Abstention from recourse to stable definitions enables the analyst to work 
with rather than against the grain of value am biguity and contestation. 
This does not preclude the possibility that the analyst may consider some 
deployments preferable to others. However, by highlighting the definition 
of values as the object of political contestation, a rhetorical approach 
dem onstrates that any such preference m ust be seen as a political 
interpretation rather than something justifiable on grounds of objectivity 
or essential meaning.
The advantage of this abstention is that the analyst avoids entanglement 
in disputes over the interpretation and meaning of values, and is able to 
read such disputes in ways that would not be possible otherwise. Thus, we 
can avoid the rather strained plausibility of Inglehart’s interpretation of 
security and Thompson, Ellis and W ildavsky's treatm ent of rights, as well 
as the pretence that these terms can be defined apolitically. A rhetorical 
approach regards conflicting interpretations as interesting rather than 
uncomfortable because they illustrate the fluidity and the constantly 
evolving character of political discourse. An awareness of this flexibility 
demonstrates that adopting the normative language characteristically used 
by opponents can be a highly effective political strategy used to support 
ones own claims. Anti-nuclear activists need not be inhibited by the 
orthodox coupling of security to the possession of state of the art military 
technology or by conventional interpretations of the national interest. 
W hether or not such innovative arguments succeed, of course, is another 
matter, but one which can also be fruitfully pursued under the rhetorical 
fram ework rather than by constructing standards of consistency and 
rationality.
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The final point of contrast concerns what is meant by shared values. Both 
value identity and rhetorical approaches attach much significance to the 
phenom ena of shared  values. W hereas the form er trea t them  as 
prerequisites for political identity and unity, the latter investigates the 
contribution of shared values to the m anagement of audience diversity. In 
doing so it is possible to see how shared values delineate the stakes of 
political conflict, rather than providing a foundation for consensus. It is 
this connection between shared values and conflict that best illustrates the 
analytic potential of a rhetorical approach and this is one of the issues 
explored in detail in the rem ainder of this thesis. Thus, the rhetorical 
treatm ent of values lays the groundw ork for a rather different way of 
analysing green politics. In the following chapter I investigate the strong 
reliance upon value rationality that is a notable feature of green political 
rhetoric.
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Chapter 4: Value Rationality and Primacy in Green Politics
Literature
It is now possible to offer an alternative interpretation of the relationship 
between values and green politics built upon the rhetorical approach 
outlined in the previous chapter. In this chapter I explore green political 
literature in order to illustrate the ways in which greens construct their 
identity in terms of values. I also draw  attention to the ways in which 
greens adopt a language of value rationality , change, conflict and 
consistency that runs parallel to the term inology of value identity 
approaches. The construction of green identity in terms of universalist 
values marks out the range of rhetorical reasons that greens are prepared 
to adopt. It is possible to trace the links between this range of rhetorical 
practice and the characteristic social location of the green constituency.
The first section of this chapter demonstrates the ways in which greens 
identify themselves in terms of values, and how elements of the political 
landscape and processes of political change are characterised in terms of 
norm ative rationality. In the second section, I docum ent how value 
rationality characteristically takes priority over other forms of reasoning. 
The th ird  section dem onstrates how a rhetorical reading  of the 
relationship between values and green politics makes sense as way of 
understanding the practice and the social bases of green politics. The final 
section raises the question of the political consequences of norm ative 
primacy and suggests that the best places to investigate such an issue are 
those contexts in which greens attem pt to construct their own political 
forms, usually as green parties.
4.1. Green Politics and Normative Identity
As value primacy is a feature of the relationship between orators and 
audiences, in the following sections of this chapter I will be drawing from 
material that has been written principally or largely with a green audience 
in mind. The authors cited are among the most influential in the 
development of green politics. Petra Kelly (1984) and Rudolf Bahro (1986),
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key figures in the early parliam entary rise of the German Greens, have 
reached a wide international audience through the publication of their 
speeches and lectures. Jonathon Porritt (1984) and Sara Parkin (1989), 
central figures in British green politics, have been well known to English 
speaking audiences. In A ustralia, the m ost w idely accessible local 
articulation of green political ideas has been the collection edited by Drew 
H utton (1987a), who has been one of the m ain protagonists in the 
establishment of an Australian green party. In addition, I also draw upon 
sym pathetic commentaries on green parties, in particular Fritjof Capra 
and Charlene Spretnak's (1984) introduction of the German Greens to an 
American and British readership. The various Ecopolitics conferences that 
have been held annually in Australia and New Zealand since 1986 have 
provided a much utilised forum in which academic and activist greens 
address each other (Dyer & Young 1990; Harding 1992). Finally, the more 
academically oriented work of Bookchin, Eckersley, Dobson and Goodin 
are also im portant as articulations of green politics directed towards a 
green audience.
4.1.1. The Content of the Green Normative Repertoire
The four principles of die Grünen, which have been widely adopted by 
green organisations throughout the world, are translated as ecological 
sustainability, social justice, grassroots democracy and non-violence. The 
ten key values adopted by the United States Green Com mittees of 
C o rresp o n d en ce  inc lude  p e rso n a l and  g lobal re sp o n sib ility , 
decentralisation, com m unity-based economics, post-patriarchal values, 
respect for diversity and future focus/sustainability, alongside the four 
German principles (Goodin 1992). In addition to these formally adopted 
principles, positive political values frequently deployed by greens include 
equality , to lerance, au tonom y, com m unity , harm ony , openness, 
sustainability, accountability, participation, emancipation, self-realisation, 
interdependence and consensus. The antonyms of these positive values 
such as centralisation, hierarchy, violence, unaccountability, patriarchy 
and inequality are frequently adopted 'negative values'. The list of 
characteristic negative values also includes control, technocracy,
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b u reau cracy , a u th o rita r ian ism , e x p lo ita tio n , su p e rfic ia lity  and 
dependence.
Most of these evaluative criteria are hard ly  unique to the green 
movement. Indeed there are many people and organisations aligned to 
New Left, anarchist and utopian socialist projects who would not identify 
themselves as green but would also use most of this normative language. 
A num ber of elem ents would also happily fit w ith standard  liberal, 
conservative and even neo-conservative repertoires. The political rhetoric 
of these other traditions is related in many respects to the rhetoric of green 
self-description, notw ithstand ing  the reluctance of m any greens to 
acknow ledge these links.1 Those greens that do acknow ledge the 
connections w ith the contents of older ideological repertoires often 
attem pt to dem onstrate the derivation of these values from ecological 
principles. Certainly, some of the more ecological normative criteria have 
emerged specifically through the environm ental movement, but none of 
the accounts discussed here limit their characterisation of the green 
package to these ecological values. As such, the above list of values cannot 
be considered as the ’property' of the green m ovement.2 Hence, the term 
'green values' does not in any way denote green custodianship of these 
values. Instead, it is used in this thesis as a less cumbersome shorthand for 
'the repertoire of values deployed by greens'.
The rationality  of green values is also a p rom inent them e in the 
articulation of the green political project. Jonathon Porritt claims that 
'(t)here are enormous differences between our goals and values and those 
of society at large' (Porritt 1984: 15). Almost w ithout exception, green 
literature uses the device of the new paradigm  to bundle together the 
various elem ents covering ecological, economic, social, cultural and
1 Sara Parkin, for example, contends that many green parties 'were started by people who 
felt the need for politics to be based on an entirely new set of values that could not be found 
in any existing political tradition' (1989: 19).
2 Further reasons are discussed in Chapter 7.
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organisational concerns into the form of a coherent rationality .3 It is 
worth comparing one of these activist versions of contrasting paradigms, 
form ulated by Jonathon Porritt, with Cotgrove's version outlined in 
Chapter 1.
Table 4.1: Porritt's Counter-paradigms
The politics of industrialism
A deterministic view of the future
An ethos of aggressive individualism
Materialism, pure and simple
Divisive, reductionist analysis 
Anthropocentrism
Rationality and packaged knowledge 
Outer-directed motivation
Patriarchal values 
Institutionalised violence 
Economic growth and GNP 
Production for exchange and profit 
High income differentials 
A 'free-market' economy 
Ever-expanding world trade 
Demand stimulation 
Employment as a means to an end
The politics of ecology
Flexibility and an emphasis on 
personal autonomy
A co-operatively based, communitarian 
society
A move towards spiritual, non­
material values
Holistic synthesis and integration 
Biocentrism
Intuition and understanding
Inner-directed motivation and personal 
growth
Post-patriarchal, feminist values 
Non-violence
Sustainability and quality of life
Production for use
Low income differentials
Local production for local need
Self-reliance
Voluntary simplicity
Work as an end in itself
3 For other versions see (Capra and Spretnak 1984: xix; Bahro 1986: 152-3; Hutton 1987: 22- 
25; Dobson 1990: 5).
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Table 4.1 (cont.)
Capital-intensive production Labour-intensive production
Unquestioning acceptance of the 
technological fix
Discriminating use and development of 
science and technology
Centralisation, economies of scale Decentralisation, human scale
Hierarchical structure Non-hierarchical structure
Dependence upon experts Participative involvement
Representative democracy Direct democracy
Emphasis on law and order Libertarianism
Sovereignty of nation-state Internationalism and global solidarity
Domination over nature Harmony with nature
Environmentalism Ecology
Environment managed as a resource Resources regarded as strictly finite
Nuclear power Renewable sources of energy
High energy, high consumption Low energy, low consumption
Source: (Porritt 1984: 216-7)
Radically different standards of rationality follow from the opposing 
paradigm s, such that divergent social and political consequences can be 
readily traced to differences in values. W hat 'is' (the ecological crisis) is 
the logical consequence of the old or dom inant rationality, and therefore 
the a lternative ra tionality  will lead to an entirely  different and 
presum ably favourable set of consequences. As Sara Parkin puts it, the 
ecological crisis is 'the logical consequence of the consum er-driven 
industrial regime which all the rich and most of the not-so-rich countries 
of the world endorse' (Parkin 1989: 18).4 There are various suggestions 
regarding the origins and basic axioms of this errant rationality. Both
4 At this level of formulation, the presence of phenomena other than values that have 
political and social consequences is either not made explicit, or regarded as manifestations 
of value frameworks. Thus, in a neat reversal of the classical Marxist image, economic 
arrangements are regarded as structures which are built upon normative foundations.
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Dobson (1990: 38) and Porritt (1992: 86) claim that it is a consequence of the 
Enlightenm ent w orld-view  predicated on control and dom ination.5 
Taking a rather more expansive perspective, Bookchin (1982) and Bahro 
(1986: 153) assert that things started to go seriously wrong when humans 
began to practice agriculture, which indelibly altered natural relationships 
betw een hum anity and nature, and egalitarian relationships between 
hum ans.
4.1.2. Value Coherence and Choice
Greens typically argue that ecological and participatory  themes are 
intricately intertw ined. This has significant effects upon the deployment 
of green norm ative rhetoric. Principles pertaining to social organisation 
are regarded as having a close affinity to ecological precepts. An example 
of this connectedness, according to Bookchin, can be found in the 
relationship  betw een ecology and equality . Because an ecological 
perspective stresses the interdependence of all living things, Bookchin 
claims that ecosystems 'cannot be meaningfully described in hierarchical 
term s' (Bookchin 1982: 26).6 He contends that because nature is 
characterised  by non-hierarchical, egalitarian re la tionsh ip s, such 
relationships are also natural in human societies.7
By a similar route, Dobson outlines the compatibility between ecology and 
tolerance. According to accepted ecological knowledge, ecosystem stability 
is a function of ecological diversity  which provides resilience to 
environmental fluctuation. For Dobson this means that a healthy society 
'is one in which a range of opinions is not only tolerated but celebrated, in
5 Both refer to the 'unholy trinity' of Descartes, Bacon and Newton.
6 The object of his critique, is the claim that relations of domination and exploitation can 
be considered to be 'natural' in human societies. Bookchin's claims regarding the 
relationship between biodiversity and equality are directed at social Darwinist 
suggestions that hierarchy is natural. But in making such a claim, Bookchin is not disputing 
the utility of the terms 'nature' and 'natural' in describing social relationships.
7 Bookchin's view of nature involves the definition of 'natural' as the opposite of 
'artificial', i.e. something to be left to its own devices and not tampered with. In this sense, 
hierarchy is an artificial imposition on the natural state of equality.
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that this provides for a repository of ideas and forms of behaviour from 
which to draw when confronted with political or social problems' (Dobson 
1990: 25). This connection is also used to support ideological pluralism 
within the greens. Parkin asserts that '(c)elebrating the diversity of human 
culture is, after all, much more in tune with the immense variety to be 
found in nature than is trying to homogenise and then fossilise it into any 
ideology' (Parkin 1989: 18-9).
Such links are m etaphorical, and Bookchin, Dobson and Parkin are 
engaged in the same sort of exercise as social Darwinist, sociobiological 
and functionalist social theory. F u rtherm ore , these a lternatives 
demonstrate that biological analogies invoking 'nature' can be harnessed 
to argue widely divergent claims about the nature of social relationships. 
Nevertheless, the new ecological use of the biological m etaphor has 
become a central feature in the presentation of green politics as a coherent 
normative package. In this context, these arguments are significant in that 
they contribute to and reflect the rhetorical currency of the green 
m ovem ent.
Many green writers suggest that it is the totality of the value package, 
rather than particular elements, that defines green identity. From this 
standpoin t, the coherence of green politics is axiom atic and self- 
referential. A common device for illustrating coherence is to reduce the 
totality of perceived crises to a single crisis with a single solution. In rather 
apocalyptic tones, Rudolf Bahro describes 'exterm inism ' (the old 
paradigm) as 'the sum of the interconnected dangers to make one single 
challenge’ (Bahro 1986: 143). He stresses that the ecological crisis, the 
prospect of nuclear annihilation and the persistence of patriarchy are all 
sym ptom s of a unified and com prehensive pathology rooted in the 
hum an condition.
Wherever we look, disaster seems to be looming. And the thought 
imposes itself spontaneously that these are not plagues which are 
independent of each other and by chance simultaneous. In them there is 
a law, a force which is working against us (Bahro 1986: 143).
Here, the sickness is reduced to a single force. The remedy for this sickness 
can also be reduced to a single, unified essence. Bookchin identifies 
holism as a basic and distinctive feature of ecological politics. As such, he
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argues that the green political project m ust be treated holistically, that it 
cannot be dismantled and retain its integrity .8 Furthermore, green politics 
is only viable in this coherent form.
It has become clear to me that it was the unity of my views - their 
ecological holism, not merely their individual components - that gave 
them a radical thrust. That a society is decentralized, that it uses solar 
or wind energy, that it is farmed organically, or that it reduces 
pollution - none of these measures by itself or even in limited 
combination with others makes an ecological society (Bookchin 1982: 3).
Green politics also parallels value identity approaches in postulating that 
value choice is a basic feature of social analysis. However, there are right 
and wrong choices, as Parkin clearly asserts.
My own diagnosis is that this regime has been constructed out of a series 
of wrong decisions - large and small, individual and collective - made 
over a considerable period of time. Building bombs instead of convivial 
life-sustaining communities, and failing to make spirituality and our 
personal potential the real challenges of our life on Earth, are 
examples of how the human species has tended to gravitate towards 
the easier option at moments of choice and decision, whether it be
practical or intellectual....In short, we are living the consequences of a
compound error (Parkin 1989:18).
This is an example in green literature of a 'litmus test' of green-ness that 
can be applied in particular circumstances which offer choices between 
green and non-green alternatives. Specific choices in specific situations 
can be regarded as manifestations of a more general orientation. Parkin 
adopts the follow ing overarching form ula to d istingu ish  betw een 
paradigms.
Perhaps the most relevant test of Green-ness of a political party (or 
indeed any person or organisation) should be its approach to a decision, 
a choice, a problem or an issue. How well has it understood the central
8 In the light of these approaches, holistic social theory based on biological metaphors is 
hardly a new enterprise, as many greens are apt to claim. Capra and Spretnak link the 
concept of 'social ecology' (a term also widely used by Bookchin) to the development of 
systems theory involving cybernetics, notions of system dynamics and positive and negative 
feedback, which they suggest is distinct from the 'conceptualisation of our bodies, the body 
politic, and the natural world as hierarchically arranged aggregates of discrete 
components' (Capra «Sc Spretnak 1984: 31). Yet Talcott Parsons, drawing upon the same 
sources, assimilated elements of cybernetic theory into his own language of 'hierarchies of 
control'.
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role of the Earth in resolving the predicament of humankind? (Parkin 
1989: 19).
The consistent theme of all these articulations of green politics is that 
being green requires a conscious choice and subsequent commitment to 
green values. In contrast to many other political identities, one is not 
'born' green, it is an achieved, not an ascribed identity.9 Self-conscious 
actors m ust choose to be green. The centrality  of personal moral 
responsibility is readily apparent in the following extract from the British 
Green Party’s 1989 election manifesto.
The Green Party stands for a new kind of politics. We must take control 
of our own lives and learn to work together for a better future. We cannot 
allow ourselves to be ruled by remote control government, the power of 
big business and the media, and the lottery of market forces. We must 
begin by taking personal responsibility for the state of the planet and 
for the job of changing it. We can only do it by choosing what we know is 
right. We can begin by voting Green, but that is only the beginning 
(British Green Party 1989).
Such ’decisionism’ helps to account for the prominence in green political 
rhetoric of references to lifestyle choices, and to the num erous contexts in 
which choices are made in industrial society such as voting, consumption, 
and decisions to have children. These 'small' choices can be treated as 
indicative of the 'big' choice of w hether or not one subscribes to the 
values of the alternative paradigm.
4.1.3. Value Change and Implementation
The pivotal place of personal value choice has significant implications for 
conceptions of political action. In particular, it supports the conclusion 
that viable political change only occurs as the result of fundamental value 
change. According to Dobson, '(i)t follows that if the Green movement 
believes technological solutions to the limits to growth problem to be 
impossible, then it will have to argue for more profound changes in social
9 Except in references to 'traditional' societies that, according to some versions of green 
politics, are bearers of ecological wisdom. (Although, John Young cautions against such 
sweeping romanticisation (1990)). Members of such societies may be assumed to be green by 
virtue of being born into these societies. However, this form of ascription is not a possibility 
for most members of green audiences.
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thought and practice - changes in hum an values and ideas of morality' 
(Dobson 1990: 77). The gravity of the change is also underlined by Capra 
and Spretnak who regard a resolution of the crisis as involving 'profound 
transform ations of our social and political institutions, values and ideas' 
(Capra & Spretnak 1984: xix).
Before becoming green, political actors are perceived as acting in 
accordance with the logic of the dominant value paradigm. Changes from 
the dom inant value rationality to the alternative rationality must occur in 
societies, institutions, and individuals. All of these are considered to be 
self-conscious and self-determ ining entities. Self-conscious actors are 
asked to acknowledge past m istakes that reflect the dom inant value 
rationality and adopt the new ecological consciousness. Value change is 
not a m atter of tinkering with particular values but of changing whole 
value system s. For some greens such as Bahro, value change is a 
cataclysmic experience akin to religious conversion.
Those who stand for the transition from Having to Being must make it 
dear that this means a change in values such as can only succeed 
through what up till now has been described as a religious experience 
(Bahro 1986: 171).
For others it is not necessarily so dramatic. Porritt, for example, describes 
his conversion experience as a gradual transition process in which the 
logic of green politics became progressively more significant at the same 
time as old and redundant perceptions receded (Porritt 1984: xv-xvi). In 
this sense, becoming green is a matter of heading in the right direction. As 
long as one sets off in this direction, one will eventually end up green, 
provided that this direction is not reversed.
These descriptions of green change give rise to some characteristic 
distinctions between 'shades' of green-ness. The last ten years have seen a 
plethora of intra-green distinctions advanced; between dark green and 
light green, deep ecology and shallow  ecology, ecologism  and 
environmentalism, ecocentric and anthropocentric green, and capital 'G' 
green and small 'g' green. For the most part these distinctions are made in 
the context of advocating the first option as opposed to the second. Light 
green, shallow ecology, environmentalism, anthropocentric and small 'g'
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green are all terms used to describe varieties of green politics which still 
retain or rely upon features of the political arrangem ents which greens 
wish to transcend. As 'lesser' forms of green, they are either accepted as 
tem porary waystations en route to true greendom, or rejected as cop out 
positions that allow political actors to pass them selves off as green 
w ithout taking on board the full implications of the green project. Either 
way, these lighter shades of green are not free from the influence of 
dom inant values.
For some greens, this means that no change should be attem pted within 
the existing structures until there has been a comprehensive shift from 
the old to the new paradigm. An Australian activist makes exactly this 
point, deploying the distinction between light and dark green:
For dark green environmentalists, there is no short cut to power and 
influence through compromise. They believe that green values can only 
be incorporated into a policy making system which emerges after a 
paradigm shift. Many do not have the confidence in the sort of gradual 
reform espoused by light green environmentalists (Beder 1992: 58-9).
Many greens invoke the existence of a political greenprint even though itSyy 
are not currently clear.10 Establishing the details of political change is often 
treated as a matter of 'reading off' the implications of these values when 
they do become apparent.
If Green politics is to develop in this country, we first must develop a 
coherent view. By that we mean a coherent world view, which would 
give rise to a set of values and ethics, which in turn would lead to 
political analysis .... from which would emerge specific programs and 
strategies (Capra & Spretnak 1984: 199).
Greens do not necessarily need to know all the implications of green 
rationality. All that is needed are a few uncontested and taken for granted 
applications of green values. Certainly, there are a number of stances that 
are notably uncontroversial, and perhaps non-negotiable for greens. As 
Pakulski (1991) suggests, such common stances are frequently defined in 
negative terms, such as opposition to woodchip logging, uranium  mining
10 Dobson asserts that '(t)he obstacles to Green change have not been properly identified, 
and the result is an ideology that lacks an adequate programme for social and political 
transformation’ (Dobson 1990: 23).
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and nuclear power in the Australian political context. However, there are 
m any com m on stances that are not purely  negative. Support for 
aboriginal land rights and preferences for more participatory political 
structures are bu t two examples. Such unam biguous orientations are 
significant in that they are often taken by greens as indications of the 
value foundations of green politics. In what amounts to a 'creation myth', 
the links between these seemingly disparate orientations are understood 
as a coherent set of norm ative principles. This story , how ever, 
characteristically plays down or ignores the vast political spaces that are 
underdeterm ined by green principles. Policy areas such as immigration, 
orientations to economic growth, the provision of educational, health and 
welfare services, taxation, industrial relations, international relations, 
trade and defence policy are all areas which are nowhere near cut and 
dried among greens. Similarly, there is much ambiguity that surrounds 
questions of how greens are to arrange their own affairs according to 
normative principles, beyond the suggestion that organisational structure 
should, as far as possible, be non-hierarchical.11
4.2. Green Value Primacy
Having demonstrated a few examples of the ways in which green identity 
is articulated in norm ative terms, one could well ask whether there is 
anything unusual about this? Most, if not all political projects are keen to 
present them selves as being on the side of the angels. Establishing 
normative credentials would appear to be a basic rhetorical strategy for any 
political project. However, it is the way in which normative reasoning is 
juxtaposed against other types of reasoning that brings the importance of 
values to green politics into sharpest relief. In green literature, normative 
criteria typically trump other types of reasons.
4.2.1. Values and Technical Rationality
This dynamic can be clearly observed if we take a look at the relationship 
between technical and normative reason in green discourse. Scientific and
11 It is this arena of ambiguity that is explored in the following chapters.
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technical reason has played a highly ambiguous role in green reflections 
on politics. A num ber of authors including Steven Yearley (1991) and 
John Young (1990) have noted that the emergence of environmentalism, 
as a key component of green politics, owes much to developm ents in 
scientific knowledge that reached public consciousness in the late 1960s 
and 1970s. The first wave of environm entalist literature, such as Rachel 
Carson's The Silent Spring, Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb, and the 
Club of Rome's Limits to Growth were all written in academic scientific 
contexts and primarily, if not exclusively, directed towards a technically 
literate audience. The seeds of green claims have often been planted in 
debates w ithin scientific communities (Yearley 1991). Scientific-technical 
know ledge has been essential in the construction  of the major 
environm ental issues in public debate, including pollution, toxic waste, 
Greenhouse Effect, threats to biodiversity and damage to the ozone layer. 
The influence of the discipline of ecology, which has developed within 
the academic boundaries of science, has had a significant influence upon 
green political conceptual frameworks.
Yet w ithin the green movement there has been significant resistance to 
the practice of approaching environm ental problem s prim arily  in 
technical-rational terms. Technical rationality features prominently as the 
villain in green political rhetoric, as it is heavily im plicated in the 
degradation of the environm ent. The environm ental destructiveness of 
large-scale technologies such as nuclear power and hydro-electricity, as 
well as the more diffuse technologies of crop pesticides and modes of 
transport dependant upon fossil fuel are emblematic of the perils of 
technology. According to Drew H utton, 'science and technology have 
become the tools which hum anity has used to dom inate and exploit 
nature' (Hutton 1987b: 19).
The susp icion  of technical ra tionality  is not confined to the 
environm ental elements of green politics. Greens often characterise the 
logic of technical reason as a significant factor contributing to structures of 
hum an dom ination over hum ans as well as hum an dom ination over 
nature. A particularly undesirable feature of technical reason is the way in 
which decision-making capacity becomes concentrated in the hands of the
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lim ited few who have the appropria te  technocratic expertise. Also 
politically problematic is what greens see as the undemocratically large 
scale and hierarchical structure of organisations and society required to 
devise and im plem ent policies dependent upon technical rationality 
(Bookchin 1982). Greens also d ispu te  the assertion that scientific 
rationality is value free.
Given this background, there is still a substan tia l range of green 
assessments of technical-scientific reasoning. Positions range from the 
complete eschewal of technology to the enthusiastic effort to develop 
environm entally friendly technology. Anti-technological greens regard 
the track record of science and technology to be sufficient reason for deep 
distrust of technology in general.12 Most greens, however, argue in terms 
of 'appropriate technology' in which appropriateness is defined in terms 
of green values. Thus, Bahro espouses the subordination of technical 
know ledge to the needs of small com m unities which w ould enable 
'technology on a hum an scale' (Bahro 1986: 158). The British Green 
election manifesto of 1989 supported the use of scientific research funds 
'to explore technologies which are most likely to serve a decentralised, 
sustainable society' (British Green Party 1989). Thus, any recourse to 
technical rationality m ust have norm ative support as good technical 
reasons cannot stand alone as sufficient justification for a particular course 
of action.13
4.2.2. Values and Pragmatic Criteria
When practical politics and green values are juxtaposed, the former is 
either subordinate or antithetical to the latter. Sara Parkin contends that 
greens have been notably 'squeamish' about the prospect of political 
power (Parkin 1989: 25). Green rhetoric contains a num ber of resources
12 See Australian activist Ally Fricker's objections to the sponsorship of an Australian 
Conservation Foundation conference by Apple Computers (1990: 224).
13 This subordination of technology to normative reasoning differs, therefore, from the 
arguments of cultural theorists who characterise greens as rejecting technology (Douglas & 
Wildavsky 1982).
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capable of portraying the acquisition and use of political pow er as 
normatively unpalatable. Traditional, institutional politics reflects the old 
parad igm , and is m anifestly  hierarchical, aggressive, pa triarchal, 
centralised and authoritarian. Power in this context is equated with 
dom ination and m anipulation. Ariel Salleh, for example, contends that 
party  politics dem onstrates ’(t)he worst excesses of this "instrum ental 
rationality"' and 'inevitably gets down to a m anipulative scramble for 
num bers' (Salleh 1987: 83). Pragmatic politics is also identified with old 
paradigm  politics because it thought to involve the necessity of trade-offs 
and making deals and the compromise of ideals.
Pragmatic rationality is often regarded as problematic by greens because it 
artificially separates the ends of action from the means to carry it out. As 
indicated by the above discussion on technical rationality , greens 
characteristically reject any suggestion that m eans are norm atively 
neutral. Petra Kelly, in contrast, stresses the norm ativity of political 
m eans.
For us, the ends do not justify the means. You cannot do away with 
violence by using violence, or war by waging war, or injustice by 
resorting to injustice. It follows, then, that the ends are a part of the 
method of action, and likewise that the method of action is included in 
the ends (Kelly 1984: 19).
Kelly posits a fundam ental contrast between pragm atic and norm ative 
rationality when she asserts that a green party 'must always be capable of 
deciding between power and morality' (quoted in Porritt 1984: x). As I will 
demonstrate in the following case study, this view of pragmatic rationality 
as the opposite of value rationality is frequently adopted in Australian 
debates about green party formation.
But pragmatic rationality is not always regarded as the obverse of values. 
A common rhetorical form ula allows the active pursu it of political 
advantage as long as those who pursue such strategies do not 'forget' their 
norm ative foundations. This relationship is indicated by the standard 
exhortation that instrum ental actions such as participation in elections 
should be balanced by normatively pristine grassroots activism.
Therefore, while contesting elections is an important part of our 
strategy, it is by no means the only one. We will also be involved in
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grassroots campaigns which are essential if destructive and 
undemocratic values in the community are going to seriously challenged 
by our movement. (Queensland Greens 1992).
Good green politics, according to Hutton, involves getting the balance 
between them right 'so that one builds on the other' (Hutton 1990: 19). 
Pragmatic rationality, therefore, can carry rhetorical weight, but only when 
it is linked to a more encompassing set of normative reasons.
4.2.3. Values and Self-Interest
The final indication of the rhetorical superiority  of values in green 
literature is in the clear cut rejection of self-interest as a valid political 
motivation. The privileging of values over self-interest is most apparent 
in the emphasis placed upon universalist criteria in green rhetoric, and 
the corresponding dow ngrading of particularistic criteria. Greens often 
claim that the only interests they represent are those of the world as a 
whole, and that the benefits of green politics are benefits that accrue to all, 
because environm ental crises ultimately affect all. The suspicion of self- 
interest is highly pervasive in normative green politics, and often extends 
to the stipulation that self-interest cannot be considered as a legitimate 
basis for political claims. Sara Parkin is quite clear about this.
I know of only one such arbiter that cannot be accused of manipulative 
self-interest - and that is the Earth itself. Greens are suggesting that by 
abandoning our obsession with ourselves, and putting the Earth into the 
centre of all the models and plans we make for our personal activities, 
we can discover that, in the words of Theodore Roszak: The needs of 
the planet are the needs of the person .... the rights of the person are 
the rights of the planet' (Parkin 1989: 18).
Eckersley's distinction between ecocentric and anthropocentric politics is 
constructed upon the basis that ecocentrism, as the more radical and 
challenging expression of green politics, is founded upon an ultimately 
universalist conception of interests.
In any event, ecocentric Greens are not only concerned to protect non­
human life. Rather, an ecocentric perspective provides an inclusive 
ecophilosophical framework that recognises the full range of human 
interests in the non-human world; recognises the interests of future 
generations of humans and non-humans; and adopts a holistic rather 
than atomistic perspective insofar as it values populations, species, 
ecosystems and the ecosphere as well as individual organisms 
(Eckersley 1990: 78).
129
According to this formulation, the more universalistic an interest claim, 
the greater legitimacy it has. Hum an interests, for example, are not a 
sufficient justification for environmental action because action motivated 
by hum an interests 'will systematically prevail over the interest of the 
non-hum an world' (Eckersley 1990: 74). This is not to say that greens 
never use particularist interest as the basis for political claims. Greens are 
not averse to favouring particular interests over others, but only when the 
interests greens support, be they of forests, indigenous peoples or the 
unemployed, are portrayed as ultimately universalistic, i.e. in everybody's 
(and everything’s) best interest. It is not feasible to construct politics in 
terms of 'us' versus 'them ' using devices such as class, nationality or 
gender.14 Greens typically wear their universalistic values as a badge of 
honour.
Green politics does not accept the philosophical dualism which 
underpins modern industrial society (mind/body, humanity/nature, 
boss/worker, male/female) nor that of the traditional left (class 
struggle and class war leading to a classless society). Instead, it presents 
the goal of a society where people live in harmony with each other and 
with nature .... (Hutton 1987b: 30).
It is worth comparing green politics to socialist and feminist politics on 
the issue of self-interest. The latter two do not have such 'in principle’ 
problems with self-interested arguments, and do not portray the relation 
between values and self-interest antithetically. Defending the interests of 
women against men, or of workers against employers is unproblematic. 
Altruistic m otivations, though im portant in these m ovem ents, are not 
accorded quite the same prom inence as in green politics. Both these 
movements have the advantage in many political contexts of claiming to 
speak for dominated social categories, but this is a rhetorical store that is 
simply not available for greens.
A lthough greens m ost em phatically eschew m otivations construed 
explicitly in terms of self-interest, there is a significant back door through
14 Offe (1990: 234) makes a related point, when he notes that the 'enemy' to be overcome by 
green politics is not a social category. However, this feature of universalistic value politics 
does not exclude the possibility that political adversaries can be named as an identifiable 
actors with (deficient) moral personalities.
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which such reasons can be countenanced. This applies when they are 
clothed in the normative legitimacy of autonomy and self-determination. 
W ithout too much difficulty the interests of the whole can be transformed 
into the big bad wolf of dom ination, intent upon tram pling the fragile 
rights of autonom ous parts. However, any such rhetoric depends upon 
the conflation of norm ative and self-interested reasoning, rather than 
their jux taposition  as opposites. This flex ib ility  in the m oral 
characterisation of 'selves' is a prom inent them e in the case study 
pursued in the following chapters.
The habits of norm ative primacy thus ensure that the most significant 
non-normative means of justification and criticism in the arena of green 
politics are kept in check. Any of these rhetorical criteria may be of some 
use for greens in as much as they complement norm ative reasoning, but 
none are allowed to take precedence over values. More im portantly, any 
of these types of reasons can be readily located on the wrong side of the 
norm ative fence. Technical, practical and interest-based reasoning are 
frequently criticised as exactly the types of reasoning which contribute to 
the ecological and political crises that greens identify.
4.2.4. Green Value Primacy and Environmentalism
While it is my overall contention that green politics exhibits a great deal 
of value primacy, there are some aspects of green-related political activity 
that have been noticeably less restricted in their scope of rhetorical 
resources. I have in m ind m uch of the p u rsu it of specifically 
environm ental agendas within a scientific institutional setting. These 
include attempts within the scientific community to take seriously issues 
such as ozone depletion and global warming. Scientific and technically 
rational contexts are associated with the development of environmentally 
friendly  technologies, the developm ent of env ironm enta l im pact 
assessm ent techniques and an em ergent discipline of environm ental 
management. The rhetorical materials used in these contexts are drawn 
mainly from the realm of technically rational arguments. They typically 
involve concerted attem pts to alter the scope of w hat is considered 
technically rational to include considerations of environmental damage.
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The emergence of increasingly professionalised environm entalist political 
lobbying has h igh ligh ted  another arena in w hich the rhetorical 
significance of values is som ew hat a ttenuated . The prom inence of 
organisations such as Friends of the Earth in Britain, the Australian 
Conservation Foundation, and Greenpeace International has indicated a 
preparedness of many green actors to engage in the realm of national and 
international pragm atic politics. Sites of practical engagem ent at the 
international level include attem pts to achieve various green political 
objectives such as whaling embargoes, strategies to deal with global 
warming, and the protection of the Antarctic wilderness. Within national 
and local contexts we can note political objectives such as the prevention 
of construction of nuclear power plants, restriction of resource extraction, 
anti-pollution m easures and creation of wilderness parks. The growth of 
governm ental and sem i-governm ental agencies w ith environm ental 
briefs also indicates sites where green agendas are pursued in realms 
where practical reasoning is more influential.
There has also been significant grow th over recent years in the 
form ulation of environm ental claims w ithin the scope of self-interest 
rhetoric. Certain elements of green agendas have been taken up by the 
corporate sector. Environmental awareness has opened up new product 
markets, and environmental credentials are increasingly im portant to the 
m anagem ent of corporate images. W ithin the discipline of economics, 
there have been attem pts to widen the scope of consideration for self- 
interest to include environm ental goods including air quality, w ater 
quality and national parks as recreational am enities. Proposals for 
'polluter pays' policies are associated with these developments. We can 
also observe the emergence of local initiatives such as Land Care groups in 
A ustralia , for whom  protection of local environm ents is justified 
according to the interests of the local community and those who rely upon 
the land for survival.
It is no coincidence that these realms of action are the target of much 
criticism  from greens because of perceived m oral inadequacy. In 
Bookchin, Dobson and Porritt we can find strong criticism of technocratic 
environmentalism, and the search for 'technological fixes' for entrenched
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environmental problems. Without an appropriate normative foundation, 
the application of technical rationality is likely to be counterproductive 
according to Porritt.
With the best will in the world, 1 can't help but conclude that many of 
today’s green pragmatists, for all their assiduous efforts to manage the 
Earth's resources more wisely through the more efficient application of 
technology and conventional reductionist science, are in the unwitting 
process of selling green politics down a very polluted river. A more 
holistic, Earth-centred vision of the world, in which spiritual values 
count for at least as much as the spur of materialism, has become a 
precondition for the emergence of genuinely sustainable systems of 
wealth creation (Porritt 1992: 91).
The political operatives of environmental lobby groups have been the 
subject of vehement criticism in Australia on the grounds that they are 
too prepared to sell out to the practices of 'mainstream' politics. The 
development of a professional elite network comprising of employees of 
Australia's two environmental peak bodies, the Australian Conservation 
Foundation and The Wilderness Society, has been characterised by 
Timothy Doyle as a markedly sinister development.15
The power of the movement seems now to be in the hands of a small 
group of professional Elites who, in turn, are far more interested in 
dealing with their counterparts in government than generating
grassroots action....The professional elite speaks the same language,
utilises the same arguments, and is beginning to think the same way as 
the governors of our society. No more arguments about wilderness; no 
more talk of scientific diversity; instead the game is mainstream 
politics: deals, bargaining, pragmatism and money .... (The) elites, .... 
on their rise to power, brought with them an ideological package 
reflecting mainstream values. Means are not especially important to 
the Elites. Ends - short-term ones - are top priority (Doyle 1991: 30).
Green consumerism, and the professed environmentalism of capitalist 
enterprises is generally greeted with great scepticism and suspicion.16 
Unless accompanied by appropriate changes in moral consciousness, these 
developments are to be regarded as cynical and manipulative exercises to 
lull consumers into a false sense of security. Porritt, for example, expresses
15 For other examples of such criticism, see (Arnold 1989; Beder 1992).
16 The March 1991 edition of Chain Reaction, a magazine published by Friends of the 
Earth in Australia, contains a number of articles critical of corporate and professionalised 
environmentalism.
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concern about the 'political and moral ambivalence of some of today’s 
trendier variations on the green theme'. He regards green consumerism 
as problematic as long as it 'allows people to suppose that there is nothing 
wrong, philosophically or spiritually with the way we relate to the Earth' 
(Porritt 1992: 88).
Each of these less normative environmental activities are also regarded as 
myopic in that the exclusive focus on environm ental problem s means 
that little attention is paid to the broader constellation of concerns that 
constitute the green normative identity. According to Dobson:
Fundamentally, ecologism takes seriously the universal condition of the 
finitude of the planet and asks what kinds of political, economic and 
social practices are (a) possible and (b) desirable within that 
framework. Environmentalism, typically, does no such thing (Dobson 
1990: 205).
These a rg u m en ts  th a t d o w n g rad e  tech n o cra tic  en v iro n m en ta l 
management, professionalised lobby politics and the greening of business, 
industry and farming are frequently m ade in the context of addressing 
green audiences.
4.3. A Rhetorical Interpretation of Green Politics
Greens most definitely identify themselves in terms of values. But the 
rhetorical approach interprets this fact quite differently to value identity 
approaches. It is possible to suggest some rather different ways of 
approaching m any of the issues raised in C hapter 1. Firstly, self- 
identification in terms of universal values serves some useful political 
functions. Secondly, a rhetorical approach allows us to suggest further 
reasons why greens engage in certain types of political action, as particular 
actions are well suited to the skills of norm ative rhetoric. Finally, it is 
possible to offer a different reading of the relationship between green 
politics and its new middle class support base.
4.3.1. The Rhetorical Functions of Green Values
A rhetorical framework allows us to ask what it is that greens are doing 
when they invoke values as a basis of identity. When addressing 
audiences beyond their own constituency, greens are engaged in attempts
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to appropriate and reinterpret the m eanings of values that are already 
widely recognised and shared in western democracies. As Offe (1985: 849) 
notes, most green values are uncontroversial, it is the green interpretation 
of these values that is politically significant. The green m ovem ents' 
political sales pitch uses established universalist values as a rhetorical 
springboard. Greens argue that if autonomy, equality and participation are 
w orthw hile, then green politics represents the m ost appropriate and 
contemporary expression of these values.
In the context of addressing green activists, the rhetorical nature of green 
values is also quite obvious. The starkness of the language adopted by 
Bahro, Bookchin, Kelly and Porritt is intended to exhort audiences to 
choose, or confirm commitment to the green cause (Coleman & Coleman 
1993). The discourse of values serves as a means of identifying audience 
com m onality. Indeed, under conditions of norm ative prim acy, the 
invocation of values is the m ost rhetorically  effective m eans of 
establishing commonality.
But most interestingly, when we adopt a rhetorical perspective on the role 
of values, the connection between the ideological diversity and the value 
identity of green politics is no longer a mystery. By identifying themselves 
in term s of values, greens are able to accomm odate the ideological 
differences such as those between 'pure' greens, rainbow  greens and 
socialist greens. This point is clearly illustrated from the evidence in Capra 
and Spretnak's interview with August Haussleiter, one of the founders of 
die Grünen. From their account it seems that the four basic principles, 
which have become a cornerstone of statem ents of green identity, 
originated as a way of circum venting serious ideological differences 
among participants at the 1979 Offenbach convention.
I myself had been almost desperate with the situation because there 
were 3,000 people screaming their own positions in the convention hall.
.... Although agreement seemed impossible, I took a piece of paper and 
wrote four (in German) words on it: ecology, social responsibility, 
grassroots democracy, and nonviolence. Then I called together Gruhl (a 
leader of the conservatives) and Reents (a leader of the radical left) in 
the room where the journalists were and said, "Sign." We then went 
back into the convention hall and announces, "We have a program!"
(quoted in Capra & Spretnak 1984: 36).
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This account bears out the rhetorical functions of values highlighted by 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in the previous chapter. As such, the 
reason value self-identifications need to be taken seriously has more to do 
their capacity to mean different things to different people than their 
specificity.
How ever, greens also use values rhetorically in order to make and 
maintain political distinctions. From the discussion in Section 4.1 above it 
is clear tha t the green 'theory ' of values closely resem bles the 
characterisation of green values found in the academic literature in the 
respects I have outlined above. In fact, there is significant cross referencing 
between activist and academic work. Hutton (1987b) and Beder (1992) both 
take their definition of the content of paradigm s from Cotgrove's 
depiction, but it is also apparent that academic characterisations of green 
paradigm s borrow  heavily from green self-descriptions. Given these 
parallels, it should not be surprising that greens also deploy techniques of 
value distinction and standards of value consistency and deviance in their 
accounts of political activity. The case study reported in the following 
chapters provides a good example of the ways in which these techniques 
are applied by greens in specific debates.
4.3.2. Green Political Participation
A characterisation of green politics in terms of value am biguity and 
primacy fits with the evidence regarding styles of political participation. 
Mass political protest and organised symbolic actions are forms of political 
participation particularly suited to normative primacy. The ability of the 
green movement to mobilise widespread support for focused campaigns 
demonstrates the efficacity of normative rhetoric in particular contexts. 
The Franklin Dam dispute in Tasmania illustrates well the political 
potency of normative campaigning. Anti-dam campaigners were able to 
deploy norm ative reasoning to capture the attention of a national 
audience and to persuade a significant portion of that audience. The 
w idespread public opposition generated by this campaign was a crucial
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factor in preventing the construction of the dam .17 In contexts such as 
this, the ambiguity of values is definitely advantageous for greens in that 
it serves to maximise their support, particularly among the urban middle 
class.
The capacity to mount organised articulations of normative criticisms and 
justification has been a notew orthy strength  of the green political 
movement. Universalistic values facilitate high levels of inclusiveness in 
these actions, mitigating against the exclusivity of particularistic identities. 
Normative argum ents in public political discourse have been a constant 
feature of w estern dem ocratic politics, no tw ithstand ing  significant 
changes in the value vocabularies over time. Greens have been highly 
skilled in the articulation of arguments that invoke shared values. In this 
respect, it could be argued, they may possess a significant advantage over 
other participants in the political process who, for various reasons, have 
not developed the same capability to argue on normative grounds, or who 
rely on normative standards that are less convincing now than they may 
have been previously.
U nder the rhetorical approach, the capacity to articulate norm ative 
concerns can be considered as a political skill com m ensurate with the 
ability to m ount technically rational argum ents. Com m and of the 
normative repertoire is a resource that can be mobilised by green activists 
in their dealings with other political actors and amongst themselves. In 
this respect, the rhetorical approach dovetails with those elements of 
resource mobilization that emphasise the the role of social movements in 
the developm ent of political skills and capacities .18 How ever, the 
rhetorical approach differs significantly from resource mobilization in that 
it identifies norm ative skills as po ten tially  m ore central to the 
m ovem ent's activities than  pragm atic , tactical calculation. U nder 
conditions of value prim acy, these criteria are less significant. This
17 The success of the campaign to prevent construction of the dam also required the 
mobilisation of non-normative arguments to other audiences, such as the Federal 
government.
18 Inglehart, particularly in his earlier work The Silent Revolution (1977) places much 
emphasis on the skill component of postmaterialist politics.
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contrasts with the preferred stance of resource mobilization theorists who 
tend to regard the normative features of social movement activity (what 
they call ideology) as an impediment to effective utilisation of resources 
(Downey 1986).
4.3.3. Value Primacy and Social Bases of Green Politics
The rhetorical approach also sheds some light on another issue raised in 
Chapter 1. If we regard the green constituency as an audience with a high 
degree of value prim acy, this gives us a useful fram ew ork for 
understanding the social-structural characteristics of green support in 
terms of values, w ithout assuming that green politics is fundam entally 
derived from values. The consistent findings regarding the social bases of 
green politics have been that green support is concentrated among those 
born since the second world war, those with tertiary education, and those 
who work in w hite collar non-productiv ist occupations. Instead of 
approaching the topic of social bases in terms of who possesses green 
values as identifiable attributes, we can ask the question in terms of what 
type of audience is responsive to rhetorical appeals invoking green values.
Drawing on the discussion presented in Chapter 3, we can start by looking 
at the relationship between tertiary education and green politics. In that 
chapter we noted the general finding that ideological consistency, 
however defined, is strongly correlated with higher educational levels. It 
is not surprising that the tertiary educated show the highest levels of 
adoption of a broad green package that covers not only environmentalist 
orientations but favourable positions on the range of social movement 
issues gathered  under the green um brella. Thus, green political 
program m es that cover this range of issues appeal prim arily to an 
educated constituency that have learnt to recognise and appreciate the 
interconnections between issues pertaining to the environm ent, nuclear 
power, women, indigenous people and participatory democracy.
Having said this, it is also clear that the green constituency is not drawn 
evenly from all sectors of the tertiary educated. In the 1990 survey of the 
British Green Party m embership, graduates in arts, social sciences and 
biology were significantly over-represented, constituting a total of around
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60% of all graduate members of the party, in comparison to around 35% of 
British student enrollments in 1988-89 (Riidig, Bennie & Franklin 1991: 
23). The areas of study most under-represented in green party membership 
included business, law, engineering and medicine. This indicates that the 
green package has a closer affinity to the types of knowledge accessible 
through training in arts, social sciences and biology. This educational 
profile is also reflected in the occupational data. O ccupations most 
frequently associated with the green constituency include teachers, artists, 
cultural specialists, academics, journalists, and those in occupations 
closely related to the m onitoring and m anagem ent of environm ental 
conditions. The green profile does not generally include entrepreneurs or 
engineers. From this evidence we can suggest that green norm ative 
reperto ires are learnt or acquired in particu lar social and cultural 
environm ents.
The findings about generational differences in political orientations can 
also be related to the content of normative repertoires. The generational 
factor becomes relevant when we consider that norm ative rhetorical 
criteria are not static. A reasonable interpretation of findings that purport 
to show generational value change is that the rhetorical repertoires of 
each generation are different in significant respects to those of its 
predecessor. Different age cohorts have differing opportunities to develop 
particu lar stan d ard s of norm ative rationality . From a rhetorical 
perspective Inglehart's findings regarding age can be used to suggest that 
the postwar generation deploys a significantly different value repertoire to 
that used by the prewar generation.
This is a more plausible alternative to the interpretation of value change 
in terms of an ahistorical notion of personal need satisfaction. A rhetorical 
interpretation suggests that the types of norm ative stances taken by 
citizens in w estern  dem ocracies are closely tied to h istorical 
circumstances.19 Following Eckersley (1989), we could suggest some of the
19 Indeed, Inglehart's items could be seen as standards which have had valency in 
particular historical circumstances. They capture differences in normative evaluations 
between the standards of the 1940s and 1950s on the one hand, and those of the 1960s and 
1970s on the other. Some authors who have used Inglehart's theories more recently are 
suggesting that the battery is unable to pick up on significant differences between the
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newer components of this repertoire that are a product of the common 
experiences of postwar generations. The emergence of the green package of 
values owes much to scientific and technological developments in which 
new forms of knowledge have been established, long-term experience of 
welfare capitalism , the cold war, in ternationalisation of economies, 
communication and culture, all of which have given rise to new forms of 
norm ative evaluation.
A rhetorical interpretation of the social location of the green constituency, 
therefore, has much in common with the interpretation advanced by Offe, 
Eckersley and Goul Andersen. It also resonates with Gouldner's notion of 
a class of humanistic intellectuals who perceive the world as a whole, and 
participate in a culture of critical discourse. But there is an additional 
element of these accounts that is more difficult to swallow. These authors 
have in terpreted  the social location of the green constituency as an 
indication of this constituency's potential to see more clearly the 
structural contradictions of industrial societies. On this basis the new 
m iddle class are allegedly more prepared to be m obilising agents of 
change.
This is most explicitly apparent in Robyn Eckersley’s article (1989) in 
which she posits adherence to radical green politics as both a reflection of 
the capacity to perceive the ecological crisis, and as a measure of virtue. As 
she points out, there are significant numbers of the new middle class who 
do not adopt the norm ative stance identified as virtuous. Eckersley 
contends that this is because the adoption of an altruistic, ecocentric 
worldview is a poten t ia l  facilitated by new class location, and that this 
potential is often unrealised. In other words, it comes down to the choice 
of individuals as to whether or not this altruistic potential is realised. As 
Eckersley expresses it, '(t)o answer the question as to why pa r t i c u la r  
individuals take the step of embracing an ecocentric world-view would 
require an exploration of the realms of personal  consciousness and 
experience and individual psychological make-up' (Eckersley 1989: 223). A
normative standards of those who entered early adulthood in the 1960s and 1970s and those 
who have come of age in the 1980s and 1990s (Reimer, 1988; 1989).
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significant proportion of the new class is simply content to continue to 
adopt basically selfish political orientations.20 This is part of an effort to 
suggest that the radical green worldview  is the benchm ark norm ative 
orientation to 'the w orld ' available to the new class, and that other 
responses must be judged as normatively deficient in relation to it.21
Such form ulations w arrant a healthy degree of scepticism. Even if we 
grant a degree of 'objective reality' to the social and ecological crisis as 
diagnosed by Eckersley, the green repertoire of values is one, but by no 
m eans the only, norm ative response to these changing social and 
historical conditions. Neo-conservatism and a resurgence of evangelistic 
Christianity have also emerged contem poraneously with green politics, 
both in response to the same societal conditions and as a counterpoint to 
green responses.22 Furthermore, it is doubtful that the majority of the 
green constituency have achieved the type of green consciousness that 
Eckersley sets as the standard. As I have argued in Chapter 2, the 
suggestion of an objective green standard  which actors approxim ate, 
generates a far more exclusive characterisation of the green movement.
A rhetorical reading of the social characteristics of the green constituency 
supports a som ewhat more m odest, bu t less exclusive interpretation. 
Green audiences are constituted by those who have acquired the cultural 
background to recognise elements of the green value repertoire and the 
interconnections between them. They are audiences that can be appealed 
to on the basis that values are better reasons for political preferences than 
any other type of reason. As such, the rhetorical approach offers an 
account of the social bases of green politics that focuses on the acquisition 
of norm ative competencies, w ithout specifying a benchm ark for the 
content of normative orientations.
20 Here she draws upon Gouldner's characterisation of the new class as 'morally 
ambivalent' in that it has the tendency to pursue both emancipation and self-interest 
(Gouldner, 1979: 83).
21 This is what Eckersley sets out to argue in Env i ronmenta l i sm and Poli t ical  Theory  
(1992).
22 See (Minkenberg & Inglehart 1989).
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4.4. Questions for a Case Study
I do not wish to suggest that value prim acy is som ehow endemic or 
inevitable in green politics. However, my concern in this chapter has been 
to establish that habits of value primacy are sufficiently strong in green 
self-description to w arrant further investigation. I would now like to turn 
my attention to how these habits influence the conduct of green politics. 
Habits of normative primacy are typically expressed through the political 
pre-occupation w ith diagnosing norm ative character or norm ative 
integrity and the emphasis placed upon 'conversion' as a mechanism of 
social change. Yet there is ample scope in such a normative repertoire for 
the types of common sense dilemmas and contradictions identified by 
Billig. The co-existence of diversity and consensus, or emancipation and 
com m unity, or harm ony and self-realisation, in the same package of 
values indicate the potential for conflicting norm ative interpretations 
between greens.
As we have seen, a significant theme of green self-description is that 
political objectives are often defined in term s of im plem enting green 
value rationality. However, there is no agreed 'political greenprint' which 
can be pu t into action. One way of th inking about green value 
implementation, in the absence of any such greenprint, is to regard green 
political practice as an experimental site for this value rationality. There 
are few political contexts that would satisfy ideal experimental conditions, 
as far as greens are concerned, given the pervasiveness of modes of 
political conduct that are derived from the principles of the old paradigm. 
One set of circumstances that could satisfy experim ental conditions, 
however, is the establishment of new green organisations from scratch. In 
this context, greens are not in the position of having to reform existing 
s truc tu res. W ithout such external constrain ts , greens sharing  a 
commitment to the formation of a political organisation would appear to 
have the perfect opportunity  to act in accordance w ith their value 
rationality.
Green parties, therefore, are an appropriate site for the investigation of 
norm ative rationality, given the explicitness with which their founders
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regard them, ideally, as the embodiment of green values. This is indicated 
by the following quote from the Federal Program of the German Greens.
Grassroots-democratic politics means an increased realization of 
decentralized, direct democracy. We start from the belief that the 
decisions at the grassroots level must, in principle, be given priority.
We grant far-reaching powers of autonomy and self-administration to
decentralized, manageable grassroots units....  We have decided to
create a new type of party structure, one founded on the inseparable 
concepts of grassroots democracy and decentralization. We believe that 
a party lacking this type of structure would be ill-suited to support 
convincingly an ecological policy in the framework of parliamentary 
democracy (quoted in Capra & Spretnak 1984: 37).
The task for the remainder of this thesis is to investigate the influence of 
normative identity and rationality upon green political activity. In doing 
so I explore the dynamics of normative primacy played out in the contexts 
of green parties, and specifically in the processes of green party formation. 
By narrowing the focus of study in this way, I wish to draw attention to an 
area of green politics which, with the exception of the work of Kitschelt 
and Doherty, has been largely unexplored. This analysis will show that 
there are significant unintended consequences and perverse effects that 
can be traced to habits of value primacy.
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Chapter 5: Green Value Ambiguity and Primacy in an Australian
Context
This chapter explores the themes of normative ambiguity, value primacy 
and the dilemmatic quality of green rhetoric. In this chapter I explore the 
particular ambiguities of green values that relate to the formation of an 
Australian green party, in order to highlight the problems that arise from 
regarding green values as a basis for political organisation. My analysis 
focuses on a series of discussions and debates which took place over a four 
month period in mid 1991 among Australian greens who were interested 
in establishing a national organisational fram ew ork for conducting 
electoral politics. This situation provides a useful test case of the 
relationship between values and political organisation.
The first part of this chapter is spent outlining the background of 
Australian green politics and the issues that were being debated among 
Australian greens at this time. This is followed by a description of a 
particular setting in which these discussions and debates were recorded 
through the medium of a public access computer conference. In this set of 
circumstances, I show how green values and principles clearly form the 
foundation of a shared rhetorical common sense. Values can be seen to 
constitute the best type of reasons in these com puter network debates. 
However, the shared repertoire of values highlight the differences rather 
than the similarities between greens. Far from being readily apparent, the 
im plications of green values and the norm ative character of actors, 
processes and structures are the subjects of vigorous contestation. In the 
case study widespread value ambiguity can be observed at a num ber of 
levels. Firstly, contestation over particular issues among greens indicates 
that the same set of normative principles are readily harnessed to support 
opposing positions. Secondly, there are significant dilemmas embedded in 
the common sense of green norm ative discourse. These ambiguities 
ensure that under conditions of political dispute, the role of green values 
in the conduct of green politics is highly problematic.
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5.1. The Argumentative Context
5.1.1. Australian Green Politics 1991
The material in this chapter is taken from discussions among Australian 
greens who wished to establish some form of green political formation 
and co-ordination. These discussions took place during the winter of 1991, 
approxim ately twelve m onths prior to the eventual launch of T he 
Greens’ in August 1992.1 The March 1990 federal election had been widely 
regarded as an election in which the green issues moved to the centre of 
the Australian political stage (Bean, McAllister & W arhurst 1990). This 
federal election was held nine months after the historic formation in the 
state of Tasmania of a parliam entary  'Accord' betw een five Green 
Independent parliam entarians, including the internationally renow ned 
Dr Bob Brown, and the Australian Labor Party.2 However, despite the 
presence of such highly favourable conditions, and in contrast to 
developm ents in m any w estern industria lised  countries, greens in 
Australia had not come together to form a unified political party. Instead, 
in the 1990 Federal Election, a plethora of candidates stood under a variety 
of green banners.
In the state of New South Wales, no less than ten different groups stood 
for the 1990 federal election using the word 'Green' or a derivation 
thereof. Of these, six were local formations who wished to restrict their 
scope to particular lower house electorates. These local groups reflected 
the green emphasis on localised participatory democracy. However, the 
other four groupings were competing directly with each other at a 
statew ide level. This contributed to the overrid ing  im pression of 
fragm entation of the green political effort, which was reflected in the
1 The Greens are a federation of state based green parties from Queensland, New South 
Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and the A.C.T. The Western Australian Greens, the only green 
group represented in Federal Parliament, is not a member of this national green party.
2 In the 1989 Tasmanian election, Green Independents received over 17% of the vote, which 
under Tasmania's proportional representation translated into five seats in the thirty-five 
seat lower house.
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decision of environm ental peak bodies to endorse the A ustralian 
Democrats in preference to any of these groupings in NSW.
The development of a green electoral presence had taken different courses 
in different states. In Tasmania and W estern A ustralia, greens had 
organised under single statewide bodies. In most other states, forums had 
been established in which already existing groups could interact and 
possibly co-operate at elections. These um brella bodies, usually called 
Green Alliances, were networks of suburban, electorate-based, regional 
and statewide groups. Some viable co-operative arrangem ents between 
different green groups had occurred at more local levels. In Queensland, 
most existing green groups were part of the Green Alliance that contested 
the Brisbane City Council elections in 1991, and whose lord mayoral 
candidate, Drew Hutton, attracted 7.4% of the vote.3
The possibility of a co-ordinated national political formation had long 
been on the agenda in the Australian new social movement arena, as the 
1980s witnessed a number of attempts to establish a presence in electoral 
politics at a national level. The first such concerted attem pt, the Nuclear 
D isarm am ent Party (NDP), achieved spectacular electoral results, 
including the election of W estern Australian candidate Jo Vallentine to 
the Senate, within six months of its formation in 1984.4 Yet by mid-1985 
the party had effectively disintegrated in all states except NSW and the 
Australian Capital Territory. In 1986, two new initiatives from different 
parts of the social m ovem ent sector, attem pted to draw  the various 
strands of m ovem ent politics together (Taylor 1989). N either of the
3 The Brisbane City Council is by far the largest local government in Australia, with 
coverage of the majority of the greater Brisbane urban area, servicing a population of 
around one million.
4 Characteristically, the NDP has been regarded as a single issue party, and during its 
brief time in the sun, its public pronouncements were predominantly related to nuclear 
issues. However, its candidates, memberships and support base could easily be considered 
as green in the wider sense. Vallentine stood for the Western Australian Greens in 1990, and 
at that time Garrett was president of the Australian Conservation Foundation.
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resultant organisations, the New Left Party and the Rainbow Alliance, 
made any significant impact at a national level.0
In April 1991, a group of green activists including Bob Brown, Jo 
Vallentine and Drew H utton initiated moves to convene a national 
m eeting of green groups which were interested in the formation of a 
green electoral presence at the national level. This meeting, known as the 
National Greens Meeting, took place in Sydney on the weekend of August 
17-18, 1991. A criterion for participation in this meeting was support for 
the p roscrip tion  of m em bers of o ther parties from  green party  
membership. Proscription had been a highly contentious issue dating back 
at least as far as the NDP's first national conference in 1985. Failure to 
reach agreement on this issue was the biggest contributing factor in the 
NDP's subsequent disintegration. The proscription issue also contributed 
to the stillbirth of initial attem pts to form the New Left Party in 1986 
(Taylor 1989). Now in 1991, the issue had em erged as a significant 
stum bling  block to co-ordination  am ongst greens. The common 
denominator to the all these disputes was the prospective involvement of 
members of a particular group, the Democratic Socialist Party, which had 
been known as the Socialist Workers Party prior to 1989. A number of DSP 
members were active in various local and state green groupings.
Many greens, including most of the convenors of the National Greens 
Meeting, regarded the involvem ent of these activists w ith suspicion, 
noting that the DSP had acquired a reputation for conducting takeovers of 
successful social m ovem ent organisations.5 6 Other greens, however, felt 
that DSP members had made very valuable contributions to particular 
green campaigns, and to their local groups and parties. Some other groups
5 Of the two, the Rainbow Alliance was closer to the typical mode of a 'new politics' or 
green political party (the New Left party also having emerged from the remnants of the 
Communist Party of Australia). The choice of name 'Rainbow Alliance' involved a 
deliberate decision against using the term green, because it was thought by many delegates 
to the 1986 conference to be too closely tied to environmental issues with not enough 
emphasis upon other social movement concerns (Taylor 1989) .
6 This suspicion was vindicated when the DSP made a successful attempt to takeover the 
Queensland Green Network in August 1991 and an unsuccessful attempt to takeover the 
NSW Green Alliance in March 1992.
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who accepted invitations to the National Greens Meeting were not sure of 
their position at the time of the m eeting and preferred the issue of 
proscription to be discussed at the meeting. Some participants hoped that 
more groups could be involved in the process if outright opposition to 
proscription was moderated (for example by allowing party membership, 
but barring eligibility for office bearing positions).
The second issue of major concern was the structure of the party to be 
formed. Many greens favoured a unified body in the form of a federation 
of state parties, with a range of national co-ordinating functions including 
policy formulation, publication of a national newsletter, and co-ordinated 
research on green issues. Most of the convenors of the National Greens 
Meeting supported such a ’unitarist’ structure. Others advocated a loose 
network model in which the structure would be limited to facilitating 
communication between local groups and would have no role beyond 
this. These ’localists' were wary of setting up national structures because 
they believed that these structures would disempower existing local green 
groups. Another version of a localist model was that of 'confederation' in 
which the national structure would have some administrative functions, 
but no capacity to determine policy.
Divisions over the two issues were highly correlated, though not 
identical. Those who favoured proscription and a party with national 
functions included the Q ueensland and Tasm anian delegates, those 
W estern Australians aligned with Vallentine, and some NSW delegates 
from regional areas beyond Sydney (Campbell 1991). Others from Western 
Australia supported some form of proscription but w anted a localist 
organisation. Localist models were also supported by many NSW groups, 
particularly Sydney-based groups who contended that decisions over 
proscription should be made at the local, not the national level. Localists 
were quite prepared to enter into dialogue with the unitarists, in the hope 
that they could influence the shape of the em ergent organisation. For 
their part, the convenors did not wish to exclude the localists, as the 
viability of the party in both New South Wales and W estern Australia 
would be severely dim inished w ithout them. A lthough some localists 
had reservations about proscription, they nevertheless accepted the 
invitation to participate in the National Greens Meeting, hoping the issue
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could be resolved there.7 The Victorian and South Australian delegates 
were against proscription (Campbell 1991), and expressed concerns about 
potential of a national green party to exclude other groups (Brewer 1991a). 
These delegates represented their state Green Alliances which included 
DSP members, but were invited to the meeting so that there would be 
some representation from these states.
Another background concern of participants in discussions about green 
party formation was that of access to electoral registration. Concerns were 
raised by those who did not want to be part of a more centralised party 
w ith proscription, that the em ergent organisation w ould prevent or 
inhibit the use of the w ord 'green' by others (Brewer 1991a). Under 
Australian electoral law, there is no restriction on the use of particular 
words such as green, provided that the full names of parties wishing to 
use the word are different.8 Nevertheless, there was a common perception 
that any group wishing to be known as 'a' green party would be seen by 
the rest of the movement and the general public as 'the' green party. Any 
recognition afforded to the emergent party which included the likes of 
Vallentine and Brown was likely to be detrimental to others who wished 
to use the name green. The convenors and their supporters also regarded 
the existence of green parties competing on the same patch as bad public 
relations. This perception created pressure to keep as many groups 
involved in the process as possible in order to avoid the prospect of 
competing green parties.
Much of the discussion and debate about these issues was actually 
conducted publicly, in both the lead-up and the aftermath of the meeting. 
Some of this dialogue between many of the central characters in the 
negotiations has been recorded in the form of a com puter conference. 
Thus, it is possible to gain a very detailed im pression of the types of 
arguments that were put forward regarding these issues at the time. The
7 The exception being the delegate from the North Shore Greens who walked out after the 
two members from groups opposed to proscription were barred (Brewer 1991a).
8 Only in NSW state electoral laws is there a restriction of the right to use the word green 
built into electoral registration.
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conference, therefore, is of significant interest as a source of rhetorical 
material in which we can have a detailed look at the ways in which values 
are deployed in the conduct of green politics.
5.1.2. The Audience: ’Greens Policy and Networking Forum'
The Greens Policy and Networking Forum (hereafter grns.oz.forum) is a 
public access computer conference facilitated by the Pegasus computer 
conferencing netw ork (see Appendix) with the purpose of providing a 
space for discussions about green political co-ordination a n d /o r  party 
form ation. G rns.oz.forum  is a unique source of m aterial in which 
dialogue and debate among greens is recorded. The type of dialogue 
captured by grns.oz.forum  ranges from spontaneous and unstructured 
postings to editorially polished contributions similar to articles or letters 
in printed publications. The length, tone and purpose of the postings all 
vary significantly , and the norm s governing  th is novel form of 
communication are in the early stages of their evolution. Articles and 
documents from other publications are often contributed as postings. In 
the period in question, a num ber of articles from the new spaper Green 
Left Weekly were subm itted .9 Utilisation of the conference has also been 
subject to variation and fluctuation. There have been perhaps a dozen 
frequent contributors, but around a hundred participants who have made 
contributions at one time or another. Utilisation rose steadily in the two 
years after the establishment of the conference in 1989, reaching a peak 
between June and September 1991, but participation dropped m arkedly 
with the establishm ent of a private conference in September 1991 to 
discuss party  form ation and has rem ained relatively quiet since that 
tim e.10 In the June to September period, the equivalent of well over five 
hundred pages of material was posted to the public conference. As such,
9 This publication is generally perceived in Australian green circles to be the mouthpiece of 
the DSP, although editors continually stress that it is not a DSP newspaper, but a broad 
platform for green and left activists generally. Nevertheless, the publication is largely 
financed and resourced by the DSP.
10 From October 1990 to May 1991 inclusive, 28 topics and 13 responses to grns.oz.forum were 
posted (an average of 5 postings per month). In the period from June to September 1991, 74 
topics and 79 responses were posted (38 per month). From October 1991 to April 1992, 20 
topics and 34 responses were submitted (8 per month).
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grns.oz.forum has been a widely utilised vessel for Australian intra-green 
discussion regarding the salient issues at that time.
This source of material is particularly well suited to a rhetorical analysis. 
One of the advantages is the quick turnaround between submission of a 
posting and its appearance on the netw ork. This facilitates quick 
responses, and in so doing creates a form of communication that is much 
more am enable to dialogue betw een correspondents than prin ted  
material. Such a form of communication can function as a more effective 
forum for debate than newspapers or magazines for whom the facilitation 
of debate is logistically more difficult. It also makes possible a different 
kind of public debate than is typical of verbal communicative forums such 
as radio , television or public m eetings. Responses m ay be more 
'considered', and not subject to the same communicative norms as verbal 
communication. Dialogue can also take place w ithout the presence of a 
m oderator or facilitator. Grns.oz.forum contributions are also public, in 
that anyone subscribing to the Pegasus network has access to them. The 
conduct of the debates and arguments, therefore, m ust be considered as 
taking place in a public, and not a private context.
Another feature that meshes well with a rhetorical m ethodology is the 
absence of researcher intervention. The analyst does not need to consider 
any 'interviewer effect' that would have to be taken into account if the 
material were collected by interview. Specifically, there is no question that 
the orator's rhetoric may be tailored to appeal to the standards and 
commonplaces of the interviewer. Thus, it is possible to make relatively 
straightforw ard  assum ptions about the audience that grns.oz.forum  
orators have in mind.
C ontributors to grns.oz.forum  could be confident that they were 
addressing a sym pathetic audience that did not include significant 
portions of members who are antagonistic or highly ambivalent to the 
green cause. It could also be assumed that those utilising the conference 
wished to see the emergence of a green electoral formation, as this had 
been the expressed purpose of the conference. Thus, there are few 
discussions about the desirability of organised electoral and political
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participation per se.11 From this pool of activists, a few other limitations 
can be noted. Participation in the forum was limited to green activists who 
are com puter literate to some degree. The geographic distribution of 
contributors is mostly lim ited to New South Wales, Queensland and 
W estern Australia, which reflects to a large extent the developm ent of 
interstate green political netw orks at an informal level at that time. 
Victorian and South Australian activists had only been weakly integrated 
into such networks, as was indicated by their minimal representation at 
the A ugust meeting. Of those involved in the national debates, only 
contributions from Tasmanian activists are noticeably absent from the 
conference discussions.
The debates conducted through grns.oz.forum  cover a wide range of 
perspectives, interests and positions relevant to the issues of proscription, 
structure, and the national process. They provide a clear indication of the 
range and content of rhetoric that can be used to address an audience who 
share an interest in developing green electoral participation. The public 
nature of grns.oz.forum is of central significance in this thesis. No doubt a 
different range of rhetorical language can be deployed in private 
discussions between greens, but that is not our concern here. As I seek to 
show in Chapter 6, the range of acceptable public rhetoric among green 
activists has a significant effect upon the ways in which green activists 
interpret and evaluate their political experiences, and the ways in which 
they can react to, and seek to shape their political circumstances.
For all of the above reasons, grns.oz.forum provides an excellent example 
of a forum in which to investigate the use of values. There is plenty of 
evidence that contributors to grns.oz.forum  adopt a highly norm ative 
language in order to identify with their audience. An early posting to 
grns.oz.forum  in 1989 provides a succinct form ulation of the shared 
values of this audience of Australian greens.12
11 In Australia, the Friends of the Earth magazine Chain Reaction  has been the main 
sounding board for anti-electoral arguments. See (O'Loughlin 1990 ; Martin 1989).
12 See Appendix for details about the system of referencing computer conference material.
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Green politics is not only different in what it has to say but in its 
approach. It signals an end to the backroom deals with those having 
vested interests. It heralds a new driving force - that of the co­
operative power of millions of people previously denied real access to 
political decision-making. Green politics must be consistently and 
resolutely democratic. Public representatives of our movement must
truly represent the movement, not simply themselves.....An open and
democratic approach allows this diverse political movement to begin 
the discussion now that will allow us to reach agreement on proposals 
and solutions over time. Working through this to build a broad, 
inclusive movement poses a real challenge to all shades of greens; to 
leave behind the old discredited politics and stake out a new claim in 
the politics of ensuring a future (Green Political Network 1989b).
This extract was taken from an article entitled 'Principles and Aims for a 
Green Political M ovem ent'. Similar form ulations appear w herever 
particular groups announce to the green public who and w hat they are. 
These articulations typically appear throughout grns.oz.forum as parts of 
organisational constitutions, or as proposed general statements that seek 
to define the nature of green politics.
There are also plenty of references to the normative rationality of green 
politics. The prem ise that political activity is to be derived from 
foundational norm ative principles is well and truly articulated in the 
following contribution from a member of the W estern Australian Greens.
The essence of the greens party policies can be summed up as a statement 
of values. Our values are fundamental in determining our choices in life, 
and in refining both action and our understanding, both in a general 
sense, and in specific cases. The priority of values held by an individual 
constitute their ethics, and hence will reveal much about both policies, 
the basis for actions, and the direction of future changes in policies and 
actions. It is therefore worthwhile to outline our value priorities here 
(River 1991b).
5.2. Contentious Issues and the Ambiguity of Values
In this section, I intend to highlight the ways in which greens articulate 
normative rhetoric when discussing the issues of proscription, the DSP, 
organisational structure and the process of party formation. To do so, I 
have chosen, as much as possible, to utilise direct quotations from the 
contributors to grns.oz.forum, rather than attem pting to paraphrase their 
com m ents. Such a preference follow s from the m ethodological 
requirements of a rhetorical approach, which focuses upon the ways in
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which political actors articulate criticism and justification. In this context, 
paraphrasing is inappropriate.
5.2.1. Proscription
The proscription issue provides the clearest example of the degree to 
which debates about issues are carried out in normative terms. The most 
common strategy for opposing proscription was to portray the practice as 
contrary to green democratic principles. One such argum ent was mounted 
by Lisa Macdonald, a member of both the DSP and the Western Suburbs 
G reens (WSG). WSG was a Sydney local group  w hich opposed 
proscription and was not invited to the August 1991 national meeting.
We hope and trust that other autonomous green groups will not be 
intimidated into non-attendance at the national meeting because they 
support the green political principle of openness rather than 
proscription (Macdonald 1991).
In the following quote, an even more extensive list of green democratic 
principles are invoked rhetorically by M acdonald both to criticise the 
proscription-based invitation process and to justify her group's attendance 
at the August meeting. In this quote she explicitly refers to the shared 
nature of green values which, in her view, are violated by the proscription 
proposal.
The delegate chosen to represent us at the meeting on the 17-18 will, 
therefore, be chosen on the bases of their willingness and ability to 
represent the views of the members of the Western Suburbs Greens, NOT 
on the basis of their membership or otherwise of another political 
party. The directive that we do otherwise is yet another example of 
the totally undemocratic practices which have characterised this 
whole process of moving towards the formation of a national Greens 
organisation. To dictate permissible attendance at a meeting which was 
called to discuss organisational structure (which presumably includes 
the question of membership) so that particular points of view on the 
question of membership are prevented from being heard is quite 
outrageous and must be condemned in action as well as words. Whatever 
happened to "local autonomy", "grassroots democracy", "participatory 
decision-making" and all those other green ideals we all espoused so 
strongly not so long ago?! (Macdonald 1991).
Another frequently raised objection to proscription was based on the 
assertion that any decision m ade at the national level would be 
norm atively unacceptable because it w ould override the autonom y of
154
local groups. This argum ent was commonly advanced by opponents of 
proscription who were not themselves DSP members. According to David 
Nerlich, a Sydney localist, even limited forms of proscription would be 
'an im position, innocuous or not, upon local groups from outside, or 
perhaps "above", depending how you look at it' (Nerlich 1991b).
Arguments in favour of proscription show similar recourse to the green 
norm ative reperto ire . D hanu River, a con tribu to r from  W estern 
Australia, argued that some form of proscription was necessary in order to 
m aintain the 'in tegrity  of the participatory  process' (River 1991g). 
According to this argument, the integrity of participatory decision-making 
requires tha t m em bers should  partic ipa te  as ind iv iduals, not as 
representatives of other groups. This theme is developed further by Marit 
Hegge, a contributor from Queensland. Having asserted that the right to 
proscribe other political parties is consistent w ith the principle of 
autonomy, Hegge makes the following claim.
I support proscription for my above outlined reasons but also because the 
sort of Green Party I wish to be part of is one in which I could engage in 
political and intellectual discussion with free-thinking individuals 
who are committed to exploring new ways of resolving global conflict 
nonviolently and to developing appropriate means of caring for this 
planet and policies to deal with the immediate environmental crises 
upon us. I am really not interested in having prolonged dialogue in a 
Green Party with individuals from another party who cannot speak on 
their own behalf, who are continuously reiterating the beliefs of 
someone higher up in their organisation and who come to meetings with 
the aim of manipulating the situation to fit in with their pre-ordained 
and often conflicting agenda (Hegge 1991b).
As with Macdonald's quote, this extract is also noteworthy for its attempt 
to draft as many elements of the green normative repertoire as possible, 
this time in the service of the argum ent in favour of proscription. In this 
case, the threats to autonomy and integrity are clearly identifiable in the 
shape of the DSP, rather than the proposed national structure. Arguing for 
the norm ative acceptability  of p roscrip tion  is p red ica ted  upon 
characterising the DSP as a particular type of organisation which merits 
disqualification on normative grounds.
A comparison between the two sets of arguments clearly shows that the 
same rhetorical terminology of values and principles are deployed by both
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sides. This is often a consciously adopted strategy. For example, one Green 
Left journalist attacked proscription on the basis that '(i)t is unlikely that a 
viable green party can emerge from a top-down process based on exclusion 
of sections of a movement that prides itself on its diversity and tolerance' 
(Painter 1991b). In response, a supporter of proscription countered that '(i)t 
is, however, certain that a viable green party cannot emerge from a non- 
proscriptive m em bership base which is easily m anipulated by external 
groups in pursuit of their own agenda' (Ozols 1991a). The charge that 
'external groups' can easily m anipulate m em bership and pursue their 
own agenda uses the same terminology that was evident in Nerlich's anti­
proscription argument.
Indeed, the common content of green value discourse is regularly 
acknowledged and directly appealed to by participants from both sides of 
debates. Doug Hine, an advocate of proscription involved in organising 
the national meeting, responded to M acdonald’s rhetorical question of 
'whatever happened to all those ideals?' He asserted that '(t)he "ideals", or 
ra ther p rincip les, of local autonom y, grassroo ts dem ocracy, and 
participatory decision-making are only diminished when tightly organised 
factions, such as the DSP, seek to abuse them' (Hine 1991c). Both Hine and 
M acdonald invoke and appeal to the same body of normative common 
sense in order to present opposing cases.
The above extracts indicate that argum ents in favour of proscription are 
closely intertw ined with attempts to discredit the DSP. These attempts to 
attribute a negative moral character to the DSP cover a range of normative 
rhetorical strategies. One well rehearsed argum ent questioned the 
legitim acy of participation of DSP m em bers on the basis that the 
organisation adopted w hat were considered to be anti-environm ental 
stances on certain issues. For example, a NSW contributor regarded the 
DSP's opposition to population  control as evidence of its 'active 
p rom otion  of an ti-env ironm en ta l ideo log ies ' (O zols 1991b). A 
Queensland activist regarded DSP support for industrialised agriculture as 
sufficiently divergent from green thinking to be problem atic (Murrell 
1991b).
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However, many contributors from both sides of the debate contended that 
disqualification of the DSP on account of its ideological disposition was 
not appropriate , in accordance w ith the principles of diversity  and 
tolerance. Nerlich, who at the time supported the right of the DSP to 
participate in green political formations, asserted that '(g)enerally people 
don't try to argue anymore that its somehow a contradiction in terms to be 
both a socialist and an ecologist' (Nerlich 1991c).13 As such, he was 
'disinclined to alienate some of the more committed and better educated 
activists merely on the grounds of ideological purity '. Criticism of the 
DSP's stances on economic, social and environm ental issues had been 
commonplace in the 1980s but the 1991 debate reflected the change in 
focus.14 Hence, Hegge argued that '(w)hat the DSP believe in is not the 
issue. It is the method of operation of a national organisation which is 
being questioned' (Hegge 1991a).
The tactic more commonly adopted by opponents of the DSP was to focus 
upon features of its structure and activities in order to cast doubt over its 
norm ative credentials. M embers of the DSP w ere not legitim ate 
participants because in their own organisation they operated according to 
centralist and hierarchical principles. According to one contributor, '(t)he 
presence of people com m itted to dem ocratic centralist principles is 
destructive of participatory decision m aking' (W right 1991). Non-DSP 
activists critically recounted their experience of DSP members operating as 
a highly disciplined bloc in meetings (Hine 1991c; Ozols 1991a). According 
to Hegge, m em bership of such a highly disciplined organisation also 
amounted to an abandonm ent of participatory credentials that accrue to 
'free-thinking ind iv iduals’, such that DSP m em bers were 'not truly 
capable of an independent and non-aligned point of view' (Hegge 1991c).
13 Nerlich’s attitude to the DSP changed in early 1992 when the DSP attempted an 
organisational takeover of the NSW Green Alliance.
14 This was, at least in part, due to the DSP's responses to these criticisms, in which they 
were quick to accuse their critics of prejudicial and McCarthyist tendencies (Fletcher 1991).
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Conversely, the activities of the DSP could also be used to defend its 
normative character. Nerlich, for example, regarded their involvement in 
various green campaigns as commendable.
I support most of the peace, environment and solidarity movements they 
get involved in, often constituting the force that keeps them going (some 
would call this "infiltration"). This kind of activity as far as I can tell 
takes up nearly all of their time (apart from survival-fundraising etc.).
They extract no kudos for this work. They tend to keep a low profile 
because they are aware that people are prejudiced against their 
economic beliefs' (Nerlich 1991c).
Members of the DSP, however, did not attem pt to directly defend their 
organisation. Instead, they adopted a strategy based on identifying 
them selves as participants in local green parties, rather than as DSP 
members. Thus, they defended their participation as legitimate by linking 
it to the autonomy of local groups, such that any proposals designed to 
lim it their participation  could be construed as attacks upon local 
autonomy. In doing so, they attem pted to move the focus of normative 
attribution away from the DSP, and play off the normative distinction that 
the localists had established between autonomous local groups and a 'top- 
down' national process. Once again, this involved shifting the normative 
spotlight to other phenomena, namely the national process, its convenors 
and the proposed national structure.
5.2.2. Organisational Structure
Green Left published a num ber of articles which made extensive use of 
the repertoire of green values in order to cast doubt on the legitimacy 
these phenomena. A favoured technique for doing so was to refer to 
'dissatisfied participants' of green groups who were critical of the process, 
and construe these criticisms as grassroots dissent. These participants were 
usually members of the DSP.
.... members of the QGN (Queensland Green Network) had expressed 
dissatisfaction with top-down moves for a national meeting towards
formation of a green party...... The elected office-bearers of the QGN
had written to express disapproval of the lack of grassroots democracy 
in preparations and proposals for the meeting (Sibelle & Fletcher 
1991).
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M any of these criticism s of the national m eeting convenors were 
advanced in order to delegitimise the push for a unified national party, as 
those seen to be initiating the proscription-based process were also mostly 
in favour of a unitarist structure. DSP m em bers were not the only 
contributors who criticised the national process on norm ative grounds. 
Localists used the same elements of the normative repertoire to paint the 
proposed unified structure as a contravention of green political values. 
River offered the following articulation of the concerns of some of the 
W estern Australian Greens.
The Greens (WA) first talked about a national party at a General 
Meeting in January, 1991, in response to a proposal we were told was put 
by the Sydney Greens at a meeting of the registration group. At the 
time, we concluded that we did not like the idea, feeling that it went 
inherently against the idea of decentralism, and would make real 
participatory decision-making more difficult than it currently is. We 
put forward that while we do not see the need for any national 
organisation, if one came into being, we would prefer that it be along 
the lines of a network or informal alliance, i.e. basically a forum for 
communication, not decision-making (River 1991k).
Some members of the NSW Green Alliance noted 'some concern about 
w hether a uniform  national structure could presently  operate in a 
grassroots participatory manner' (Nerlich, Eager & Ash 1991), while Hine 
expressed fears that Brown, Vallentine and the other convenors appeared 
to be 'pushing for som ething much more authoritarian ' (Hine 1991d). 
Articles in Green Left adopted  a m uch more striden t use of green 
norm ative rhetorical d istinctions, a ttem pting  to locate the unified 
structure squarely in the realm of the dominant paradigm. Painter argues 
that 'it is unlikely many greens would accept the degree of centralisation 
necessary to impose such an undemocratic structure' (Painter 1991a). In 
another article he cited a particularly strong critique.
Moreover, a number of groups expressed reservations about the structure 
proposals, and argued for a loose alliance to preserve existing unity and 
cooperation between diverse groups committed to fundamental green 
principles. The Lismore-based Richmond Green Alliance wrote to the 
national meeting organisers, saying: ’We wish to make it clear .... that 
our group does not support any sort of centralised party structure, or any 
decisions that are not seen to abide by the four principles, especially 
any betrayal of grassroots democracy .... there needs to be an Australia­
wide Green Network, however we do not see the need for a centralised 
party structure run along mainstream party lines.' (Painter 1991b).
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In the face of such criticism, based as it was upon alleged norm ative 
deficiencies, proponents of a unified party were concerned to defend the 
credentials of their preferred option. In June 1991, a group of Brisbane 
activists including Hutton, Hegge, and Malcolm Lewis, established the 
Australian Greens W orking Group as part of their push for a national 
party.
AGWG would like to see a national organisation comprising state 
groups with a common constitution and policy framework, agreed upon 
democratically. Within this constitution and framework states could 
develop their own structures and constitutions, and policies pertinent to 
their own agenda. This would satisfy the requirements of autonomy, 
diversity, and grassroots democracy and participation while also 
laying a organisational basis for cooperation at a national level (Lewis 
1991e).
Hegge adopted similar language in defending the integrity of the unified 
party proposal. She claimed that 'the original convenors of the process, 
especially Bob Brown, have stressed how im portant the participation of 
grassroots activists is to the success of a party, and reiterated the need for 
regional autonomy to be built into a party constitution' (Hegge 1991c).
Advocates of a more decentralised structure adopted m uch the same 
language to support quite different proposals. Dhanu River maintained 
that he supported  confederation 'as the only form of truly national 
organisation that is likely to m aintain any form of participatory  
democracy' (River 1991a). Paul Fitzgerald from the Sydney Greens 
evaluated the com peting m odels and concluded that his proposed 
netw ork m odel was the only option which w ould be 'an achievable 
workable compromise through which a national organisation could be 
formed while the autonomy of the local Parties is m aintained’ (Fitzgerald 
1991a).
The localists were not the only contributors who sought to propose that 
their opponents' preferred model was not in accordance with green 
political principles. Unitarists repaid in kind. Apart from asserting that a 
unified party  could satisfy principles of autonom y, democracy and 
participation, and assuring that it would 'not be top-down' (Hegge 1991b), 
unitarists also found ways to question the normative legitimacy of localist 
proposals. This was done by claiming that the status of 'local autonomous
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group' may not warrant the morally privileged status it had been given by 
localists, such that a structure based upon local autonom y could easily 
have un-green implications. Lewis, for example, points to the likelihood 
that local groups may at times operate outside the bounds of green 
principles.
I require that our mutual agreements about such basic principals (sic) not 
be so wide that anyone could interpret them the way they chose. Thus 
it follows that I am not prepared to give local branch an unfettered rein 
to promote whatever policies they wish (Lewis 1991d).
According to Hegge, the interpretation of local autonom y and diversity 
offered by the localists opens the door to a m em bership 'including the 
"green" Liberals, Fred Nile "greens" and m ultinational corporation lobby 
groups keen to promote their environmental credentials' (Hegge 1991c).15 
Ian Murrell, who was also one of the Queensland unitarists, contributed 
another angle of attack on the status of local groups.
The argument that one of the cornerstones of Green politics is autonomy 
is both true and false. I like the idea of autonomy for people but not for 
entities such as groups. To me one of the great unwritten laws of Green 
politics is co-operation. Autonomous people can co-operate. But to me 
there will be no, or very slow, co-operation in a tight network of 
autonomous local groups. Worse still it will be hierarchical (Murrell 
1991c).
It should be noted that the defence of the unitarist structure is not 
predicated on the assertion that such a structure would be sufficiently 
grassroots democratic. Neither side constructs the issue as a m atter of 
degree. Instead, the unitarists argue their case by mirroring the rhetorical 
strategy of the localists in that they too set out to persuade the audience 
that of the two competing alternatives, only one is in accordance with 
green principles, while the other is normatively suspect.
These debates highlight many pertinent points about the relationship 
betw een green values and attem pts to construct green political 
organisation. It is clear from these discussions that the various
15 The Reverend Fred Nile is a member of the NSW Legislative Council who is commonly 
identified as a 'morals crusader', and who is well known for his unsympathetic stances to 
homosexuality and the 'erosion of family values’.
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protagonists all appeal to the im prim atur of green values. As such, there 
is an enorm ous degree of flexibility in the deploym ent of the green 
normative repertoire regarding these issues. Rather than meshing tightly 
as a coherent system of thought with easily discernible implications, green 
norm ative discourse contains a range of rhetorical materials that are, in 
practice, easily p itted  against each o ther in concrete debates and 
discussions. Far from being readily discernible, the implications of green 
political values are frequently the focus of intense political contestation 
among greens, due to the well developed capacities of activists to exploit 
the ambiguity and flexibility of normative standards.
5.3. The Rhetorical Primacy of Values
5.3.1. Values and Practicality
Given this pervasive recourse to normative criteria to criticise and justify 
particular actors, actions, processes and structures, just how significant is 
normative rationality to rhetorical discourse in grns.oz.forum? It would 
be misleading to suggest that values and normative principles are the only 
form in which in which justifications and criticisms are advanced. Non- 
normative rhetoric can be found in the course of both debates. The most 
prom inent competitor to normative reasoning in the context of building 
national links and networks is that of practical or pragm atic rationality. 
There are occasional attem pts to give practical considerations greater 
standing in green rhetoric in relation to value standards. Malcolm Lewis 
highlighted some of the impracticalities he believed to be implicated in 
the network model articulated by Fitzgerald, and in the calls for extensive, 
inclusive participatory mechanisms that were outlined in River's model 
of confederation.
A system that takes 2 months to reach a decision might be inclusive but
might condemn us to being ineffective....... Perhaps it would be
irresponsible to set up a system that was too cumbersome to apply the 
crowbar of pressure politics. Where would we be in our negotiations if 
we were made a great offer 3 weeks before the election, but had to wait 
2 months for our membership to respond to plebiscite about the issue?
(Lewis 1991d).
However, these non-norm ative reasons simply do not wash for many 
contributors, precisely because they are not normative. This move is made
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by redefining the issue as simply a choice between implementing and not 
implementing green principles and highlighting the disastrous effects of 
the latter option.
Altogether, I don't see any real problems getting a participatory,
consensus-based process going..... The idea that this is too "idealistic"
and "impractical" is a nonsense. We've tried representative systems for 
a long time, and the 'best' they result in is a clone of "Yes, Minister". At 
their worst they result in corruption, secrecy, covert action against its 
citizens, and the sort of repression seen in the fifties McCarthyism, or 
its correlate Stalinism. The USSR, of course, is also a representative 
system (River 1991c).
As a useful adjunct to this strategy, argum ents invoking practicality may 
also be countered by re-affirm ing the m oral virtue of the practical 
difficulties generated by preferred, principled options. Nerlich typifies this 
reaction in declaring:
We cannot sacrifice the fundamental principle of grassroots democracy 
for some expedient notion of nationalism/federalism or the expectations 
of the media. As far as I'm concerned the more we confound the media 
with our diversity and lack of centre, the sooner that grassroots message 
will take hold in the mind of the public (Nerlich 1991a).
The relationship between pragm atism  and principled politics can also 
redefined in term s of how far green principles can 'practically ' be 
implemented. Fitzgerald claims that there are important limits to the scale 
of participatory democracy, and that the problem with the national model 
is that it exceeds those limits. As such, attem pts to go beyond local 
im plem entation  of g rassroots dem ocracy are too am bitious and 
unrealistic. He contends that '(t)he difficulty in communication between 
and within the States and the amount of distrust that has been generated 
in the past few months indicate that we can't aspire to anything more, but 
I don't think we should anyway' (Fitzgerald 1991b).
The privileging of normative over practical reasoning is also apparent in 
the proscrip tion debate. River notes that the involvem ent of DSP 
members affords some definite practical benefits, due to the skills these 
activists brought with them in the areas of m eeting facilitation and 
campaign organisation. According to River, DSP m embers in W estern 
Australia 'were the only activists that seemed to be able to get the right 
paper and glue so the posters d idn 't just fall off' (River 19911).
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N evertheless, River rem ains a suppo rte r of p roscrip tion , as such 
practicalities should not override consideration of the DSP's threat to 
participatory integrity. The same conclusion is reached by a NSW activist.
It would be great if DSP members could genuinely participate in 
consensus decision-making, because they have great activist skills and 
energy. But the history of an organisation is difficult to shed (Wright 
1991).
Supporters of proscription could well argue on pragm atic grounds that 
proscription should be considered as an adm inistrative measure. It is 
hardly unreasonable for a fledgling organisation to institute measures to 
protect itself from takeovers by potentially hostile groups, and there was 
plenty of evidence to suggest that the DSP was such a group. Yet under 
conditions of value prim acy, w hat w ould be considered as entirely 
reasonable pragm atic and self-protective argum ents in other settings do 
not get very far. Such argum ents sim ply do not appear, unless 
accompanied by the norm ative gloss regarding the DSP's threat to the 
sp irit of au tonom ous decision-m aking . W ith in  the context of 
grns.oz.forum, all the strong argum ents in favour of proscription were 
based upon values. In order to portray proscription as norm atively 
justifiable, supporters needed either to argue that the DSP was not truly 
green, or that those who wanted a party with proscription should be free 
to have one .16 While practical argum ents would appear to be the most 
straightforward way of justifying proscription, the primacy of values over 
practicality ensures that it is not the route taken with this audience. These 
non-norm ative criteria are not regarded as reasons which can override 
norm ative considerations, their only use as rhetorical resources is to 
support positions that have already been advanced on principled grounds.
5.3.2. Normative Primacy and Rhetorical Skill
The grns.oz.forum debates also indicate that 'mastery' of the normative 
repertoire is a highly useful capacity, and that the ability to deploy green 
norm ative rhetoric is a prerequisite for participation in public debate
16 This argument is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 6.
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among greens. One manifestation of rhetorical skill is the capacity to lodge 
normative identifications in more subtle ways than the sort of arguments 
that explicitly seek to show how X is democratic, or how Z undermines 
autonom y. There are som e s tan d ard  rhetorical ploys in which 
phenomena are characterised as possessing or lacking normative integrity 
by their very definition. The term 'local autonom ous groups' is a typical 
example of this move. Local groups are invested with normative integrity, 
not by virtue of anything that they have done, but through the language 
by which they are defined. This term is loaded with the implication that 
anything that is seen to threaten these groups can then be categorised as 
norm atively suspect. Similar efforts are m ade to give some phenomena 
labels which have inbuilt negative evaluations such as ’centralised 
structures' and 'highly disciplined groups', in the hope that these labels 
will become the standard for identifying such entities.
With this in m ind it is not surprising that m any of these attem pts to 
attribute norm ative character by definitional fiat are resisted by those 
whom they are directed against. If the label 'local autonom ous groups' 
was to stick as an accepted way of identifying individual green groups, the 
task of those arguing against a network structure would be made all the 
more difficult. Lewis was well aware of the political importance of control 
of language.
.... we believe that the wording in Doug Hine's letter, "local 
autonomous green parties" preempts a decision to be made at the August 
meeting or at a subsequent agreed upon forum. Not only are we opposed 
to the precedent of assuming such an important issue, we also strongly 
concerned about this vague and naive wording. The phrase is ambiguous 
but would even seem to indicate a preference for a network or alliance 
structure rather than a party. If this is the case, we would strongly 
oppose this unilateral decision (Lewis 1991e).
The deployment of normative rhetoric is also significant in the building 
and breaking of alliances among greens. In this sense, skilful use of the 
normative repertoire can help establish or cement coalitions with regard 
to specific issues. DSP m em bers' deploym ent of the term  'local 
autonom ous group', for example, signified the connection between them 
and the localists.
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Another element of norm ative rhetorical skill is the capacity to deploy 
standards of value integrity, consistency and rationality that can be readily 
recognised and adopted by green audiences. From the evidence in this 
chapter, it seems that members of the DSP are the most skilful greens in 
this respect. This supplements the assessment that these participants were 
relatively  highly skilled in other aspects of green activity. Their 
preparedness to present norm ative argum ents in the m ost vehem ent 
tones highlights the extent of their norm ative virtuosity. A G reen  L eft  
article posted in the aftermath of the National Greens Meeting contained 
the following quote from Lisa Macdonald, which is a good example of 
'pulling all stops out’ rhetorically.
What we saw in operation was no more than the first stage in a grab for 
the exclusive control of the name 'green' electorally, using methods 
more in common with the old, top-down, politics of power-grabs, 
behind-the-scenes manoeuvres, ultimatums and brinksmanship than 
with new politics based on diversity, participatory democracy and 
accountability (Brewer 1991b).
As we have seen throughout this case-study, this is something which DSP 
contributors were wont to do quite regularly when under threat. But they 
were by no means the only contributors to adopt a heightened tone of 
moral indignation. Com menting on reports he had heard about the 
National Greens Meeting, River made known that '(m)y objection and 
strong disquiet is based primarily on the process, which I see as aggressive, 
devisive (sic), unrepresentative, and totally antithetical to the values I 
hold' (River 1991h). Referring to the outcome of the meeting on the issue 
of proscription (which River supported), he protested.
.... where a decision, or series of decisions is pushed through with such 
haste and force, that they leave a metaphorical "trail of bodies", the 
process probably goes against both the principle of participatory 
democracy, and that of non-violence in its wider sense. These are two of 
the four principles that are, at this time, the only elements the Greens 
purportedly hold in common (River 1991 h).
This statem ent highlights both the creativity and force with which the 
norm ative repertoire is utilised in these discussions, in addition to its 
emphasis upon the value foundations of green politics.
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Thus, the debates of grns.oz.forum typify a discursive context characterised 
by high degrees of norm ative primacy. For this audience, rhetorical 
persuasiveness is u ltim ately  contingen t upon  dem onstra ting  the 
principled nature of one's point of view, in contrast to unprincipled or 
inadequately principled alternatives.
5.4. Ambiguities in the Normative Repertoire
The above accounts of the debates over proscription and structure 
revealed substantial elasticity in the norm ative interpretation of specific 
proposals, events and actions. This should hardly be surprising, keeping 
in m ind Billig's claim that any repertoire of common sense has the 
potential for am biguous and contradictory evaluations. This insight is 
confirmed when we investigate norm ative am biguity at another level, 
beyond the specific argum entative contexts discussed above. There are a 
num ber of 'types of actors', including individuals, groups, factions and 
political parties, that feature across the range of green political discourse, 
and which typically have highly ambiguous normative characters.
5.4.1. Individuals and Groups
Perhaps the best example of this type of ambiguity is the various ways in 
which 'individuals' are portrayed in green discourse. Participants in 
grns.oz.forum  regularly  appropria te  liberal them es that locate the 
individual as a basic moral unit of society. This is usually expressed in the 
form of extolling the potential and capacity for self-realisation and 
autonom y that is inherent in individuals. In an earlier proposal for 
federation of green parties, some members of the Sydney Greens phrased 
their political ideal in the following terms.
The Federation of local Green parties is based on the Green 
philosophies of grassroots democracy and thinking globally, acting 
locally. It is to help encourage and empower individuals and local 
communities where real change occurs (Sydney Greens 1989).
Individuals are capable of empowerment given the opportunity, and the 
green m ovem ent carries w ith it the prom ise of allow ing such 
em pow erm ent to flourish in 'non-dom inating non-exploitative ways' 
(Lewis 1991d). As the Sydney quote indicates, individuals are not the only
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moral agent defined in this way, and it would be mistake to characterise 
green rhetoric as merely a reform ulation of classic individualist themes. 
The language of self-determination, potential and autonom y are just as 
easily applied to social categories, groups, communities and bioregions as 
they are to individuals. Nevertheless, special consideration is often given 
to individuals that is not available to other agents in green norm ative 
discourse.
The status of the individual may be m orally privileged in relation to 
collective green agents. In the context of arguing against DSP participation 
in a national green party, it was suggested that autonomy only m ade sense 
with respect to individuals, not groups. Effective political participation 
was based on the capacity for ind iv iduals to m ake 'free-thinking ' 
judgem ents about matters before them as opposed to the strictures of 
group or party discipline. Individuals, according to this line, are the only 
agents capable of true participation . Sim ilarly, River asserts that 
participation in green consensual decision making is 'based on people 
speaking as individuals, with their own understanding  and concerns' 
(River 1991d), while Murrell refers to the basis of consensus as 'people 
representing their own thoughts' (Murrell 1991c).
However, in other contexts, the normative legitimacy of individuals is on 
m uch shakier ground. This is most apparent in discussions involving 
'representation '. While the local group, party  or m ovem ent may be 
constituted by individuals, individuals cannot speak on behalf of these 
larger entities unless authorised to do so. The illegitimacy of individual 
action is most strongly indicated when particular actors are perceived as 
having acted w ithout such authority. On one occasion, the letterhead of 
the NSW Green Alliance was used by three of its members to reply to 
some queries about the national process from greens in W estern 
Australia. This prom pted the reaction from an office holder requesting his 
audience not to 'write off the NSW Green Alliance as a DSP front because 
of the m isbehaviour of three individuals' (Hine 1991b). At around the 
same time, another regular contributor made the following disclaimer.
I .... wish to state that the views I expressed on Pegasus Network are
my own, and I had no intention of acting as a representative of the Avon
Greens or any other person. My decision to place them on pegasus was
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also my own, and not agreed to or approved of by any other person 
(River 1991 f).
The dow ngrad ing  of the norm ative sta tu s of the ind iv idua l is 
encapsulated by Lewis' request to '(p)lease bear in m ind that I am only 
speaking as an individual' (Lewis 1991a). One of the communicative 
norms that developed among contributors to grns.oz.forum was a caveat 
stating that postings were the contributions of individuals and not made 
on behalf of groups of which they were members.
An anti-individualist ethic also applies in the context of green dealings 
with those outside the movement. Nerlich proposes that a suitable public 
spokesperson for the greens would be someone who could articulate 'why 
the media shouldn't be talking to them as an individual anyway' (Nerlich 
1991b). Similarly Macdonald expressed dissatisfaction with the prospect of 
'spokespeople who are accountable to nothing in particular' (Macdonald 
1991). Both Macdonald and River are critical of the individualism of what 
they call the 'conscience position' in which representatives do not follow 
the decision of the group if their conscience does not allow (Macdonald 
1991; River 1991i).
As well as being potentially unrepresentative, individuals are prone to 
illegitimate self-interest. Such strategies draw  upon the current of anti­
individualism  in green discourse which involves the deep suspicion of 
prominence and leadership. Centralised decision-making is, at least in 
part, a consequence of 'egocentric individualism ’ (River 1991k). One critic 
of the national process alleged that 'self-appointed leaders .... are afraid 
that, quite apart from the DSP, if they subject them selves to a truly 
democratic process they might not stay in the leadership, and they might 
not get their precious bum s on those precious seats in parliam ent' 
(Fletcher 1991). Having established this distinction between the interests of 
the m ovem ent and those of individual leaders, it becomes feasible to 
assert that the interests of the latter are actually at odds with those of the 
former.
N orm ative ambivalence is hardly restricted to the consideration of 
individuals. Much the same dynamic can be observed regarding the 
evaluation of local groups. As with individuals, local groups have been
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invested w ith moral privilege vis a vis other agents, particularly the 
suggested national green party  and the state um brella bodies. Any 
restriction of the autonom y of local groups was often presented as self- 
evidently in contravention of green principles. In the same way as 
individuals, however, specific local groups are unable to represent the 
movement or the party as a whole. According to M urrell, the localist 
models such as that proposed by Fitzgerald 'are all based on the premise 
that local groups are of param ount im portance and are the prim ary 
consideration of all structures' (Murrell 1991c). In response, he offers the 
following critique of this param ount status of local autonomous groups.
.... each autonomous local group will have power over the whole 
network. The small autonomous local groups will form a point of view on 
an issue, within themselves, with what may be limited information
and a narrow discussion......  The network, with a larger number of
people participating, should have a wider point of view on an issue.
The larger the number of people the more representative the point of 
view will be of all the Greens. Yet one autonomous local group will be 
able to stop the Network from making a decision (Murrell 1991c).
Less 'official' actors, such as sub-groups among greens, can also be easily 
presented in both positive and negative guises using the repertoire of 
green values. On the one hand, they can be characterised negatively as 
factions and cliques. According to River, simply focusing on recognisable 
organisations such as the DSP neglects the possibility that the same type of 
problem can occur due to the actions of informal groupings.
Obviously the problem is equally applicable to "any" party. It is 
equally applicable to people into democratic centralism "within" a 
party. You can make sure that people who are openly members of 
another party, any other party, cannot do this. It's far more difficult 
when you're dealing with covert members of any outside group 
(political party or not), and even more difficult when you're dealing 
with some group within your own group (River 1991c).
In other circumstances, however, informal groups and sub-groups are 
regarded as having the right to pursue their positions when they are not 
equivalent to those of the wider body. An equally principled argum ent is 
advanced by the same correspondent who asserts that '(c)onsensus fails
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where an action of the group runs against the interests and values of some 
section of that group' (River 1991d).17
5.4.2. Unity and Diversity
These examples highlight the more general pattern of conflicting language 
used by greens to describe relationships between 'parts' and 'wholes'. In 
River's first quote about sub-groups, the actions of parts are considered 
detrimental to the whole. But in the second quote we see the reversal of 
this moral hierarchy in which it is stipulated that the actions of the whole 
should not damage the integrity of its constituent parts. This normative 
'Janus-face' pervades the discourse of participants in grns.oz.forum. One 
prom inent image of the relationship between parts and the whole is that 
the whole should be imagined as greater than the sum of its diverse parts. 
According to Lewis, '(a)ll of us are smarter than any of us' (Lewis 1991 d). 
In this formulation, no part, or even a collection of parts can claim to 
represent the whole. This image draw s upon elem ents of the green 
reperto ire  such as harm ony, com m unity , so lidarity , w holeness, 
interdependence and integration, all of which can be identified under the 
broad rhetorical theme of unity.
However there is also a repertoire of norm ative discourse in which the 
uniqueness of each part must be respected and protected at all costs against 
threats to this autonom y from other entities, which may include the 
whole. Here greens can deploy values such as autonomy, openness, self- 
realisation, tolerance, and celebration of difference. These exemplify the 
rhetorical language of diversity. Adding another level of complexity, there 
are also conflicting possibilities regarding which entities should be 
considered as parts and wholes. The group, for example, can be considered 
as 'the whole' in some contexts, or as a constituent part in others and is 
therefore subject to two types of divergent normative interpretation.
17 This statement was qualified by the contention that a 'clear majority' (as opposed to 
consensus) was permissible in order to 'allow decisions where self-interest of some is clearly 
seen as counter to the general interest of the group'.
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The dilemmatic pair of unity and diversity are often embedded in single 
norm ative criteria. Perhaps the best exam ple of this is the term  
'grassroots’, which has a remarkably chameleon-like quality. On the one 
hand the term is used to denote commonality. Leaders and would-be 
leaders are (usually by definition) out of touch with the grassroots. Here 
the term is used in the singular sense, the grassroots supposedly speak 
with one voice. Yet in other argum entative contexts, the grassroots are 
m ultifarious, representing a rich range of experience and outlooks that 
resists reduction to a singular characterisation. The plurality  of the 
grassroots is emphasised as the source of normative integrity.
'Participation' is another normative standard that exhibits this rhetorical 
suppleness. Participatory democracy is regularly extolled in grns.oz.forum 
as a mode of self-expression in which individuals pu t forw ard their 
diverse points of view, and where the caucusing of overt or covert groups 
constitutes a threat to self development which is facilitated by democratic 
participation. In this sense, participatory  action contributes to the 
autonomy of the parts, regardless of its effect on the whole. Alternatively, 
participatory democracy can be characterised as a practice that enhances the 
character of the collectivity, and is envisaged as a process which reveals a 
collective w isdom  not accessible to ind iv idua ls. R estrictions to 
participation, whether voluntary or imposed, detract from the legitimacy 
of both decisions and the decision-making body.
N orm ative tw o-sidedness is also apparent in the characterisation of 
political disagreement among greens. Participants constantly remind each 
other of the diversity of green politics and the differences of perspective 
that are gathered under the green umbrella. Internal political difference, 
therefore, can be regarded as an entirely legitimate indication of a healthy 
eco-polity. The corollary to this is that unity may not necessarily be 
desirable if it is achieved 'artificially'. This provides a rationale for letting 
conflicts and disagreements happen.
If we have spokespeople telling the national media that such and such 
is the Australian Greens' position on an issue and at the same time local 
groups in various parts of the country are stating the opposite we will be 
accused of being disorganised and hypocritical because we are 
pretending to be united when we are not. Some people might be thinking 
that if we enforce total proscription we will be much more united. I
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don’t think that's true. Getting rid of people who belong to other 
political parties won't get rid of the huge diversity of opinion among 
Greens about many issues (Fitzgerald 1991b).
However, differences of opinion can also be norm atively problematic 
when viewed through the lens of green unity. Another interpretation of 
political disagreement and conflict is that if and where it exists, it needs to 
be w orked through and overcome, albeit by legitim ate means. The 
persistence of conflict is patently unhealthy as it indicates the persistence 
of adversarial 'old' politics that green politics hopes to avoid. According to 
one activist, '(t)he last thing the green m ovem ent needs is the back- 
stabbing and party political game you have in the Liberals, Labor and, now, 
the Democrats’ (Brewer 1991b).
In addition to these differing characterisations of conflict, there is also 
significant am biguity regarding the way in which antagonists should 
overcome their differences. Compromise, for instance, can be portrayed as 
a laudable means by which diverse perspectives are reconciled. But the 
green value reperto ire  also supports a highly jaundiced  view of 
compromise. If altruism is the abrogation of self-interest, and the adoption 
of the interests of others, then the preparedness to negotiate and 
compromise can only damage the interests that one has vowed to protect. 
Compromise, in this sense, amounts to a capitulation to the temptation of 
self-interest.18
5.5. Conclusion
The green norm ative repertoire can be easily harnessed to 'prove 
opposites'. If one wishes to support the claims of a local group against the 
national body, one simply dips into the store of norm ative resources 
relating to the themes of diversity that portray the group as a valiant 
battler against the m ight of an oppressive whole that restricts free 
expression. If one takes the alternative position, there are plenty of green 
values pertinent to the theme of unity that can be used to build up a
18 The dilemma of compromise is covered in more detail in Chapter 6.
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picture of a recalcitrant and maverick group acting out of self-interest and 
disregard for the wider cause of green politics.
I wish to em phasise that the types of norm ative dilem m as that are 
apparent in grns.oz.forum are hardly the unique preserve of greens, nor 
are the rhetorical tactics adopted notably novel. Similar contradictory 
evaluations from a common sense stock of principles are most likely a 
feature of internal debate w ithin other political organisations, where 
processes of decision-making and organisational structure are subject to 
discussion and debate, even if the terminology differs. As Billig and his 
colleagues have argued, similar exercises could be carried out with regard 
to the common sense rhetoric of democratic liberalism, or Marxism, or 
conservatism (Billig et al. 1988). The greens of grns.oz.forum need not be 
singled out for criticism that their normative language is full of potential 
contradictions when applied to specific circumstances.
The po in t of in terest in the grns.oz.forum  debates concerns the 
implications for a style of politics that places so m uch weight upon 
normative rationality, when this rationality is highly flexible, ambiguous 
and dilemmatic. In the following chapter I pursue the argum ent that 
normative primacy greatly amplifies the practical difficulties and conflicts 
encountered by greens. The material in this case study offers an ideal 
opportunity  to investigate the perverse effects of building a political 
identity upon the shifting sands of green values.
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Chapter 6: The Perverse Effects of Value Primacy
The purpose of the previous chapter was to h ighlight the extent of 
ambiguity, contestation and open-endedness characteristic of the green 
norm ative repertoire. Following from this groundw ork, the purpose of 
this chapter is to explore some of the political consequences of placing so 
m uch rhetorical w eight on norm ative criteria in the light of this 
ambiguity. The habits of value primacy create significant problems for 
green political actors as the norm ative legitim acy upon which green 
action is to be built is precarious and unstable. The chapter highlights 
some characteristic perverse effects that can be traced to value primacy. I 
examine the ways in which participants in grns.oz.forum  approach 
questions of party identity and deal w ith some the differences which 
pervade their discussions. I then explore the political vulnerabilities that 
arise from perceiving their political activity as being built upon distinct 
values.
The chapter will concentrate on two inter-related issues that have been 
particularly problematic for the greens of grns.oz.forum. These difficulties 
include the issue of setting organisational boundaries for the prospective 
party and the difficulty in resolving conflict when and where it arises. 
Both of these issues illustrate the dilemmatic quality of green rationality, 
especially the tension between diversity-related and unity-related values. 
They also demonstrate the perverse effects of using green organisational 
principles as a foundation for political action.
6.1. Reconciling Diversity and Unity
As a precursor to these issues, it is pertinent to address at a more general 
level the ways in which grns.oz.forum  participants acknowledge and 
attem pt to deal with the conflicting themes of diversity and unity. The 
normative ambiguity of grns.oz.forum discourse did not go unnoticed.
I implore you all to think about a solution to our problems without 
thinking in terms of hierarchies or dualisms. I would like to challenge 
everyone in this dialogue to try and think about this question of
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structure and autonomy without using such vague terms as grassroots and 
without using concepts or diagrams that suggest levels (Lewis 1991b).
Interestingly, Lewis suggests that the way out of dilemmas between unity 
and diversity can be achieved by further application of green political 
principles. The task at hand is the design of a national party which 'will 
seek by a participatory structure and cooperative ethos to resolve the 
tension betw een diversity  and unity  w ithout being fragm ented or 
authoritarian' (Lewis 1991c). This is a motif that appears regularly in green 
discourse w hen norm ative dilem m as become apparent. There are a 
num ber of princip led  solutions to such dilem m as that have been 
suggested.
One m ethod of m anaging the co-existence of potentially contradictory 
themes is to attem pt to separate the contexts in which they are applicable. 
For instance, a hypothetical split is often posited between arenas within 
which the autonomy of particular green agents is valued and the arenas in 
which such agents act in unauthorised and unrepresentative ways. The 
most noticeable example of this is the delineation between autonomous 
participation within a group and representative activity on behalf of a 
group. In this formulation, representative participation is not appropriate 
within groups and autonomous activity is illegitimate beyond the group's 
boundaries. River articulates this model in his discussion of participatory 
democracy.
The basic model of a participatory democracy involves meetings of the 
citizens who discuss freely an issue, often at some length, and over some 
period of time. They may chose some person or people and empower 
them to carry this decision out. The chosen person or persons have the
power to do what is decided, and nothing else..... Representatives are
chosen by the people and charged with a specific task. Betrayal of the 
trust of the people in the name of "conscience" cannot be considered a 
moral action (River 1991d).
This device relies on the presence of clear boundaries between internal 
and external spheres of activity. The principle of diversity governs 
internal relations, whereas unity is the over-riding consideration for 
external dealings. People are entitled to participate as autonom ous 
individuals within the group, but not when they are representing the 
group. A problem  here is that such a neat separation between the
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performance of autonomous and representative capacities simply was not 
applicable in m any of the forum s w hich A ustra lian  greens had 
established. For example, the NSW Green Alliance and the Queensland 
Green Network were forums open to the participation of both individuals 
and  groups. Strict demarcation between autonom ous and representative 
participation was extremely difficult in such settings.
Furtherm ore, the categorisation of actors as either autonom ous or 
representative is frequently contested among contributors. Although DSP 
members are regularly identified by other participants as representatives 
of the DSP, they them selves claim that they are participating  as 
ind iv idua ls . Sim ilarly, w hen DSP con tribu to rs claim  tha t their 
Queensland opponents participate in the green forums as members of a 
party-like formation and caucus together at meetings, Lewis is at pains to 
point out that he participates 'as an individual' (Lewis 1991a). River and 
Nerlich both point out that greens, regardless of the DSP, m ust be ever 
vigilant against the formation of cliques and informal sub-groups whose 
members claim that they are acting as individuals when they are really 
presenting a rehearsed group perspective. Thus the conditions for making 
clear separations between spheres of autonom y and representation are 
rarely, if ever, present.
Another attem pt to separate realms of diversity and unity can be seen in 
efforts to distinguish matters of principle from issues in which diversity of 
opinion is accepted and valued. Fiona Campbell, a Sydney-based activist, 
suggests such a separation.
This raises the issue .... of the relationship between a national body 
and groups that abide by the four principles (for example) but disagree 
on the issue of membership not being up to the local group to decide 
based on their local conditions (Campbell 1991).
Defining the party as unified in terms of principles but allowing for 
diversity in 'other areas' is undoubtedly a flexible approach, but one 
which begs more questions for green activists than it answers with regard 
to contentious issues. River identifies a num ber of relevant intra-green 
debates where this delineation may not be altogether straightforward.
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I also agree with Malcolm that some control needs to be set on the limits 
to diversity. I certainly wouldn't wish to be identified with any 
organisation at any level which advocates, or allows members to 
advocate, nuclear weapons/nuclear power, or racism, or sexism, or 
exploitation of the third world. At the same time, these are far less 
likely to be at question than diversity on economic/social issues. How 
many Green parties are willing to adopt a "no economic growth" 
position, for example? What about population control? There are 
contentious issues within green thought, and we somehow need to work 
out which are "black and white" issues, and which are issues where 
maximum diversity is allowed. The example of population control
springs to mind......  This appears a far more real issue than the
suggestion that any Green Party would support nuclear weapons (River 
1991i).
The population/im m igration issue is an apt example of the difficulty of 
separating the realm of diversity and tolerance from the province of unity. 
This issue can be readily constructed as one in which diversity is accepted, 
because divisions are evident. However, either side of the debate can be 
expected to argue that its position is derived from the green principles 
which supposedly form the basis of green party unity. Overlaid on to the 
dispute over whether immigration restrictions are consistent with green 
values and principles is a second-order d ispute about the role this 
contentious issue plays in the definition of green identity.
A more decisive way of dealing with conflicting themes of diversity and 
unity, if collisions betw een them  are acknow ledged, is to make a 
principled stance of privileging one over the other. This is what Paul 
Fitzgerald seems to be doing in his proposal for a 'tight network'.
The confederation proposals would result in a mess. If we call ourselves 
by a name that indicates we are unified but at the same time we allow 
any significant degree of local autonomy there will be chaos. If we have 
spokespeople telling the national media that such and such is the 
Australian Greens’ position on an issue and at the same time local 
groups in various parts of the country are stating the opposite we will be 
accused of being disorganised and hypocritical because we are 
pretending to be united when we are not (Fitzgerald 1991b).
Fitzgerald suggests that such a situation could be avoided simply by 
deciding in favour of diversity and autonom y in circumstances where 
they cannot be reconciled with unity.
.... this package of proposals won't work if we don't have a name that 
makes it clear from the start that we are not pretending to be unified.
One suggestion is "The Australian Network of Green Parties". In any
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case we need a name that PROCLAIMS the autonomy of the Green 
Parties, that shouts it from the roof-tops. Local autonomy is an asset.
Not something to be hidden (Fitzgerald 1991b).
Similarly, Hine contends that the acceptance of the local autonom y of 
parties m eans that 'the fear of who controls the central resources 
disappears at a stroke' (Hine 1991b). These characterisations are notably 
pessimistic in their assessment of the prospects of reconciling unity and 
diversity at the level of relations between local green groups and parties. 
Reasons given for the im practicability of unitarist structures include 
problem s of scale (River 1991 j) and the difficulty of comm unication 
(Nerlich 1991a). It is interesting to note that the capacity of local groups to 
speak with one voice is simply taken as given, so that the difficulty of 
attaining unity is only ever acknowledged and dealt with in the context of 
co-ordination between, rather than within, local groups.
The localist strategy of privileging diversity and autonomy over unity was 
criticised by other grns.oz.forum participants who saw it as an obstacle to 
concerted political action. Murrell offered the following caricature.
The Greens could spend the rest of time not co-operating, keeping their 
little power bases intact, and "spitting the dummy" if they do not get 
their way. In the mean time there is a highly organised group of people 
out there destroying Gaia (Murrell 1991c).
The price of this strategy of dealing with conflicting themes is a marked 
tendency towards inertia and inaction, as initiatives, efforts to construct 
consensual decision-making processes, and attempts to achieve consensus 
all come to grief against the rocks of non-negotiable autonomy. Fitzgerald, 
River and Nerlich all frequently argue that there is little prospect of supra- 
local structures operating according to grassroots and participatory 
democratic principles, and this, in their view, is sufficient argum ent 
against building any supra-local structures that have the capacity to act.
These contributors are aware of the costs of privileging diversity. 
Nevertheless, localists would not concur that they are abandoning the 
ideal of unity. On the contrary, they argue that only the type of unity 
w orth having is that which is based upon fundam ental respect for 
diversity. Initiatives taken to achieve co-ordinated and unified action 
cannot be considered as producing 'real' unity if the structures and
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processes adopted bypass the input and assent of all constituent groups. 
Their interpretation of experience is based on the perception of failure, up 
until now, of green structures to meet the conditions that could facilitate 
such unity, and perhaps more interestingly, the lack of desire for unity 
among local groups.
Each of the above strategies represent theoretical attempts to reconcile the 
tension betw een diversity and unity. H ow ever, the co-existence of 
dilemmatic themes is frequently encountered by greens in more concrete 
circumstances. In other w ords, the problem faced by greens is one of 
dealing w ith circum stances in which the im plications of different 
elements of the normative repertoire appear as contradictory. The task of 
establishing the boundaries of a new political party is one such issue 
where it is virtually impossible to avoid collisions between dilemmatic 
them es.
6.2. Managing the Boundaries of Green Party Identity
As I have repeatedly observed, the distinction between greenness and 
non-greenness is defined in terms of adherence to values and principles. 
Such a definition excludes, therefore, only those who do not adopt these 
principles. As the norm ative legitimacy of greenness is built into its 
definition, once exposed to the desirability and rationality  of these 
principles it is expected that most people, apart from  those with 
entrenched and vested interests, will reasonably adopt these principles. 
Beyond this common denominator of adherence to green principles, the 
boundaries of green identity, symbolised by the concept of the green 
m ovement, are highly inclusive. No-one need be excluded from being 
considered green on grounds of gender, race, religious affiliation, 
geography, class, age or education. The benefits of a green polity accrue to 
all. The inclusive green m ovem ent ideal celebrates diversity. As a 
universalistic movement, greens perceive themselves as well-placed to 
draw together a broad range of support without particularist limits.
What inspires me is that it is apparent that there are many people in 
different places, from different backgrounds who have come to share a 
similar outlook that is identifiably Green. Any difficulties need to be 
put in that perspective (Hine 1991b).
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Among contributors to grns.oz.forum, there is a tendency to regard green 
movement identity and green party identity as the same thing. Perhaps 
the best indication of this tendency to isom orphism  is the definition of 
local green party membership in the same terms in which the movement 
is identified. For example, a newly-formed suburban Sydney group, the 
Inner West Greens stated that they 'seek to extend m em bership of The 
Greens to all in the community who are in accord with our fundamental 
objectives' (Inner-West-Greens 1992). These objectives are predicated on 
the Four Principles. Similar formulas are found throughout green-forum 
discourse.
According to River, his local group asserted that 'as a group, we are less 
interested in "Greens” as a political party than in "Greens" as a social 
movem ent' (River 1991k). The propensity to identify the party  as the 
political expression of the m ovem ent is not surprising in the light of 
green concepts of value rationality.
I would like to think that people see Greens as the true alternative 
political force in this country.... as I see it, Greens are about defining a 
totally new Australian politic. I hope this process can be embraced by 
those representing the Green movement at the August meeting where a 
national party will be proposed (Garton 1991b).
The practical problem  for party  founders, therefore, is how to 
operationalise this highly inclusive and therefore highly am biguous 
identity. Some provision for exclusion from green party membership of 
those who do not adhere to green principles is deemed to be necessary 
when party  m em bership is predicated upon norm ative identity. Here, 
Lewis and River provide clear statements of the link between movement 
principles and party identity.
I for one, after having risked my life on several occasions swimming in 
front of nuclear ships will not be in the same organisation as other 
people who are pro-nuclear power or nuclear weapons. If they advocate 
pro-nuclear or pro-nuclear deterrence policies, I can not credit them as 
being believers in nonviolence or in ecological sustainable values (Lewis 
1991d).
Well, I'm not happy about living with a group that is overrun, and 
putting out views I consider fundamentally anti-green, e.g. racism etc.
.... Yes I agree that this view implies some discipline......There has to
be ways of divorcing ourselves from groups, or de-registering them 
(River 1991 j).
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Defining organisational identity in terms of values and principles places 
an enormous am ount of weight upon the need to discern the normative 
character of actors who seek to align them selves w ith the party. 
Interestingly, suggested techniques of diagnosing the normative character 
of actors bear close resemblance to the techniques used by social scientists 
to categorise the value dispositions of their objects of study. However, 
being able to distinguish green-ness from non-green-ness is a practical 
issue for green political activists, rather than a task of data categorisation. 
How, then, do grns.oz.forum  partic ipan ts propose to m ake such 
diagnoses?
Criteria such as 'all who are in accord with principled green objectives' 
seem to suggest that prospective m em bers know  their norm ative 
orientation, because they have consciously chosen it, and that parties can 
accept the truth of their testimony. In this sense, normative character is 
considered transparent, and those who fall outside the boundaries of 
green identity are also considered to be beyond the scope of recruitment. 
The assumption of the transparency of green credentials has been a feature 
of m ost A ustralian  green party  statem ents of iden tity , and this 
interpretation is definitely useful in the context of maximising the scope 
or potential of party membership and support.
However, circumstances arise in which the assumption of transparency is 
problematic. Lewis points to what he considers as a highly unsatisfactory 
possibility opened up by green self-identification.
If I was the owner of (a) Chemical factory, or a uranium mine, then I 
could arrange for enough of employees and cohorts to pretend to agree 
with Green Principals (sic), and to apply for membership of the local 
Green Party, to take it over and play all sorts of political games (Lewis 
1991d).
Just as academic authors such as Cohen and Wildavsky are suspicious of a 
reliance upon testimonial claims to green identity, so too are participants 
in process of form ing a green party. According to Hegge, '(m)any 
groupings have adopted these principles out of expediency rather than 
conviction' (Hegge 1991c). These comments cast doubt on the transparency 
of a green identity. If it is possible that some individuals and groups are 
insincere about their own values then the task of norm ative diagnosis
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m ust be managed in som ewhat different ways. Instead of relying on the 
d irec t d iscernm ent of 'in terna l' norm ative sta tes, one looks for 
appropriate 'external' features which reveal norm ative character. It is not 
sufficient to say that one is green, therefore, as one's green-ness must 
demonstrable in other ways.
Participants adopt m uch the same techniques suggested and used by 
attributional and transform ational theorists in their attem pts to discern 
the norm ative dispositions of individuals. Actors can be attributed a 
norm ative character by others on the basis of their behaviour. Fitzgerald 
suggests that such an activity w ould be part of the function of a 
Registrations Com mittee that w ould make decisions after 'rigourous 
examination of the credentials and intentions' of those wishing to form 
local parties. Some members of the N orth Shore Greens, a suburban 
Sydney group, suggested that in the national organisation or party, public 
spokespersons would be selected on the basis of their capacity to 'articulate 
and demonstrate (by their actions) the principles of the green movement' 
(Jas 1991).
In grns.oz.forum, however, norm ative diagnosis is much more than an 
exercise of categorisation. These techniques are also widely utilised by 
participants as rhetorical devices in debates about proscription and 
structure. References to the actions of the convenors, or the actions of DSP 
m em bers are taken as evidence of their true norm ative disposition. 
Poisoning the national greens process, or riding roughshod over the 
autonom y of local groups serve as behavioural indicators of normative 
character, which are counterposed against claims of normative legitimacy 
based on self-identification in rhetorical contexts in which they are used.
In the evidence presented in Chapter 5, a common form of the 'attribution 
by behaviour' approach was the allegation that particular actors have 
betrayed or abused green principles. There was also the assertion of 
incom patible 'cultural codes', in the W ildavskian sense, as a basis for 
norm ative diagnosis. The observation that '(s)ome individuals belong to 
groups which have a constitution which is hierarchical and uses a simple 
m ajority voting system ' (Murrell 1991a) served to indicate that these 
individuals reject consensual, egalitarian cultural modes.
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The diagnosis of norm ative character was one of the central rhetorical 
strategies for those who wished to institute proscription and exclude the 
DSP. If members of the DSP by their actions betray their lack of respect for 
green principles, they cannot be considered as bona fide greens, and are 
therefore ineligible to be considered as participants in a truly green party. 
Hegge, in fact, is quite clear about this equivalence.
There are obvious fundamental anomalies in existence amongst those 
who call themselves "green", and amongst groupings who see 
themselves as contenders for ownership of such a name. It is not so much 
the name that is at stake but rather the ideological direction which 
green politics will take in this country. A national Green Party with 
proscription would go a long way to clarify these anomalies. There 
would be no members of other political parties unsure about whether 
they were in "support non-violence" mode for this meeting and later on 
in the day at a different meeting supporting armed resistance. A forum 
would also exist where green activists who were truly committed to 
these four principles could have discussion and develop policy 
appropriate to their beliefs (Hegge 1991c).
In claiming that there are activists who are 'truly committed to green 
principles', Hegge is alluding to the spectre of norm ative deviance. 
C ontestation reveals incorrect in terpretations which can either be 
recognised as problems of inconsistency, error, or lack of knowledge, or 
more negatively as abuse and betrayal of the values and principles 
concerned. Perpetrators of such betrayal therefore demonstrate their lack 
of norm ative legitimacy through their insincere or expedient invocation 
of green values. The process of constructing a formalised green identity, 
therefore, implies some recourse to an objective definition of green-ness, 
and its associated possibilities of normative inconsistency, irrationality, 
ignorance, deceitfulness and deviance.
H ow ever, there is a rather serious problem  w ith this norm ative 
justification for defining the boundaries of a green party in such a way as 
to exclude participation by DSP members. In the context of the Australian 
green discussions of 1991 there is no available mechanism that is capable 
of laying down and sanctioning any such normative orthodoxy. Recourse 
to the essential definition of green political principles is like appealing to a 
non-existent referee. The absence of norm ative authority ensures that 
particular interpretations do not come with sanctions attached. Those 
excluded by any attem pt to draw  normative boundaries can simply reject
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the interpretation upon which their exclusion is based, and question the 
right of those making such distinctions to do so. Attempts to exclude DSP 
members from the definition of green identity were caricatured by the 
editor of Green Left Weekly who rem arked that the m otto of some 
members of the Queensland Greens was '(t)here are no Greens in the 
world but thee and me, and sometimes I'm not so sure about thee' (Myers 
1992). The disadvantage of rhetorically using techniques of normative 
distinction w ithout any authority to back up these diagnoses is that such 
delineation of green identity can be easily portrayed as petty and divisive.
An alternative strategy for the supporters of the national process was to 
put aside the question of whether or not members of the DSP were really 
green. This strategy was built upon the claim that those who wanted a 
party with proscription should be free to form one, and that the resultant 
form ation does not constitute a m onopoly on political and electoral 
greenness. Proscription, in this light, is not so much a m atter of drawing 
boundaries around the movement as it is stipulating a basis of exclusion 
from party m embership irrespective of definitions of green identity. At 
one point in the debates, Lewis argued that the national process was 'no 
longer about trying to include absolutely everyone' (Lewis 1991c). Lewis 
was at pains to point out that the formation of a unitarist party was not an 
attempt to achieve exclusive access to green electoral and political identity. 
Instead, it should be seen as just one m anifestation of a diverse 
m ovem ent.
The Green Party that I want to be a part of will complement the present 
diversity of the green movement. It will not be the green movement. It 
will (be a) separate and distinct organisation but it will be a part of the 
wider green movement. Each will be enfolded into the other. It will not
be the green movement..... It will not even be "the" green movement's
electoral wing. It will be a electoral wing; one of many complimented by 
other parties .... and by environmental and community based 
independents (Lewis 1991c).
Significantly, moves to prevent or obstruct the formation of a unitarist 
party could be portrayed as attem pts to limit diversity and autonomy. 
Such an argum ent is highly principled as it is supported by requests for 
autonomy from those who wish to initiate a national party, just as those
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who preferred some other model should also be free to pursue their own 
claims (Hegge 1991c). Lewis made the following plea.
I don't want to stop other people doing other things but I think they 
have to be honest. If they don't want a national Green Party then 
please let the people who want one have one (Lewis 1991c).
So, in this formulation the party constitutes only a part or section of the 
movement, not a complete representation of the range of activists that 
constitute the whole green movement. Likewise, the party  cannot be 
considered as a complete political expression of the movement according 
to other criteria. According to Lewis, ’there is no way that a green party can 
be formed that has exclusive control of green political ideas' (Lewis 1991 d).
This strategy for supporting proscription, however, is just as problematic 
because it underm ines a different source of norm ative legitimacy for the 
party, nam ely its portrayal as a m anifestation of alternative political 
rationality. The projection of the party  as 'a' (as opposed to 'the') 
m anifestation of green principles makes for m uch weaker claims to 
normative legitimacy, especially when there are other greens who claim 
adherence to the same rationality but are not, for whatever reasons, part of 
the same organisation. Furthermore, the admission that the membership 
scope of the party  differs from that of the m ovem ent suggests the 
possibility that the party is not the same as the m ovem ent. This opens 
another rich vein of rhetorical possibility for opponents of proscription. A 
more exclusive party is an actor capable of acting out of self-interest, rather 
than in the universalistic interests of the m ovem ent as a whole. If the 
proposed party cannot possibly represent the movement in its entirety, the 
door was well and truly open for Sue Bolton, an opponent of proscription 
to argue the following.
It was very clear that delegates from Tasmania, Queensland and West 
Australia had no real idea of how the process has proceeded in other
states. What's more, they didn't care...... Those who say they want a
proscribed party and it's their right to have one, ignore the way the 
process has developed elsewhere (quoted in Brewer 1991b).
This rhetorical possibility would be open to opponents of proscription, to 
some extent, without it being flagged by supporters. There are a number of 
other more m undane factors that suggest that the boundaries of a green
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party m ust be som ew hat different to those of the green movement, 
regardless of whether or not activists choose to make such distinctions. 
Participation in a party requires some means of formal recognition in the 
form of m em bership. Looking at any green party  in term s of actual 
mem bership, there is much scope for discrepancy between membership 
and the movement ideal. At any time there are many actors considered to 
be of the m ovem ent who are not members of the party. There is an 
abundance of reasons as to why people who identify with the movement 
do not or choose not to participate formally in a green political party. 
These reasons w ould include lack of tim e, poten tially  conflicting 
expectations between the party and other commitments, or the preference 
to invest one's activist energies in other movem ent related activities. We 
may also reasonably assume that people are not considered to be members 
unless they approach or are approached by other members. Restrictions of 
such contact and access, whether intentional or not, inevitably exclude 
many from party membership. The green movement, in contrast, is not 
defined in terms of formal membership, and is not subject to the formal 
requirem ents of boundary maintenance. This discrepancy ensures that 
there is always the possibility to portray the party as divergent from the 
movement as a whole, given that the movement as a whole can only be 
identified ambiguously.
Thus, claims of unrepresentativeness in relation to the movement are a 
stock elem ent of the green rhetorical repertoire . They cannot be 
definitively refuted in the absence of mechanisms capable of defining 
what can be considered as representative. Hutton, in response to his DSP 
critics knows that he can turn the accusation of unrepresentativeness back 
upon those who use it against him.
A thorough process of consultation with community groups will reveal 
how hollow are the DSP's claims that, somehow, they represent the 
wishes of the grassroots of the movement (Hutton 1991).
The problem s of m anaging green identity  for the partic ipan ts in 
grns.oz.forum, then, can be traced back to ambiguities inherent in value- 
based identities per se. Attempts to formalise party identity can always be 
shot down on the basis of green principles. D raw ing m em bership 
boundaries, the prerogative of any organisation, can be easily made to
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appear illegitimate. Opponents of proscription simply can wait and see 
which way supporters will jum p. W hen they favour unity-based 
arguments, the themes of diversity can do the job. If they adopt diversity- 
based arguments, the repertoire of unity will be most useful. Such are the 
rhetorical perils and possibilities of a highly ambiguous store of common 
sense.
6.3. Resolving Conflict
The conflicting themes of unity and diversity are manifest in the range of 
specific debates am ong A ustralian  green activists. M any of these 
differences are tolerated w ithout activists attem pting to resolve them. The 
divergence over immigration is one that, up until this point at least, has 
been largely left to one side in grns.oz.forum. The proscription issue, 
however, was not such an issue that would be indefinitely shelved. It had 
been brought to a head by the calling of the August 1991 meeting. This 
meeting, then, serves as a useful point to explore the dynamics of value 
rationality in a context where a definitive resolution to an intra-green 
conflict is sought. Many of the regular contributors to grns.oz.forum, 
including Lewis, Hegge, H utton, Nerlich, Fitzgerald, and Hine were 
among the thirty participants.1
The first day of the National Greens Meeting was marked by heated debate 
over the proscription issue. The convenors had hoped to avoid such a 
debate by stipulating support for proscription as a precondition for 
attendance. Delegates from anti-proscription groups had turned up at the 
m eeting but were ruled ineligible to attend, helping to precipitate 
extensive discussion of the issue. Subsequently, some of the invited 
delegates wished to officially debate the matter and achieve some form of 
resolution. Straw-polls taken early in the day indicated that sixteen of the 
tw enty-three voting delegates supported  p roscrip tion  and of the
1 The meeting was attended by 10 delegates from NSW, representing the NSW Green 
Alliance and 8 local groups. 6 delegates came from Queensland, 3 from Tasmania, 2 from 
W.A. and one each from Victoria and South Australia. Lisa Macdonald from the Western 
Suburbs Greens (NSW) and Sue Bolton from the ACT Green Democratic Alliance were 
barred from participation (Hine 1991a; Brewer 1991a).
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rem aining seven, only four delegates actively opposed it (Hine 1991a). 
However, debate continued throughout the day on the understanding that 
the meeting required a consensual outcome. Late in the day, one of the 
meeting convenors suggested a compromise of a six month sunset clause, 
in which members of other parties would not be barred until February 
1992. This was accepted by the meeting as something that 'could be worked 
with' (Campbell 1991).
The proscription debate at the national meeting was a graphic illustration 
of a context in which the ambiguity of green values is translated into a 
series of practical contradictions and double-binds. W hat em erged 
throughout the m eeting was a m ultiplicity of seem ingly irresolvable 
conflicts exacerbated by value dilemmas. On top of the proscription debate, 
there was am biguity regarding w hether or not the proscription issue 
required a unified stance, or whether it was an area in which diversity and 
tolerance should be valued. There was also divergence over whether it 
was appropriate  to take steps to resolve the conflict, and w hether 
compromise was acceptable as a form of resolution. There was dispute 
over w hether the issue should be discussed, given that support for 
proscription was a precondition for attendance. There were divisions 
regarding the legitimacy of the meeting itself, and whether it should make 
such decisions or leave them to be made in other forums.
The six m onth sunset clause adopted as a compromise did not win 
en thusiastic  norm ative endorsem en t. On the one hand , some 
proscription supporters were quite happy with the deal and the way it had 
been reached. Hegge described the adoption of the sunset clause as 'a credit 
to (the participants') preparedness to comprom ise’, considering the fact 
that the two positions were 'virtually impossible to reconcile' (Hegge 
1991c). However, others soon raised questions about the legitimacy of the 
way in which the decision was made. Fiona Campbell, one of the 
participants at the meeting, questioned the legitimacy of the compromise 
in term s of the delegates' au thority  to change their stance. The 
compromise eventually adopted, according to Campbell's account left 
some delegates wondering whether or not they had acted w ithout the 
authority of their group in agreeing to the amended proposal of the sunset
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clause. She also reports in her account of the meeting that participants 
representing their groups and organisations at this meeting did not feel 
authorised by their groups to change their m ind even if they wanted to. 
According to Campbell, the reason the compromise was adopted had more 
to do with the weariness of the participants than the successful application 
of consensual democracy.
Also not evident from the voting record is the way people felt by this 
time. I, for one, felt totally exhausted from debating this issue for about
eight hours..... I think many of us felt that if some agreement wasn't
reached, the same issue would be on the agenda of the next meeting and 
the one after that. We would never ever get to talk about policy 
(Campbell 1991).
In this example, there is a striking lack of fit between a green principled 
account of conflict should be dealt with, and the way in which it was 
actually resolved. According to green rationality , hopes for conflict 
resolution are placed squarely on the shoulders of a participatory and 
consensual decision-making process. Consensual procedures are expected 
to achieve some form of resolution that can cater for everyone's concerns. 
If all mem bers are allowed to participate fully, the 'best' solution to 
conflict can be achieved.
In consensus or co-operative decision-making the emphasis is on working 
out the best possible solution, one that addresses everyone's concerns and 
is a reflection of the cumulative wisdom of the group. A proposal is put, 
and everyone can speak to it. As people put forward their objections, 
and ideals for modifications, the proposal becomes stronger, clearer, 
and more generally acceptable. People’s concerns can also be addressed, 
information shared, and people modify their views as they gain a 
better understanding of the problem. Ultimately, the goal is to arrive 
at a resolution that effectively addresses the problem while satisfying 
everyone's concerns (River 1991d).
However, the above account of the national greens meeting indicates that 
concerted efforts to follow such procedures in aim ing to achieve 
consensual decisions does not necessarily lead to outcomes that meet 
either criteria of resolving problem s or satisfying everyone's concerns. 
Campbell paints the picture as follows.
So, two very different positions, neither feeling they could budge. Both 
sides seemed willing to 'just work with the groups that agreed with 
them' i.e. split, before compromising. Hardly any basis for consensus.
After much debating, in fact very much debating, we still didn’t seem to
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be getting any closer. There was a short speech from A1 (Lismore) on 
how we should try and reach consensus. Each side tried harder to get 
the other side to see their point of view (Campbell 1991).
The entrenchment, rather than the resolution, of conflict throughout the 
day could be seen as a product of the attempted conscious implementation 
of green principles of decision-making and representation. Such efforts are 
just as likely, and perhaps more likely to result in entrenchm ent of 
opposing positions in circumstances in which significant disagreements 
have em erged. The N ational Greens Meeting was one instance of a 
situation in which consensual procedures and guidelines, rather than 
facilitating a resolution, were a significant factor in escalating and 
prolonging the debate between supporters and opponents of proscription.
The lack of fit between principles and experience is also problematic if 
there are no back up mechanisms when principled procedures do not 
appear to be working. According to the principles of participatory 
democracy, differences should be transcended by a collective wisdom, 
which is only accessible to the group as a whole. It was clear that none of 
the participants identified anything approxim ating such wisdom on the 
first day of the national greens meeting. In the absence of collective 
wisdom, no formal mechanism was available to resolve the dispute over 
the norm ative character of p roscrip tion . There was no stand ing  
committee to which the question could be put, nor was there any figure 
invested with the authority to discern which side's position was more in 
keeping with green principles.
The absence of any such umpire in normative disputes ensures that issues 
are not resolved by one side 'succeeding' in proving the superiority of its 
normative credentials. On the contrary, it is far more likely that disputes 
are resolved by decidedly worldly and apparently unprincipled means. For 
example, proscription was successfully instituted by the emergent party 
not because it became apparent to all protagonists that proscription was 
consistent with green values, or even because its supporters won over 
those who were ambivalent or opposed through the force of rhetoric. 
Instead, proscription was successfully adopted in 1992 largely because the 
coalition between the localists in NSW and the DSP disintegrated in the
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m onths follow ing the national m eeting, culm inating in the failed 
’takeover' attem pt by the DSP of the NSW Green Alliance in March 1992.2
The power struggle between the two groups also ensured that within 
NSW there was no rem aining localist netw ork of any significance to 
defend against the unitarists. At this point, many of the ambivalent local 
NSW groups joined the national initiative. The elimination of the most 
serious obstacles in NSW was a crucial factor in the eventual formation of 
a national party. A national green party, known as T he Greens' was 
form ed in A ugust 1992, one year after the Sydney National Greens 
Meeting. At its launch, the new party consisted of m em bership from 
Queensland, New South Wales and Tasmania. The W estern Australian 
Greens decided not to join on the grounds that they preferred a more 
localist structure, but agreed to work co-operatively w ith the newly 
formed national party. Branches were soon established in the Australian 
Capital Territory and Victoria.
W hat the denouem ent of this conflict shows is that where values are 
sim ultaneously the prim ary source of identity and the grounds upon 
which disputed identity are fought, there is little prospect of normatively 
acceptable resolution. Normative primacy also diminishes the possibility 
that non-norm ative circuit breakers will be seen as legitimate. Thus, 
w here values have no purchase in the resolution of conflict, the 
development and denouem ent of political conflict appears as even more 
unprincipled and debilitating to those involved.
Indeed, it was apparent that the wash-up of the National Greens meeting 
brought to the surface significant levels of frustration and dissatisfaction
2 On March 1, 1992, the DSP 'stacked' a NSW Green Alliance meeting, and attempted to 
oust Nerlich and Fitzgerald as secretaries of the Alliance and dismantle the body that 
had been established to administer electoral registration. These actions were taken in an 
effort to thwart the emergent national green party from having access to the name green in 
NSW state elections. This attempted takeover, initiated two weeks after the expiry of the 
six month sunset clause, would have created substantial public relations problems for the 
national green party, who would not then have had access to the use of the word 'green' in 
NSW state elections. The NSW Electoral Commission, however, decided in favour of the 
non-DSP petitioners such that The Greens do have access to the name.
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with the process as it had panned out. There was a period of soul- 
searching from all sides of the debate in which various suggestions were 
offered as to what had been going wrong. Significantly however, the 
protagonists do not perceive any problem with the ideals of participatory 
democracy and consensual decision-making. W hat is of interest here, 
then, is how the participants them selves in terpret the escalation of 
conflict and the problems of resolution.
Blame for the inadequacies of the conflict resolution process could simply 
be sheeted home to the other side. Lisa M acdonald claimed that ’(t)he 
conflict resolution practitioner who was facilitating the meeting on the 
Saturday commented that she had never struck such an intransigent bloc 
vote in any meeting, and if this was how a national green party operated, 
she w ouldn’t have a bar of it' (quoted in Brewer 1991b). The 'intransigent 
bloc' was a reference to the supporters of proscription. From the other 
side, River saw fit to identify the DSP in normatively pathological terms 
as 'working to divide, poison and weaken the Green Parties in Australia' 
(River 1991j).
But River, who was not present at the National Greens Meeting, also 
presents a far wider diagnosis of the procedural ailment. His perception of 
what should happen when greens find themselves in conflict as they did 
in the N ational Greens Meeting was critical of the behaviour of all 
participants. He claimed that the m eeting and its processes were 
inadequate on a number of grounds, including the fact that not all invited 
green parties were represented, therefore decisions made by those there 
could not be taken to represent the wishes of all greens. That decisions 
that were 'pushed through’ indicated a lack of respect for the sensitivities 
of participants. River claimed that the process was inadequate because it 
was not a sufficiently concerted attempt to implement green principles.3
If we are going to involve ourselves in any kind of caring, participatory 
system, it is also not adequate to discount those who do not voice an 
opinion. Is it insecurity? Are they feeling bullied or pissed off at the
3 Elsewhere in the same posting, River argues that the decisions were not made by a 
legitimate quorum of green groups.
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process? Do they just not care? Do they not understand, or are they 
unclear as to the issues and consequences? Why are they not voting?
WHY have only half the potential delegates turned up? (River 1991h).
The most popular explanation for the perceived failures of consensual 
and participatory processes was 'inadequate communication'. Lewis notes 
the 'present confusing climate of poor comm unication and bad faith' 
(Lewis 1991a), while Fitzgerald cites that substantial distrust has been 
generated by the 'difficulty in communication between and within the 
States' (Fitzgerald 1991b). An activist from the N orth Coast of NSW 
contended, '(a) form ula for balanced and em pow ered  grassroots 
representation to a national Greens process is still unclear in light of 
inadequate  m ethods of com m unication’ (G arton 1991a). H aving 
recognised the link between value ambiguity and internal conflict, Lewis 
maintains that solutions could be reached if protagonists were able to 
communicate more clearly.
People who think green politics is good idea use words like autonomy, 
grassroots, participation in decision making, diversity and assume that 
the people who they are talking to share the same meanings of these
concepts..... I believe this debate could be harmonised if people defined
the sense in which they use these concepts (Lewis 1991b).
Lewis' quote best encapsulates the habit of norm ative primacy. Even 
though he recognises significant tensions within the repertoire of green 
values, they are resolvable, according to Lewis, th rough  more 
conscientious adherence to procedural green dem ocratic principles. 
Greens express faith that such clarity will extract them from the political 
quagmire that these greens have found themselves in. They hope that 
better communicative practices will defuse and depoliticise the heated 
debates that are exacerbated by divergent normative interpretation, a point 
exemplified by Lewis' belief that the debates can be harmonised if people 
were clear about what they meant.
The significance of these claims does not lie in the provision of practical 
solutions to the problems green acknowledge, as they are typically not 
accom panied by suggestions of novel or un tried  m echanism s of 
communication. From Campbell's account of the latter stages of the first 
day of the National Greens Meeting, communication does not appear to be 
the problem. Both sides of the argument clearly understood each other's
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position and neither was p repared  to budge. Instead , the term  
'communication', I would suggest, is a rhetorical device that refers to a 
space which is untainted by political contestation, in order to retain faith 
in the transparency of green norm ative principles. This is the rhetorical 
role once occupied by 'consensus'.
Communication is but one device for displacing conflict. Similar hopes 
are invested in an improvement of participatory practices. River stressed 
that effective participation required the elim ination of 'emotional or 
intellectual m anipulation ' (River 1991a). Campbell suggested that the 
process could be redeemed if 'members of all groups look at improving 
negotiation, communication and conflict resolution skills so that we are 
equiped (sic) with the skills necessary for effective grassroots participation' 
(Campbell 1991). Echoing River she also suggested that improvements 
would follow if 'everyone feels included and consulted'. Participants 
seeking a m eans of reconciling their aw areness of the apparently  
destructive effects of DSP participation, w ith the undesirability  of 
excluding com m itted activists perceive the possibility of a further 
impeccably principled solution. The solution to the 'security risk' posed by 
the DSP is more committed participation by non-DSP members.
6.4. The Failures of Normative Rationality
The problem s being experienced, therefore, serve to h ighlight the 
assessment that green value rationality has not been adequately realised. 
This assessment, however, spurs participants to redouble their efforts to 
discover the essence of these values. True im plem entation of green 
political principles is displaced to some ideal future. Grns.oz.forum  
activists characteristically m aintain that the im plem entation of green 
political principles 'hasn't worked yet', rather than conclude that it 'hasn't 
worked'. This commonly adopted reaction anchored in the habit of value 
primacy provides an all-purpose rhetorical device for coping with the 
contradictions that arise out of value ambiguity. The solution to manifest 
fa ilu res  of va lue  im p le m e n ta tio n  is ever m ore r ig o u ro u s  
im plem entation. U nintended and unprincipled consequences will be 
avoided, theoretically, if greens work harder to ensure that ideal 
conditions exist. We could paraphrase this habit of thought in the
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following way: 'ideal political conditions cannot be created until ideal 
political conditions are in place'. The price of retaining a norm ative 
definition of politics is the admission that the ideal is not realised in 
present circumstances.
In this way the characteristic gap between the green ideal of political 
organisation located in the future and the current 'reality' is maintained 
and even widened. At a num ber of points in the debates the choice 
between the two appears in a stark form. Some participants in the debate 
were prepared to put on ice the possibility of concerted action when it was 
apparent that consensus on issues such as proscription and structure 
would not be forthcoming.
.... I believe any attempt to push ahead with the current process, is 
more likely to cause discord, and split the Green political movement, 
than it is to provide unity and a process we can trust and have faith in. I 
would like to make a personal plea, therefore, to 'stop' now, put a 
moratorium on further action in forming a national party, and do some 
fence mending. I personally do not feel that if things go ahead on this 
basis, the resulting party will be anything I wish to be a part of, no 
matter how good its policies are (River 1991h).
Thus, each of the above ways of dealing with internal tensions highlights 
the characteristic pitfalls of norm ative primacy. W here greens perceive 
that orientation to their political landscape is fundamentally derived from 
distinctive values, the discernm ent of norm ative character is of 
param ount importance. Indeed, it constitutes the most utilised rhetorical 
strategy. How ever, we have seen in grns.oz.forum  that norm ative 
character is constantly open to contestation. This in itself is not so much 
the problem , as this is true for m ost settings in which norm ative 
assessments are made. The problem is that the amount of weight placed 
upon norm ative character is untenable. In the context of the Australian 
case study, the normative legitimacy of actors, processes, structures and 
organisational mechanisms can never be satisfactorily 'proven' in the 
absence of an accepted authority.
The destructive potential of this habit of norm ative primacy is most 
evident in times of stress, when the spotlight is directed inwards. 
Consistent with green diagnoses of 'the problem with the world', conflict, 
tensions and frustrations are indications of normative irrationality and
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deviance within green ranks. After all, if the deploym ent of normative 
evaluations is what greens are best at, it should not be surprising that it is 
their first response to difficulties experienced among themselves. Under 
such conditions, much rhetorical effort goes into the characterisation of 
the actions of ones' internal opponents as unprincipled, or beyond the 
bounds of green-ness. As long as every element of the green landscape 
can, at sometime, be characterised as illegitimate or normatively deficient, 
this possibility will be taken up by antagonists in internal debates when 
and where it suits.
Now one can speculate about the motives of the DSP in these discussions, 
but if their main priority was to undermine the emergent national process 
and its convenors, then they certainly had pinpointed a most effective way 
of going about it. Indeed, sustained white-anting of normative integrity 
proved to be a most useful strategy, judging from this reaction from one of 
the staunchest supporters of proscription.
Much damage has been done in this reportage and the seeds of doubt 
must have been sown in many an activist's mind as to the motives of the 
organisers. I know that several months ago I became so enraged after 
reading various articles in GL (Green Left), so that as a result of that 
reading and after conversations with various DSP members in Brisbane,
1 wrote a scathing letter to Jo Vallentine criticising her motives and the 
process. I also through those articles had cause to doubt Drew Hutton, 
an activist I have known and worked with for years, and to doubt 
several close friends in the Rainbow Alliance (Hegge 1991b).
This penchant for criticism contributes to the marked asymmetry in the 
deployment of values which is striking in the grns.oz.forum discussions. 
In these debates, green principles were invoked far more often to identify 
shortcomings, inadequacies and breaches of norm ative rationality than 
they were to affirm norm ative integrity. In cases where integrity was 
affirmed, such affirmation was usually combined with criticism of a 
competing position, but these affirmations tended to have a much weaker 
rhetorical status. For example, positive evaluations of a unitarist structure 
were made in the form of assurances that it would not be top-down and 
that it would be able to conform to principles of autonomy and grassroots 
democracy, but these assurances cannot be satisfactorily guaranteed. On 
the other hand, criticisms tended to be far more strident and definitive, 
indicating specific features of phenom ena that were inconsistent with
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green principles. Thus, instances of the fulfilm ent of value rationality 
were rarely clear to grns.oz.forum  orators, but instances of such value 
rationality having been violated were vividly apparent.
Occasionally, there is also a sense of the norm ative fragility of green 
efforts, notwithstanding what are presented as the best of intentions. Hine 
acknowledges that '(o)f course there have been mistakes made in this 
process, but in virtually every case, they are the result of inexperience and 
the imperfection of individuals rather than of some conspiracy' (Hine 
1991c). It is som ewhat ironic that even the best of intentions can lead to 
non-green outcomes given the moral weight that greens invest in such 
intentions and the associated devaluation of green outcomes that are not 
the consequence of p rinc ip led  in ten tions. G iven the constant 
vu lnerab ility  to norm ative criticism  tha t pervades grns.oz.forum  
discourse, it is also apparent that greens sometimes express normative 
uncertain ty  about their own actions. Partic ipants can be seen to 
acknowledge this uncertainty, and attem pt to inoculate themselves from 
normative criticism. Thus, it is possible to detect a notable 'confessional' 
tone in grns.oz.forum. Sensitivity to the possibility of attracting criticism 
is apparent in River's plea to his audience, upon contributing a suggested 
model for national co-ordination, of '(p)lease don't abuse me personally, 
I'm only a person trying hard' (River 1991e). The shadow of normative 
rationality is often projected inwards.
6.5. Conclusion
The case study of grns.oz.forum indicates that there are many unintended 
consequences and perverse effects that can be traced to habits of normative 
primacy. The process of negotiation over the form ation of a national 
green political organisation or network presents an ideal opportunity to 
observe the implementation and rationality of green political principles. 
According to the new politics m odel, diversity of perspective and 
differences of opinion could be accommodated and synthesised through 
partic ipatory  and consensual decision-m aking processes in which 
everyone’s views were considered and respected. Yet the experience of 
Australian greens in dealing with the issues that divided them indicated 
that this was an extremely elusive and distant ideal.
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Instead, from the evidence of grns.oz.forum, the experience of difference 
and diversity among greens is divisive and debilitating, and characterised 
by the absence of effective mechanism s capable of handling internal 
conflict. Once conflict was apparent, it was prone to escalation and 
exacerbation as the w ell-honed and sharpened  rhetorical tools of 
normative distinction were turned against fellow greens. The damage was 
all the more serious in circumstances where there were attem pts to 
resolve conflicts. Hopes for unambiguous and uncontested interpretations 
of green political principles were well and truly misplaced, as the green 
rhetorical repertoire was easily marshalled to 'prove opposites'.
In this case study, I have identified a number of parallels between the ways 
in which academic interpreters of green politics and activists themselves 
deal with the 'noise' of normative ambiguity. In Chapter 2, I noted the 
c irc u la rity  of va lue  id e n tity  ap p ro ach es . These app roaches 
characteristically suggested that fulfilment or vindication of normative 
rationality is postponed to some unspecified future, or asserted the need 
for norm ative education or re-education. A ustralian green activists 
typically adopt the same escape routes. However, these escape routes do 
not provide much comfort for activists, particularly under circumstances 
of internal tension. From the material presented in this thesis, greens who 
are confident in their version of norm ative rationality can diagnose 
deviance and inconsistency as much as they like, w ithout their opponents 
taking any notice of them. There is no capacity to enforce a value identity 
and rationality, when it is breached or abused. The shutting out of noise 
seems to be achieved by covering ears and closing doors, thereby ensuring 
that activists who adhere to a well defined value rationality must operate 
in a m uch more confined space than they w ould wish. The use of 
norm ative identity as a means of exclusion also works against the 
inclusivity that is a feature of the ambiguity of green politics, and which is 
an im portant strength of green politics.
Alternatively, commitment to norm ative rationality does not have to 
mean that the implications of green ideals are known by those who 
commit themselves to it, but it can rest on the presum ption that such 
implications are, in principle knowable. If activists start from the premise
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that there is a value rationality, even though its implications are not 
currently clear, this is also a problematic strategy for dealing with noise. 
Noise is regarded as dissonance which will som ehow eventually be 
harmonised. From this study, there appears to be little point in basing 
actions and assessments on the hope that such a greenprint will become 
more apparen t in the future. The vigorous utilisation of values as 
rhetorical weapons in internal disputes of the past and present indicates 
that the noise, if anything, gets louder and more excruciating.
The debates of grns.oz.forum bring to the fore perhaps the most eccentric 
element of green normative primacy, the faith that it is somehow possible 
to define party  boundaries and resolve conflict apolitically. This is 
manifest in the tendency to perpetually displace the problems that arise to 
a space free of political contestation. If conflict occurs, it can be resolved 
apolitically through consensus. If consensual procedures don't work, the 
problem can be fixed through better communication. If communication 
breaks down, participants m ust learn to avoid m anipulative behaviour, 
and so on. The failure to recognise that practical applications of 
participatory democracy, autonomy, representation are constructed and 
contested, and that they can only be established through political means 
condem ns participants to a state of frustration  w ith the apparent 
inevitability of 'old paradigm ' politics.
To use the famous Weberian metaphor, grns.oz.forum participants have 
built for themselves a different type of iron cage - one of normative 
rationality. Their attem pts to construct organisational mechanisms are 
constantly subject to more intense scrutiny, and their efforts to be faithful 
to green political principles constantly produce apparently perverse and 
unprincipled results. The following chapter moves beyond the case study 
level in order to demonstrate that these dynamics can also be observed 
more generally in the practice of green politics.
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Chapter 7: The Misplaced Faith in Green Value Rationality
The case study in the previous chapters provided a rather fine grained 
analysis of political practices that come with the territory of value primacy. 
This chapter broadens the scope to a more general discussion of the 
perverse effects of a politics that is preoccupied with the fulfilment of 
norm ative rationality and the achievem ent of change through value 
conversion.
In the first section of this chapter I follow up two areas of perverse effects 
which were identified in the A ustralian case study  and which are 
generalisable to the experience of other green parties and organisations. I 
discuss some consequences of attem pts to design political organisations 
according to green political principles. I also draw attention to the ways in 
which internal conflict is largely created and exacerbated by the rhetorical 
emphasis placed upon values. Both of these issues reveal much about the 
habits of viewing the w orld in norm ative terms. The assessm ent of 
political experience within a framework of green rationality exposes a 
wide variety of breaches of rationality. These breaches are characteristically 
interpreted as evidence of the persistence of normative irrationality. As a 
foundation for political action, green norm ative rationality supports a 
range of self-fulfilling prophesies of failure when it becomes apparent that 
experience does not match rationality. In exploring these issues, I press 
further with a critique of academic treatm ents of green politics which 
share the pre-occupation with value-based identity, indicating how they 
are ill-equipped to grapple with the issues raised in this analysis of green 
political dilemmas. These academic treatm ents suffer from the same 
blindspots to the perverse effects of green value rationality as the activists 
them selves.
In the final section of the chapter I discuss a num ber of more general 
vulnerabilities and lim itations of a green political project when it is 
defined primarily in terms of values. The new m iddle class location of 
green politics can be seen to place significant restrictions on the scope of
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green political activity, and the habits of value primacy limit the range of 
potential green converts. I also show that the green emphasis on value 
conversion and integrity has little political purchase in the absence of 
more formal mechanisms that can underw rite the 'correct' interpretations 
of green values. For all these reasons, the preoccupation with value 
change shared by academics and activists is manifestly unwarranted.
7.1. Self-fulfilling Prophesies of Failure
Recourse to standards of value rationality  involves com plem entary 
standards of 'anti-rationality ' indicated by terms such as irrationality, 
ignorance, deceit or even evil. I will refer to this anti-rationality as the 
'shadow' cast by the 'light' of norm ative rationality. In green discourse, 
where the most commonly suggested source of value rationality is the 
alternative paradigm, the shadow of normative rationality appears in the 
form of the dom inant paradigm . In the A ustralian case-study, the 
experience of green political actors revealed a series of 'self-fulfilling 
prophesies of failure’, in which feedback from political experience 
overwhelm ingly confirms the norm ative deficiencies of the world and 
the enormity of the political task. The dynamic of self-fulfilling prophesies 
of failure can also be clearly seen more generally in the development of 
green politics throughout the industrialised world. The 'devil' of the 
dom inant paradigm  m anifests itself in unexpected and ever more 
pervasive forms. Political action, therefore, requires ever more integrity 
on the part of those committed to green rationality.
7.1.1. Normative Organisational Design
In material available on European green parties there are a num ber of 
indications of the ways in which greens interpret the results of attempts to 
consciously im plem ent norm ative rationality. As has been argued in 
previous chapters, the development of green organisations can be viewed 
as attem pts to create norm atively designed structures. An im portant 
feature of norm ative primacy in these circumstances is that criteria of 
grassroots democracy, autonom y, participation and the elim ination of 
hierarchy and domination characteristically carry more rhetorical weight 
than criteria of practicality, efficiency and effectiveness. Literature on
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green parties and organisations elsewhere indicates that these dynamics 
are not unique features of the Australian green political context.
Perhaps the m ost prom inent instance of norm ative design in green 
parties is the practice of rotation of parliam entary seats instituted by die 
Grünen  in the early 1980s. Just as was evidenced in the Australian 
discussions, debate over the issue was subject to value primacy. Rotation 
of parliam entary representatives was introduced as a way of minimising 
the prospect of a parliamentary green elite. As such, it was clearly regarded 
as a method of implementing principles of participatory democracy and as 
a means of preventing the emergence of an oligarchical leadership. Those 
who had been elected to the Bundestag in 1983 were therefore asked by the 
party to relinquish their seats after two years, to be replaced by a new batch 
of deputies. Capra and Spretnak summarise the norm ative justifications 
for ro tation  advanced by Germ an Greens in term s of com bating 
undem ocratic consequences of parliam entary  representation . These 
consequences allegedly included the developm ent of inegalitarian 
expertise which contravenes grassroots principles, the insulation from the 
community that develops with long-term parliam entary tenure, and the 
dangers of fostering personal, charismatic authority  of parliam entary 
'stars' (Capra & Spretnak 1984: 41-2).
The practice of rotation required each parliam entary representative to 
w ork w ith  an a lternative  w ho w ould  becom e their successor. 
A dm inistratively, these Nachrücker were em ployed as the legislative 
assistants of their respective parliam entarians. The policy of mid-term 
rotation was contested when it became clear that it was causing a number 
of difficulties for the German Greens' participation in parliament, and was 
responsible for a degree of internal tension in the party. The hoped for co­
operative working relationships between Bundestag members and the 
Nachrücker were rendered difficult by the implied competition between 
them (Capra & Spretnak 1984; Kitschelt 1989). This developm ent of 
competitive relationships was clearly an unintended consequence of the 
practice of rotation.
The issue came to a head in 1985 when a number of the original group of 
Bundestag representatives, including Petra Kelly, objected to relinquishing
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their seats on the grounds that rotation would seriously affect the capacity 
of the party to communicate its message. They argued that the knowledge 
that had been built up in the first two years by these representatives was 
too valuable a resource to be so easily discarded. But, in addition to calling 
attention to the practical problem s experienced as a result of rotation, 
Kelly's stance sought to establish the normative legitimacy of abandoning 
the practice. One of Kelly's normative arguments against rotation was that 
the eradication of old paradigm  politics was built upon long-term  
processes of personal growth and development, and that two-year rotation 
would not give the process time to work.
We are all caught up in a painful and terrible process of finding 
ourselves as new persons in an old society, and before we find ourselves, 
we may all be rotated (quoted in Capra & Spretnak 1984: 157).
From the perspective of supporters of rotation, however, the dispute was 
read in terms of defending the integrity of green political principles. These 
principles were threatened by the constraints of the parliam entary context 
that was itself a product of dom inant paradigm  structures. According to 
this interpretation, the experience of practical difficulties does not indicate 
that there is anything at fault with the norm ative principles. Instead, it 
m erely confirm s the norm ative deficiency of the in stitu tion  of 
parliam ent. For A ndrew  D obson, th is inciden t rep resen ted  the 
inappropriateness of institutional politics as a vehicle for implementing 
green values.
Since 1983 commitment to rotation and the principles it embodies waned 
and it May 1986 it was formally abandoned. This is not because the 
principles in themselves were found wanting but because they were 
unworkable, as originally conceived, in the context of parliamentary 
politics (Dobson 1990: 138).
Thus, the impracticality of two year rotation is not denied, it is simply not 
a good enough reason to abandon the practice. An abandonm ent would 
amount to a compromise of these alternative paradigm  principles and an 
unwarranted concession to the 'reality' of the parliam entary arena. Kelly's 
opposition to rotation was also regarded as confirmation of the fears of 
those m em bers of die Grünen who held strong objections to the 
emergence of parliamentary stars.
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So although there are varying accounts of the 'failure' of two year rotation 
as an innovative feature of green organisational design, they share a 
theme of norm ative deficiency. Either the parliam entary context was 
sufficiently foreign to the principles of the new paradigm  to be an 
insurm ountable obstacle, the com m itm ent of green parliam entarians 
insufficient to overcom e this obstacle, or the a lternative political 
consciousness of the parliamentarians needed time to 'mature' in order to 
have an effect. There is a notable absence, however, of assessments that 
rotation had 'worked' as an application of principled normative design.
Rotation is not the only exam ple of perverse effects of norm ative 
rationality documented in the secondary literature. The consequences of 
norm ative design are also dealt with extensively in Herbert Kitschelt's 
case studies of green party structure and process (Kitschelt 1989; Kitschelt 
& Hellemans 1990). Kitschelt claims that in Belgian and German ecology 
parties, Michels' iron law of oligarchy has been used as a standard 
interpretative frame with regard to party organisation. Leadership, on this 
basis, is characterised by many members as normatively suspect because 
leaders are tem pted by their political opportunities to compromise the 
integrity of green political principles. Leadership is also suspect because it 
creates scope for green political actors to be motivated by self-interest. By 
contrast, the grassroots are considered to be the custodians of green 
principled integrity. They are 'naturally radical' (Kitschelt 1989: 197).1
This has resulted in the design of green parties which explicitly seek to 
prevent the emergence of both organisational and personal sources of 
power. This tendency has been well established in both the British and 
German parties. Antipathy directed towards identities such as Kelly and 
Bahro from within the German Greens was based upon the perception 
that they found their status as media identities personally satisfying and 
gratifying (Capra & Spretnak 1984). Incidently, Bahro's intriguing response
1 See also the discussion by Rüdig, Bennie and Franklin (1991: 46-56) of the design of 
British Green Party decentralised structure, and perceptions of this structure by party 
members. For an Australian example of the formulation Kitschelt describes, see Doyle 
(1991).
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to criticisms of his prominence was to interpret them as the expression of 
normative deficiency in a different form.
There are a lot of unfulfilled needs for self-realization, so the very kind 
of competition we want to abolish thrives within the party. There is a 
great deal of jealousy toward anyone who emerges (quoted in Capra &
Spretnak 1984: 156).
Kitschelt provides evidence that the structures that result from anti- 
hierarchical design have a number of consequences that create significant 
problems for greens. Beyond criticisms based upon practicality, Kitschelt 
show s how the fruits of norm atively designed structures are not 
necessarily in keeping with the green ideal of a grassroots participatory 
organisation (Kitschelt 1989: 188). The structures of green parties designed 
according to anti-hierarchical principles have produced informal sources 
of power that proliferate because so little autonom ous power is invested 
in formal positions.
Power migrates out of the realm of formal authority to informal groups 
of political entrepreneurs who sway a party’s course with their 
rhetorical skill and personal following. This dynamic is an unintended 
consequence of the militants' efforts to create a tightly coupled, inverse 
hierarchy with democratic control through the rank and file. The 
party apparatus, unable to maintain a regular flow of communication 
between local party units and representative organs, produces a 
stratarchal fragmentation of power (Kitschelt 1989: 188).
Processes organised along radical participatory  lines, fram ed by a 
M ichelsian picture of organisational politics produce results that are 
recognised by activists as lacking legitimacy. So much attention is paid to 
the political and financial conduct of party leaders, who are assumed to be 
highly prone to acting out of political and financial self-interest, that little 
time is spent discussing and making decisions about policy, leaving policy 
determ ination informally in the hands of parliam entarians (Kitschelt 
1989:179).
The heavy commitment of time resources and skills that are required in 
order to participate in party decision-making is also regarded by many 
green party members as norm atively problem atic (Kitschelt 1989: 123; 
Goodin 1992: 142). These resources and skills are unevenly distributed 
among activists such that activists with few conflicting commitments and
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with developed rhetorical skills tend to predom inate in these forums. 
Rüdig, Bennie and Franklin report that members of the British Green 
party were not confident that there were sufficient political resources and 
skills necessary for grassroots democracy to operate satisfactorily within 
the party (1991: 53). Although these differential patterns of political skill 
formation are a feature of any political party, they are features which are 
recognised as normatively problematic by party participants because they 
work against the ideal of egalitarian participation. Another commonly 
voiced frustration with green organisation, according to Kitschelt, is that 
of unfulfilled norm ative expectations of indiv idual self-expression, 
communal co-operation and disciplined political action (Kitschelt 1989: 
133). In terms of the analysis presented in the previous chapter, these 
tensions are not surprising, considering the dilemmatic features of green 
rationality. The consequence of these unfulfilled expectations, according to 
Kitschelt, is high levels of membership turnover, a point also borne out in 
the British study (Rüdig, Bennie & Franklin 1991: 64-72).
Failures of norm ative rationality are not lim ited to contexts in which 
greens w ish to design their own structu res. I have, until now, 
concentrated on this area of green political activity because it represents 
the best testing ground for green attem pts to im plem ent alternative 
political structures. But norm ative deficiencies are also frequently 
diagnosed as a consequence of green party forays into the wider political 
environm ent. In fact, the shadow of norm ative rationality looms large 
when greens are concerned with overall strategies for green change. I wish 
to suggest that the failure of green rationality is an appropriate framework 
for understanding the pervasiveness of disputes among greens framed in 
terms of fundamentalism versus realism.
7.1.2. Internal Conflict: 'Fundi v Realo'
The issues that have been played out in terms of fundamentalism versus 
realism cover enormous scope, from issues of organisational structure, 
through perceptions of the role of green parties in parliam ent, to the 
prospect of forming coalitions with other political parties. Particularly 
prom inent in the German Greens' realo-fundi dispute has been the issue 
of co-operation with other political actors, and specifically the relationship
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betw een die Grünen and the SPD.2 In Britain, how ever, where the 
prospect of co-operation with the Labour Party has never been a realistic 
option, the cleavage emerged around whether or not the ultimate aims of 
the party were directed at forming governments (Doherty 1992: 111-2).
In the light of this breadth of scope, it is useful to read fundi-realo disputes 
as about form rather than content. The form of such conflict is shaped by 
value primacy. The following discussion concentrates on the rhetoric 
associated with this form of conflict, rather than on the content of specific 
fundi-realo disputes. It is im portant to take into account what realos and 
fundis have in common, namely their shared com m itm ent to a green 
normative rationality. Both share the view that there is a significant gap 
between the green ideal of the alternative paradigm  and the current reality 
of the dom inant paradigm . The cleavage betw een realo and fundi 
positions is typically a m atter of how to respond to the existence and 
perpetuation of this gap.
Throughout green literature it is possible to find a num ber of readings of 
the process of conversion from the dom inant to the alternative paradigm. 
I start with the most optimistic account of political change, from the green 
point of view. In this scenario, the dom inant paradigm  will inevitably 
collapse due to its internal contradictions and unsustainable practices, 
leaving space for the new paradigm  to emerge in its place. The political 
task for greens is to provoke and hasten the collapse of the old, and to 
nurture the emergence of the new. In some characterisations, such as 
those articulated by Rudolf Bahro (1986), the transition  from the 
dom inant to the alternative paradigm  involves a w ithdraw al of energy 
and support from established power structures. These structures, and 
those who are dependent upon them, are not expected to be able to initiate 
the appropria te  change, but nor are they expected to survive the 
withdrawal of allegiance.
2 The terms fundi and realo need not be consistently applied to particular protagonists. 
Petra Kelly, for example, took a clear fundamentalist stance in relation to coalitions, yet 
her attitude to rotation located her on the realist side of the fence in that dispute. 
Similarly, those who favour realist party strategies such as Porritt have hardly been 
averse to characterising issues using the language of 'refusal to compromise principles'.
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Clearly, existing political parties (and their backers) are not willing to 
countenance even the first steps towards a sustainable society. Such a 
society can only be achieved by millions of people deciding that the 
time has come to change societies whose day to day economic operations 
menace the biosphere (Green Political Network 1989a).
According to British activist Penny Kemp, the purpose of green 
participation in established political institutions is lim ited to making 
them ungovernable (Frankland 1990: 23). The predom inant criteria for 
evaluating political activism is the degree to which political activities 
h ighlight the degeneracy, corruption and m oral bankruptcy  of the 
dom inant paradigm.
Unsurprisingly, the political experience of greens confirms the normative 
shortcom ings of the political system. But in as m uch as collapse is 
expected, experience also demonstrates the survival and perpetuation of 
the dom inant paradigm. While for m any greens, the tim ing of collapse 
may be perpetually postponed, a political strategy based upon waiting for 
the collapse of dom inant structures is regarded as both frustrating and 
counterproductive. Jonathon Porritt gives voice to som e of these 
frustrations, in order to justify political engagem ent w ith established 
political institutions.
To suppose that such a transformation will just come about of its own 
accord is extraordinarily naive even by green standards. I shudder to 
think of the number of initiatives that have wasted away, the amount 
of idealistic energy that has been squandered, and the whole gamut of 
opportunities that have been lost because of foolish regulations, a lack 
of financial support, and every conceivable form of political and
institutional obstruction.....The voice of transformation must be also be
heard and be influential within the existing system - otherwise we're 
wasting our time (Porritt 1984: 167).
Porritt's concerns suggest a different image of how a paradigm shift occurs. 
Exposure to the wisdom of the alternative paradigm  enables those who 
subscribe to the dom inant paradigm  to see the error of their ways and 
embrace the new wisdom. This can be dubbed as a 'transform ative' 
interpretation of green politics and it is this formulation of the paradigm 
model that provides the norm ative justification for realist political 
strategies to green audiences. Such an interpretation typically encourages 
an engagem ent betw een the forces associated with the alternative 
paradigm  and those of the dom inant paradigm . The aim of such
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engagem ent is to encourage political parties, bureaucracies and 
organisations to do green things for green reasons, and to precipitate a 
change of heart on the part of these political actors. The cumulative effect 
of such conversions is the dismantling of the old and the supplanting of 
the new. Political action, in this view, is assessed on the grounds of the 
perceived success of efforts of conversion, that is, how much the 
bureaucracy or the social democratic party has 'turned green'.
Realists do not readily accept the characterisation that their strategies 
amount to a dilution or compromise of green norm ative ideals. Instead, 
they argue that green politics can be characterised by a complimentary 
p u rsu it of strategies of engagem ent w ith the dom inant paradigm  
alongside strategies designed to build the strength of the alternative 
paradigm. We can characterise this as the 'two-feet' (one foot outside, one 
foot inside) approach to green politics. By and large, realists do not oppose 
the forms of political action preferred by fundamentalists, but they argue 
that viable political strategy cannot be built on symbolic protest and 
consciousness raising alone. The transform ative depiction of the 
'chemistry' between the two paradigm s is essentially positive. Realists 
suggest that a meeting of the two paradigms facilitates the transformation 
of dom inant into alternative.
By justifying engagement with established political institutions in these 
paradigm atic terms, realist greens leave themselves open to a charge of 
naivety. Political experience would seem to indicate that there is little 
evidence that engagement with parties, bureaucracies and other political 
actors has resulted in any noticeable 'greening from within'. Put in these 
terms, the criteria for evaluating successful political action become quite 
constrained. Simply achieving a favourable policy result, such as 
implementing tougher environmental standards for industry, does not in 
itself demonstrate the acceptability of the realist strategy. If it is apparent 
that such a success was achieved as a political trade-off, this would 
patently dem onstrate that the motivations of the decision-makers who 
brought in the tougher regulations were not particularly green. According 
to an Australian activist:
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The willingness to compromise and make trade-offs in return for 
influence and favourable decisions promotes the view that 
environmentalists are just another lobby group protecting their own 
interests, which is anathema to dark greens who believe politicians 
should protect the environment because it is the right thing to do (Beder 
1992: 59).
Any claims that other political actors, structures and institutions have 
successfully greened from w ithin are usually m et w ith considerable 
scepticism. In Australia, few greens would accept that Senator Graham 
Richardson, the Minister for the Environm ent from 1987 to 1990, was 
acting according to an ecocentric world-view, even though his tenure in 
the portfolio facilitated the most pro-environm entalist phase of the ALP 
government, and perhaps of any government in Australia. According to a 
new spaper report, Porritt him self had little faith that the Labor 
governm ent's motivations were particularly green.
It was extremely dangerous for the green movement to back any
political party......They are always playing at the business of being
green to suit their own political ends. As soon as they believe there is no 
electoral mileage to be gained out of it, they will drop it (The Age, 4 
April 1991).
Green critics of this phase of environm ental politics point to what was 
seen as the subsequent untrustw orthiness of the Labor governm ent in 
1991.3 They argue that the closer relationship between conservation peak 
bodies and governm ent established during Richardson's tenure was not 
worth the price that was paid. Much the same judgem ent was reached by 
greens evaluating the accord between Green Independents and the Labor 
Party  in Tasm ania, the fu rthest reaching exercise of institu tional 
engagem ent in Australia. None of these participants believed that the 
Labor Party in Tasmania had turned green as a consequence of this accord. 
On the contrary, these experiences of political engagem ent have left 
participants heavily bruised and have em phatically dem onstrated the 
willingness of other political actors to neutralise, marginalise and subvert 
the green challenge rather than be converted to it. The 1992 state election 
which ended the Green Independent's balance of pow er prom pted
3 The green movement saw the Labor government’s proposal of resource security legislation 
as a significant breach of trust (The Age, 11 October 1991; 7 November 1991).
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expressions of relief that the green participants were no longer subject to 
as intense political pressures that such arrangements produced .4
The realist scenario of political change has not yet materialised as a result 
of realist strategies, leaving the way clear for the fundam entalists to say 
'we told you so!' From a fundam entalist standpoint, what's worse is the 
damage done by strategies of engagem ent to the em erging political 
paradigm. Bookchin expresses this response to realism in typically stark 
language.
The fear of 'isolation', of 'futility', of 'ineffectiveness' yields a new 
kind of isolation, futility and ineffectiveness, namely, a complete 
surrender of one's most basic ideals and goals. 'Power' is gained at the 
cost of losing the only power we really have had that can change this 
insane society - our moral integrity, our ideals, and our principles 
(Bookchin 1980: 82).
In reaction to the realist rhetoric, the chemistry between paradigm s is 
reversed in fundamentalist rhetoric. Experience demonstrates the capacity 
of the dom inant paradigm  to contaminate the integrity of green politics. 
The poisonous potential of the former should never be underestim ated, 
as indicated by this quote from an Australian activist:
Never can we delude ourselves that such an all-embracing system is 
going to reform its character and work with us to heal this planet. We 
reject totally any such co-option into the very value system which is 
killing us (Fricker 1990: 225).
The political imperative of this interpretation is a defence of the integrity 
of the alternative paradigm  against infiltration and co-option by elements 
of the old paradigm. Integrity is perpetually threatened by the actions of 
those w ithin the m ovem ent or party  as m uch, if not more, than by 
political opponents. In this scheme, compromise can only be dangerous 
for greens as it opens the door to co-option and contamination. As Beder 
argues:
4 After the Tasmanian state election in February 1992, the Greens' election co-ordinator
commented: 'It's the end of being taken in by this system..... It's the end of forgetting our
vision and our clear-sightedness' (Cumming 1992:12).
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Within the dominant paradigm, the environment is a resource and 
those who subscribe to this paradigm believe it is acceptable to 
compromise in order to save the most valuable areas. For deep 
ecologists, the environment has intrinsic value and so trade-offs have 
no place, whatsoever (Beder 1992: 59).
Thus, the fundam entalist stance becomes a m atter of claiming a role of 
defender of the principled integrity of the green movement. This means 
that the realos' willingness to compromise is regarded as a reflection of 
patently non-green motivations. Getting elected to parliam ent or having 
the ear of a governm ent m inister serves as an 'ego boost' reflecting 
norm atively problem atic aspirations for pow er and influence (Martin 
1990: 14). Jutta Ditfurth, one of the well known fundis in die Grünen, 
claimed after her May 1991 resignation that the Greens had 'changed the 
meaning of political responsibility from responsibility for hum ans and 
nature to subm ission to the logic of being in coalition w ith Social 
Democrats' (Merkenich 1991).
The defensive interpretation that characterises fundampntalism carries a 
high price for greens as it also generates a self-fulfilling prophesy of 
failure. Not only is experience of the world construed in these terms as 
overw helm ingly imm oral, bu t the integrity of alternative politics is 
continually threatened from within. The objective of green political 
activity is reduced to its symbolic effect, that is, its capacity to present 
symbolic contrasts between good and evil. For the realists, this principled 
defence is no more than a retreat to the shelter of a self-imposed political 
ghetto. This is then condem ned as irresponsible because it makes no 
impact on the status quo and steadfastly refuses to respond to the political 
opportunities which do arise for fear of contamination. H utton points to 
the fundam entalist impediment to green change that is a consequence of 
the 'schismatic behaviour of greens intent on m arginalisation' (Hutton 
1990:19).
Entrenched cleavages such as fundam entalism  v realism threaten the 
faith in value rationality within the green movement. Such conflict either 
draw s attention to the am biguity and indeterm inate im plications of 
value-based green politics, or it fosters interpretations that one view is 
correct and the other is mistaken. When green activists argue that some of
213
their colleagues are operating within a flawed interpretation of green 
values, or according to illegitim ate m otivations, norm atively ideal 
decision-m aking procedures - such as w idespread consultation and 
consensus - are greatly impaired. This is because the assumption that all 
participants share the same value perspective is underm ined. As fundi- 
realo conflict becomes entrenched or escalates in internal disputes, the 
'other' side tends to be represented as an obstacle and im pedim ent to 
authentic forms of green politics, rather than as a legitimate indication of 
diversity. The shadow of norm ative rationality exists w ithin the green 
movement as well as outside it.
In these ways, the significant problem s experienced by greens are 
habitually attributed to norm ative deficiency, w hether it be of specific 
actors, structures and processes, or of the w ider context within which 
greens operate. The typical interpretation of the experience of difficulty, 
frustration and destructive conflict is the recognition of the ever more 
pervasive face of the dom inant paradigm  within green processes. This 
occurs despite the best efforts of resistance from those with the requisite 
commitment and integrity. A recognition of the unintended consequences 
and perverse effects can easily serve to reinforce the habit of normative 
primacy. As perhaps the most strident exponent of norm ative primacy, 
Bahro contends:
All the aggravation in the alternative projects - including such 
political projects as the Green party - comes from the fact that the 
monadic and frustrated personality structure in general enters in an 
unreformed state (Bahro 1986: 158).
Thus, through the circular logic of normative primacy, it is possible to 
attribute the source of conflict and difficulty to the selfishness and egotism 
that green politics attempts to eradicate. In this way, there is even more 
cause for political pessimism, as self-interest abounds in the very political 
processes which were designed to transcend it. From the point of view of 
those who adhere to it, the integrity of the alternative value paradigm 
need not be threatened by difficulties and conflicts and contradictions 
between the different demands it generates. As the Australian case study 
shows, there are num erous ways of using the experience of political
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difficulty to confirm rather than deny the validity of a purely principled 
approach to politics.
Problems experienced by greens can be attributed to the failure of non­
green actors to be converted to green consciousness, the failure of greens 
to live up to green principles, resistance to the adoption of appropriate 
green orientations within the m ovement, or the preparedness of some 
greens to compromise the integrity of these principles. The ambiguity of 
the green norm ative repertoire ensures that the shadow  of norm ative 
rationality can be cast in any direction. The positive m oral status of 
particu lar green form ations is alw ays ten tative  and liable to be 
underm ined  by the experience of difficulties w hich illustra te  the 
pervasiveness of the dom inant paradigm.
7.2. Blindspots of Value Identity Approaches
A central argum ent of this thesis has been that the terms used in the 
academic literature to identify and assess green politics run parallel to 
those used by greens themselves. Because value identity approaches adopt 
the analytical language of value paradigms, they are in no better position 
to escape the circularities of norm ative logic that afflict m uch of the 
practice of green politics. Thus, where the issues addressed above are 
recognised, they are dealt with unsatisfactorily. Value identity approaches 
typically entail a set of parameters for conceptualising green politics which 
are just as problematic as those employed by greens themselves.
The interpretation of green party organisational structure is a case in 
point. Dobson's reflection on the Germ an Greens' abandonm ent of 
rotation leads him to pose the question 'how far can Green politics be 
achieved .... if it demands the progressive abandonm ent of the principles 
of such politics?' (Dobson 1990: 138). This progressive abandonm ent, 
argues Dobson, has been a notable feature of all green political actions that 
have a ttem pted  engagem ent in estab lished  in stitu tiona l politics. 
Apparently, Dobson expects true green political practice to emerge in a 
vacuum, a space uncontaminated by the residue of old paradigm  models 
of organisation. From the evidence of greens them selves, this is an
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extrem ely forlorn hope, given the surrep titious ways in which the 
dominant paradigm  finds its way into green organisation.
These parameters for assessing green political structure are not restricted 
to those who see greens as agents of desirable political transformation. 
Kuechler and Dalton construct a similar calculus.
Realistically, one cannot expect that the movement parties will fully 
succeed in establishing and practicing non-hierarchical forms of 
communication and decision-making. Measured against the utopian 
ideal, the parties may fall short, but the differences from established 
parties are clearly discernible. Yet, in their attempt to function 
effectively in the long run, they may have to compromise, partially 
resorting to more traditional organizational patterns (Kuechler and 
Dalton 1990: 295).
Yet these authors also insist that green politics is defined in terms of its 
distinctive value profile (1990: 278). If this is the case, Dobson's question is 
apt. The gradual formalisation of green parties and the moves towards 
traditional organisational forms that Kuechler and Dalton identify can 
only be regarded as an erosion of this identity. Either green parties 
underm ine the very basis of their identity or they rem ain marginal to 
political processes. Neither option allows much scope for the positive 
evaluation of political activity.
Value identity approaches also parallel activist interpretation with regard 
to the issue of broader social change. Both fundam entalist and realist 
rhetoric have their academic equivalents. A num ber of commentators on 
fundi-realo conflict have accepted the claims that fundam entalists are the 
custodians of green values and that realist strategies constitute a dilution 
of green principles. According to Dobson, the failure of strategies of 
engagem ent should not be particularly surprising as the institutions 
realists wish to engage with are by nature a part of the dom inant 
paradigm . Here, the shadow  of the dom inant parad igm  assum es 
m onum ental proportions:
The problem that has informed this discussion of the possibility of 
bringing about Green change through the parliamentary process centres 
on the difficulty of bringing about a decolonized society through 
structures that are already colonized - structures that are deeply 
(perhaps irremediably) implicated in the status quo that Green politics 
seeks to shift (Dobson 1990: 139).
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Once again, such a reading is not restricted to those who are sympathetic 
to the fundam entalists. In a review article of green politics literature, 
Stephen Young claimed that in as much as green parties have to address 
themselves to 'the problems facing governments now', they are forced to 
choose between 'compromising their principles, or more or less opting 
out of the political system ’ (Young 1992: 9). Thom pson, Ellis and 
W ildavsky represent realo strategies as an attem pt by adherents to an 
egalitarian culture to form alliances with other cultural types, a process 
which m ust involve some sort of com prom ise w ith non-egalitarian 
culture. As they argue:
.... egalitarians who wish to rule and not just criticize (the "Realos" as 
opposed to the "Fundis" in the current parlance of the German Greens) 
may seek out an alliance with one of the other active ways of life. An 
alliance with hierarchy promises to make it easier for egalitarians to
make decisions......  In order to do this, however, egalitarians must
moderate their suspicion of authority......  So, .... egalitarians worry
that coercive hierarchical means may pervert voluntary egalitarian 
ends (Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky 1990: 89).
The language of compromise and of the dilution of identity  figures 
prom inently in this account. The cultural theory approach claims that 
egalitarians are more comfortable rem aining true to their values than 
they are at venturing beyond their self-imposed boundaries (Thompson, 
Ellis & Wildavsky 1990: 90).
Not all analysts of green politics, however, take the fundi interpretation as 
given. Jean Cohen attempts to give credence and legitimacy to the realist 
in terpretation  of paradigm atic politics. For Cohen, the new social 
movement values of autonomy, plurality and difference mitigate against 
norm ative absolutism, fundam entalism  and the insistence on one true 
path. Her analysis supports realist interpretations inasmuch as she is 
sceptical of fundam entalist claims to moral custodianship, and in her 
articulation of a norm atively principled justification of institutional 
engagement. Cohen shares with the realists a hope in the transformative 
potential of new forms of politics within existing institutional settings. 
Her argum ent is based upon a Habermasian vision of political action in 
modern industrial society. She suggests that '.... the selective realization of 
the potentials of m odernity entails institutional developm ents in civil
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society that involve dom ination but also the bases for em ancipation’ 
(1985: 712). The forum of parliam ent in liberal democracies is cited as 
exactly the type of institu tion  that contains the potential for both 
domination and emancipation. Cohen, therefore, seeks to give credence to 
the 'one foot inside, one foot outside’ approach to political change.
A different route to a principled defence of the realist approach is 
advanced by Robert Goodin who, having outlined  the norm ative 
argum ents of both realos and fundis, asks the question 'which is the 
correct characterization of the green ethic in particular?' (Goodin 1992: 
111). He decides, on the basis that green ends should carry more weight in 
the argum ent than green m eans, that strategic political action is 
normatively preferable to inaction. Goodin also speaks in similar terms to 
Porritt when he insists that green action on the part of governm ents, 
political parties and business, m ust be informed by green values (Goodin 
1992: 92).
The parallels between activist and academic interpretations of fundi-realo 
conflict make for rather pessimistic assessments of green political activity. 
If fundamentalists are regarded as the true custodians of green values then 
it would appear that enormous efforts are required from the faithful just 
to protect the principled integrity of green politics from those who wish to 
comprom ise it. This is to say nothing of w hat m ay be required to 
precipitate norm ative conversion on a w ider scale. If the core green 
political actors are prone to sell-outs, w hat hope is there for a more 
w idespread  green conversion? If, on the o ther hand , the realo 
interpretation is treated as closer to the essence of green politics, there 
appears to be little basis for claiming that such a transformation has been 
set in train by green participation in the electoral and parliam entary 
sp h e re .5 Goodin acknowledges that conversions among the ranks of 
established political actors have not generally  been forthcom ing. 
However, he asserts that this is the problem of the governm ents and
5 With regard to parliament in particular there are also greens who would argue that a 
successful transformation would mean little given the irrelevance of parliament in western 
democracies. Martin Jänicke, a former die Grünen parliamentarian, offers such an account 
(Jänicke 1990: 22-4).
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parties rather than a problem  for the realists, who cannot be held 
responsible for the moral orientations of those from whom  they gain 
political concessions (1992: 110). Either way, there is little to suggest that 
social and political changes are taking place according to any logic of green 
transform ation.
The failure of normative rationality also looms large in the conclusions of 
the theorist who most strongly believes that transform ation is inevitable. 
Touraine's in terventions in groups of French anti-nuclear activists 
illustrate perhaps the most concerted attem pt to im plem ent normative 
rationality and weed out irrational or resistant orientations. In Touraine's 
commentary it is possible to detect the same tendency to diagnose the 
failure of current political efforts as an indication of the persistence of 
resistant elements.
Should we say that the reconversion had failed? Yes, in so far as the 
struggle was unable to transform itself into a social movement. Those 
who still appealed to the mobilising force of the rejection of industrial 
values knew as well as the others the weakness of the struggle and its 
inability to undertake new actions (Touraine 1983: 165).
Aside from this tendency tow ard pessimistic assessments, all of these 
approaches underw rite a markedly restrictive definition of green politics 
by buying into the terms of internal green conflicts. If significant sections 
of the green movement are to be considered not as representing the new 
political directions of green politics, but as resistant to them, it is 
som ew hat more difficult to retain a characterisation of the green 
movement as a formidable and broad-based political force.
7.3. Limitations of Green Rationality
The in terp reta tion  of green political experience w ithin norm ative 
parameters reinforces claims for the urgency of right green action and the 
param ount importance of upholding the integrity of green principles. In 
other words, 'crisis' accounts play an im portant part in generating 
commitment on the part of green actors (Coleman & Coleman 1993). 
Exhortation to urgent action and greater commitment undoubtedly has 
some political utility. I have noted that green activists adopt a rhetorical 
language of value prim acy as a device to facilitate conversion and
219
m aintain commitment to the green cause. Could not the same be said 
about the theoretical attempts to stipulate the essence of green movement 
politics undertaken by Cohen, Touraine, Bookchin, Dobson, Eckersley and 
Goodin? Like their activist counterparts, such efforts are regarded as 
im portant and significant in that green change is dependent upon the 
norm ative orientations of political actors in general, and of greens in 
particular.
But is this em phasis on the norm ative conversion, consciousness and 
integrity of political actors warranted? The analysis presented in this thesis 
raises serious questions about both the usefulness and appropriateness of 
regarding personal value change and integrity as the lynchpins of green 
political strategy. If green change is thought of as being em bedded in a 
normatively principled rationality that is freely chosen, then considerable 
weight m ust be placed upon the normative state of political actors. Having 
identified  the tendency tow ards analytical circularity and political 
pessimism that is a general feature of value identity approaches, there are 
a num ber of other reasons why I would suggest that the emphasis on 
conversion and integrity is misplaced.
7.3.1. New Middle Class Politics
There is, for example, the issue of the social location of green political 
support. Social science data indicates that the pool of potential green 
converts, while theoretically universal, is in actuality draw n from a 
lim ited subsection of the population of industrial societies. It would 
appear then, that the voluntaristic altruism of green politics has its roots 
firmly planted in middle class soil. The literature on the 'genealogy of 
morals' offers some suggestions about the connection between the new 
m iddle class and value-based politics which fits comfortably with the 
rhetorical interpretation offered in Chapter 3. The work of Minson (1993) 
and Hunter (1993) could be used to suggest that the limited social location 
of green support reflects the social distribution of acquired capacities to 
perceive the self in a particular way, namely, as an individual subject for 
whom political orientations are to be based upon normative principles. If 
this is the case, then the concentration of green support among the 
postwar generation, the educated and the new middle class maps out the
220
sociological limits of these practices of self-formation. The majority of the 
population of industrial societies have not been trained to aspire to this 
historically and sociologically peculiar form of moral subjectivity. This 
interpretation is a plausible antidote to the tendency of value identity 
approaches to assume that all individuals are coherent moral subjects 
who choose from a m enu of packaged alternatives. It also supports a 
sceptical a ttitude  tow ards objective standards of green norm ative 
consciousness against which political actors are assessed.
The social boundaries of green politics also demarcate the situses where a 
morally integrated green life can be lived. These situses most definitely do 
not include w orking for m ultinational m ining corporations, being a 
member of a conservative political party, or helping to develop more 
efficient nuclear energy technology. But apart from these obvious 
examples, there are many other social locations in which it is difficult to 
live a life of green integrity. These locations include much of the private 
sector, the traditional rural sector, and employm ent associated with the 
defence industry. In terms of a capacity for green conversion, these 
locations are effectively written off. By contrast, the locations in which 
greens are found, namely the public sector, tertiary education, arts and 
cultural occupations, present fewer ethical problems for greens. In this 
way, there are significant self-imposed limits on the scope of conversion.
If these social lim its to the acquisition of green consciousness are 
acknowledged, a question then arises about the extent to which political 
change can be achieved by those elements of the new middle class who 
have already acquired green consciousness. Members of this category are 
comparatively well equipped with cultural resources and with the capacity 
to articulate normative claims. However, as I have argued earlier in this 
chapter, there is little point in regarding green norm ative rationality as 
appropriate baselines for the analysis of political change. Keeping this in 
mind though, it is feasible to suggest that the normatively literate new 
middle class has a significant influence upon the rhetorical repertoires 
available to political actors. The link betw een a changing rhetorical 
repertoire and changing social practices is hardly a straightforward one, a 
point that I will argue in a later section of this chapter on the 'ownership'
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of green rhetoric. With this in mind, I would venture that the effect of the 
new m iddle class norm ative rationality w ithin green politics is best 
interpreted in terms of changes in discursive practice rather than as 
changes of heart.
W hatever the benefits of the new middle class location of green support, 
there is also a range of political vulnerabilities that go with this 
sociological territory. As a correlate of middle class location, the altruistic 
eschewal of self-interest can be a considerable Achilles heel, particularly 
when greens enter debate in the wider political arena. Recalling that there 
are a num ber of rhetorical commonplaces that can be counterposed 
against the privileging of values over self-interest, the vulnerabilities of 
green politics come into sharper focus. For instance, there is an ever­
present danger that greens will appear insensitive to the legitimate 
interests of particular groups. Greens are frequently criticised on the basis 
that their political objectives are skewed against the interests of workers. 
Blue collar unions in particular have regularly voiced suspicions that the 
employm ent and distributional implications of environm ental demands 
hit the industrial working class the hardest.6 In A ustralia, the same 
problems have also been raised in relation to the aboriginal community; 
green proposals are sometimes said to ignore, or have the potential to 
adversely affect the interests of aboriginal com m unities (Lark 1990; 
Mansell 1990). In such circumstances, the relatively restricted social base of 
green politics returns to haunt greens, as it becomes easier to paint some 
green claims as the latest manifestation of middle class meddling.
Examples abound of greens paying serious attention to the potential 
inequities that arise from green policies, and of collaborative efforts 
between greens and marginal groups. But what remains problematic for 
greens is the essential difference between universalist and particularist 
prom otions of group claims. Where the legitim acy of the claims of
6 According to a newspaper report on the Australian Council of Trade Unions' policy on the 
environment, 'low income earners must not bear a disproportionate cost of environmental 
reform' (The Age, 16 September, 1991). The main story in this article contained a speech by 
the ACTU president attacking the influence of the green lobby in Australia.
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aboriginals, women, workers and local communities are acknowledged 
and taken up, they are still interests taken up 'on behalf o f others. The 
'unselfish' and universalistic normative standpoint adopted by greens can 
also carry with it the suggestion that greens are in a better position to 
know or assess the interests of these groups than the groups themselves. 
Paradoxically, some claims by aboriginals (for land rights with the capacity 
to benefit from mining royalties) or the unemployed (for greater spending 
on governm ent job-creation schemes) may also carry less norm ative 
weight because they reflect self-interested motivations.
The reliance upon the legitimacy of universalist in contrast to particularist 
criteria creates other dangers for greens. After all, in very obvious ways, 
greens can be easily depicted in particu larist terms. Recall that the 
'selfishness' card was played in the A ustralian grns.oz.forum  debates 
because any identifiable actor constituted a 'self' whose interests could be 
construed as at odds with the greater whole. In other contexts, the political 
opponents of greens have been just as adept at deploying this rhetorical 
strategy. The very existence of green organisations is seen to constitute 
'selves' capable of self-interest. The unavoidable particularist location of 
greens allows opponents to play the 'selfish greens' versus the 'needs of 
the whole community' card .7
Criticisms of 'unrepresentativeness' are easy to make when greens are 
draw n from a relatively limited range of social locations. Furthermore, 
these charges do not depend upon showing how the new middle class 
benefits from green proposals, (notwithstanding the occasional attempt to 
do so). Should greens be so surprised if trade unionists or newspaper 
columnists play the selfishness card in this way? It is difficult for greens to 
respond to such charges because they have no recourse to the virtues of a 
particularistic identity.
7 One long-time and trenchant critic of the green movement, former Finance Minister Peter 
Walsh claimed '(w)e know that the "green" lobby does not care how many other 
Australians it puts out of work or how much debt it passes on to the next generation. It basks 
now in a warm inner glow ' (Peter Walsh, Australian Financial Review, 9 July 1991).
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A middle class politics that places so much weight upon altruism is also a 
soft target in circumstances where the pursuit of 'grub' before ethics seems 
reasonable, as in the case of electoral politics in recessionary times. The 
habitual norm ative primacy of green rhetoric simply cuts no ice under 
these conditions, because the ecocentric brand of altruism greens espouse 
is precisely that which currently can be successfully portrayed as a luxury .8 
These are significant vulnerabilities, not so much because the accusations 
levelled against greens are 'true' or 'accurate', but because they resonate 
with the common sense of wider audiences. As long as green politics can 
be portrayed as a middle class luxury, opponents will adopt this argument. 
And as long as green politics is defined in terms of an alternative value 
rationality, it will have limited appeal beyond the middle class.
7.3.2. Audience Reach
This raises a closely related limitation built into a value rational green 
politics. The privileging of values, and of green values in particular, in 
rhetorical practice places significant limitations upon the 'reach' of green 
oratory. If the habits of normative primacy are well entrenched in green 
forums, it is worth considering how this affects the conduct of green 
politics in settings where different types of audiences, such as the media, 
the electorate, the parliam ent or the bureaucracy are addressed. Indeed, 
one of the noticeable side-effects of normative primacy is the ambivalence 
about addressing audiences who are not presum ed to share green values.
The fundam entalist current constitutes a strong impedim ent to any such 
green oratory unless it is dedicated to the task of green conversion. For 
fundamentalists, electoral activity presents the opportunity of convincing 
the uncommitted. If this translates into votes, well and good, but if not, it 
simply serves as further evidence of the influence of the dom inant 
paradigm. Thus, a characteristic fundi argument regarding elections is that 
votes should not be pursued for their own sake, especially if this involves
8 This is in contrast to notions of altruism inherent in 'social justice' rhetoric which become 
more acceptable in harder economic times. Greens compete with social democratic parties 
over this normative ground, whereas until now they have benefited electorally when 
environmental issues are at the forefront of the public issue agenda.
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making concessions to dom inant paradigm  logic. In their view, this is 
exactly what occurs if appeals to standards of living, economic prosperity 
and the 'nim by' (not-in-m y-backyard) syndrom e are offered as good 
reasons to vote for green candidates. These criteria are problem atic 
elements of what is characteristically thought by greens to be the common 
sense of the whole electorate.
Fundam entalists are not predisposed to address policy-makers, other 
political parties or parliaments in other ways, as these forums are regarded 
as audiences beyond persuasion. Occasions on which they do advocate 
direct engagement with policy-makers are largely limited to protest actions 
in which the rhetorical objective is to articu late  strong symbolic 
normative contrasts between themselves and their adversaries. In these 
antagonistic settings, the object is not so much to win the offending 
politicians and bureaucrats over to the normative view being espoused, as 
it is to articulate fundamental opposition.
The majority of green activists do not have such a restrictive view of 
political action. Nevertheless, the constraints of paradigmatic thinking are 
still apparent in the activities towards the realist end of the spectrum. A 
well known problem  for greens who have engaged in electoral and 
parliam entary politics is the difficulty in reconciling the dem ands of 
attracting votes with those of addressing the highly principled ecopolitical 
constituency .9 This is a problem particularly in those circumstances where 
the core constituency is inclined to equate the w idening of the scope of 
acceptable evaluative criteria with the watering down of the principled 
basis of green politics. But even where strategies of extension are more 
acceptable, the demands of addressing wider audiences can quite easily be 
seen as threatening to green normative integrity. Drew H utton tells the 
following anecdote.
When I was campaigning for the Green Party in the 1985 Brisbane City
Council elections I was asked by a radio talkback host, "But you're not
one of those Greenies who are against all development, are you?" The
9 The work of Kitschelt (1989) contains much material on the tension between the 'logic of 
constituency representation’ and the ’logic of electoral competition'.
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question was obviously guiding me towards some statement of moderate 
"rationality" and I responded accordingly. In retrospect, however, I 
would have answered this question quite differently, even at the 
expense of confusing many listeners (Hutton 1987b: 15).
The dilemma for H utton was how to access the common sense of a 
talkback radio audience and host on the topic of 'developm ent' w ithout 
abandoning green common sense. Such dilem m as, of course, are no 
different to those faced by any political actor presenting a challenging 
message to a w ider audience. Hutton's reflections on his performance, 
however, focuses upon his failure to use the interview as an opportunity 
for conversion to the alternative paradigm.
Instead of pointing out that Greens were opposed to development that 
was needlessly destructive of nature, my response should have explored 
the assumptions underlying the question. Greens, because they reject 
many of the assumptions of the old world view and so much of the 
system of industrialism, mean different things when they use words 
like "development" and "rational" (Hutton 1987b: 15).
So although H utton is prepared to take the green message to wider 
audiences, he still regards the common sense of the radio audience as 
indicative of old paradigm  values. As such, he reveals a considerable 
ambivalence regarding the purpose of the interview. Post hoc, there is 
regret that he did not 'tell it like it is' and risk confusing significant 
sections of his audience. Any difficulties caused w ould be entirely 
consistent w ith their 'a ttachm ent' to the dom inant w orldview . In 
addition, we could surmise, there is a hint of regret that his oratory may 
have successfully persuaded some listeners to vote green without them 
realising that green politics represented a radically contrasting worldview. 
Either way, Hutton's reappraisal reinforces the green habit of perceiving 
the principal political task as one of conversion from one value paradigm 
to another.
Thus, for green activists who are prepared to widen the scope of their 
audience, the habit of thinking in terms of distinct paradigm s can place 
considerable restrictions upon the ways in which they are prepared to 
argue their case. H utton is right in sensing that the questioning of 
assumptions about rationality and development would confuse a talkback 
radio audience, but I would suggest that this is largely because the
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willingness and ability to engage in the 'questioning of assum ptions' is 
limited to an audience with experience of tertiary education. Once again, 
this strategy is unlikely to make much headway with those sections of the 
population who are more remote from the characteristic social milieu of 
greens.
7.3.3. The 'Control' of Normative Rhetoric
The third area of limitation relates to the point made earlier regarding the 
political influence of a normatively rational new middle class. Among the 
most striking political changes induced by green political activity has been 
the em ergence of norm ative standards such as b iodiversity  and 
sustainability into public political discourse. The green movem ent has 
also played a substantial role in re-emphasising and re-interpreting older 
normative criteria such as democracy, autonom y and participation. In a 
sense, greens have been am ong the m ost successful 'norm ative 
entrepreneurs' in recent decades in western democracies. However, this 
significant influence upon the norm ative common sense of western 
publics is not w ithout its downside. The introduction of these criteria to 
the stock of more public common sense by no means implies that they 
will be used and deployed appropriately, from a green perspective.
The trajectory of the term 'sustainability' in Australian political processes 
illustrates that greens may have very little influence over the ways in 
which green values are deployed in the public arena. In Australia, the 
most commonly cited problem of values being m isappropriated by non­
green actors has been in relation to the term 'ecologically sustainable 
developm ent' (ESD). This tripartite process involving the governm ent 
and business and environm ental peak bodies was established by the 
Hawke government in 1990 as a framework for the implementation of the 
B ru n d tlan d  C om m ission  rep o rt Our Common Future. A m ong 
commentators on Australian environmental policy, a common view has 
emerged that the ESD process has enabled both government and industry 
to co-opt green language in order to justify developm ent proposals 
(McEachern 1993). ESD allows business and government to respond to or 
sidestep green criticism by claiming the environm ental legitimacy of its 
actions. The ESD example illustrates that any success in introducing a new
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Standard to the political process is also associated with a lack of control 
over the deployment of that standard. Indeed, it has been argued that the 
various interpretations of sustainability which were produced in the ESD 
process reduced or neutralised the utility of the concept of sustainability. It 
had been rendered too ambiguous in public political discourse to be of any 
use to greens.10
The problem  of stolen rhetoric highlights further significant problems 
regarding the emphasis upon normative integrity and character. The lack 
of control over the deployment of green rhetoric is particularly disturbing 
when values are regarded as underpinning a distinct green identity. If 
green values are used by actors who are not regarded as legitimately 
possessing them, the characteristic response is to interpret such actions in 
terms of violation of property rights. Green values are stolen, adopted 
fraudulently, and hijacked when they are deployed by non-green actors. 
'O w nership ' is of most concern when green rhetoric is deployed to 
support manifestly non-green actions. This is an issue that concerned 
David Nerlich, the Sydney activist, in his reaction to a story that received 
widespread coverage in the Australian news media at the end of 1990.
This year in Port Augusta, South Australia, a poll was held on a 
proposal by the Mayor, Alderman Joy Balluch to impose a curfew on 
teenagers - banning children under 16 years from the streets after 10pm.
Less than half of registered voters turned out (of total 10,000 registered) 
but of those who did, 80% voted in favour of the curfew. This was 
hailed by Alderman Balluch as "a victory for grassroots democracy".
What do we make of this (both the method and the result)? Is this 
what we mean when we promote the idea of community self- 
determination? Should we worry that the decision and similar 
initiatives often tend not towards the enhancement but to the erosion of 
civil liberties? Should the vote have been compulsory? (Nerlich 
1990a).
This posting prom pted debate and discussion about how greens should 
respond to this suspect deployment of green values, and how they might 
ensure that their values are interpreted in the right way. A Californian 
activist responded to Nerlich's questions by suggesting that:
10 See, for example (Hollick 1990).
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Decentralized power works best with an enlightened, educated 
population. Greens will do the educating, of course (Marcus 1990).
Regardless of whether or not this remark is facetious, it exposes a new set 
of normative dilemmas, as Nerlich reminds Marcus:
Who's teaching the Greens? Who defines the higher moral ground?
Will anybody listen? It was federal law, not federal education, that 
stopped lynching and torture of blacks (Nerlich 1990b).
Value identity  approaches also m irror their activist counterparts in 
lam enting the capacity of non-green actors for norm ative ignorance or 
deceitfulness. Goodin, for one, is concerned about the tendency of 
mainstream political actors to 'mimic' green values.
They (mainstream parties) will often argue, imply or allude that they 
are not only doing green things but that they are also doing them for 
green reasons. Occasionally they say as much; more often they merely 
allow voters to believe as much, without actually saying so themselves.
Either way, though, it is a simple form of fraud (Goodin 1992: 95-6).
Indeed, it is a common complaint, just as noticeable in the academic 
literature as in green rhetoric, that non-greens, either knowingly or 
unknowingly are wont to misleadingly adopt green mantles, because it is 
considered politically good to be green (Dobson 1990: 2; Eckersley 1992: 8). 
Fraudulent usage of green values is regarded, therefore, as a significant 
impediment to the cause, especially when mere tinkering with the status 
quo could be passed off as green change. For Goodin, this is a political 
practice which is both morally flawed and logically untenable (1992: 96).
However, it is worth asking what is the point of invoking a foundational 
set of green normative principles w ithout the political capacity to make 
such definitions stick? Let's assume for the moment that greens agree 
am ong them selves upon  re la tively  unam biguous boundaries to 
interpretations of values such as grassroots democracy and autonomy. It is 
doubtful that they would be able to discourage other political actors from 
deploying these values 'fraudulently', or that these deployments would 
cause the sky to fall (selectively) upon the perpetrators of such fraud. At 
the very least, if the offenders were to be punished, their deviance would 
have to be recognised by a far wider or more powerful audiences than 
those who share green values. Goodin is not oblivious to this point. He
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adm its that political parties, have and will continue to engage in 
piecemeal borrowing, and will do so regardless of logical incompatibility. 
They can afford to do so because of the short-term nature of the electoral 
cycle, as the chickens might take a bit longer to come home to roost than 
the next election. Accordingly, 'the only rem edy for this myopia of 
political parties is farsightedness among voters' (1992: 172). If this then is 
the means by which political inconsistency does not pay, it seems that it 
has very little to do with inherent logic. Goodin makes no claim that there 
is any such logic that is currently m anifest in the conduct of electoral 
politics.
In any case, effective control over the deploym ent of norm ative rhetoric 
in public political discourse is a tall order. Such control, I would argue, is 
significantly more difficult to achieve than control over the use of 
technical criteria which can be largely facilitated through the licensing of 
experts. The contexts in which moral authority is formally licensed are 
heavily circumscribed in contemporary western societies.11 Furthermore, 
the power of 'external' normative authority, which would be required in 
order to uphold the requirem ents of a norm ative rationality, has been 
subject to sustained challenge from the sovereignty of the individual 
conscience. Greens are among the most vocal contemporary champions of 
the latter against the former, and because of this distaste for formalised 
moral authority, they are even less predisposed to 'do the educating' even 
if they were in a position to do so. Greens, therefore, are both unable and, 
by almost all indications, unwilling to protect their normative repertoire 
against abuses, whether from within or without.
If this is the case, then there is little point to grounding green political 
activity in foundational value definitions when there is virtually no 
prospect of formal measures to underw rite them. Therein lies a highly 
ironic aspect of green normative primacy and the rhetoric of conversion. 
The very suggestion of normative authority and expertise that would be 
required as part of any regime of moral intervention is itself normatively
11 The Catholic Church can be regarded as the few large remaining setting where 
normative authority is formally sanctioned.
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problem atic for greens who have em phasised the sovereignty of the 
individual conscience. In the absence of norm ative authority, all that 
remains is a vague faith that individuals from beyond the orbit of the new 
middle class will spontaneously see the green light.
7.4. Conclusion
The dynamics outlined in this chapter raise serious questions about 
trea tin g  value  conversion  and im p lem en ta tio n  as ap p ro p ria te  
frameworks for assessing green political and social change. Values cannot 
support the weight of expectation that is placed upon them. Green habits 
of value prim acy system atically produce self-fulfilling prophesies of 
failure and exacerbate internal tensions. When new political paradigm  
values are regarded as the foundation of green party  design greens 
discover that old paradigm  politics is extremely difficult to eradicate. 
W hen green values are seen as underw riting  social change, the 
frustrations of political experience are translated into internal battles 
betw een fundam entalism  and realism. In addition to these perverse 
effects, the rhetoric of green conversion is ineffectual beyond certain 
sociological boundaries, and the integrity of green values is constantly 
violated by political opponents. These are the ways in which the world 
appears to greens when politics is assessed in terms of value rationality. 
Academic analyses that assess green politics within these same terms of 
reference support these pessimistic evaluations. This is the price to be paid 
for regarding values as appropriate bases for a distinctive identity while 
ignoring their rhetorically ambiguous character.
Chapter 8: Conclusion
Green parties are among the most prom inent exponents of the 'ethic of 
ultim ate ends' in contem porary politics. They definitely do 'do things 
differently' on the basis of the values they espouse. How ever, the 
evidence in this thesis demonstrates that green normative rationality does 
not work in the m anner that its own terms of reference would suggest. 
Commitment to normative rationality, particularly when combined with 
the exclusion of other types of rationality, produces a range of unintended 
consequences and perverse effects. Unfortunately, the bulk of literature 
that deals with green values adopts a notably unironic interpretation of 
claims of green norm ative identity  and rationality . This form of 
interpretation of the role of values in green politics, I have endeavoured 
to show, is highly unsatisfactory for academic analysis and for the conduct 
of green politics.
In this thesis I have attem pted to develop an alternative to the standard 
ways of conceptualising the relationship betw een values and green 
politics. A rhetorical framework of analysis avoids defining green politics 
as a coherent value paradigm , but allows us to give credence to the 
im portant fact that greens characteristically describe themselves in these 
terms. Values are significant as a type of good reason that supports 
justifications and criticisms. They are not the only type of reason, but in 
many contexts they carry more rhetorical weight than other types of 
reasons.
8.1. The Argument Against Value Identity
The most im portant element of this different understanding is that the 
rhetorical im portance of values can be seen as a function of their 
ambigui ty . Values are rhetorically pow erful because they can mean 
different things to different people. This central rhetorical characteristic of 
values serves as a useful basis for investigating the ways in which values 
are actually used. It allows a variety of different usages of which two are 
particularly significant in political discourse. On the one hand, values
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provide ways of identifying with audiences. In this sense, values serve as 
mechanisms of inclusion. This is where rhetorical ambiguity, flexibility 
and suppleness is most definitely advantageous. The 'inclusiveness' of 
green politics is most evident in the highly universalistic content of green 
values.
On the other hand, values are deployed rhetorically in attempts to identify 
boundaries. In this sense, they serve as m echanisms of exclusion. Both 
value identity academic analyses and green political practitioners have 
relied heavily upon the 'exclusive' deploym ent of values in order to 
distinguish green politics from the rest of the political landscape. This is 
usually achieved by locating green politics in terms of an alternative value 
paradigm. Emphasis upon the rationality of green values implies that the 
correct implications of green values can be distinguished by academics and 
activists alike. However, the unavoidable am biguity of values ensures 
that their usage as mechanisms of distinction is somewhat problematic for 
both groups.
Efforts to define green politics in term s of a distinct set of values 
encounter the ambiguity of normative discourse in a num ber of forms. 
Firstly, greens are not the only political actors who deploy the values 
commonly identified as green. Green values are frequently deployed by 
other actors to bolster claims that greens themselves would not support. 
Secondly, greens regularly  differ significantly  am ong them selves 
regarding the interpretation of these values in specific contexts. The same 
values are frequently used to underpin quite different and often opposing 
claims. Thirdly, the green repertoire of values is itself highly ambiguous. 
There is enormous scope for contradiction between green political values 
such as unity and diversity, consensus and autonomy, emancipation and 
community. The weaknesses of value identity accounts are most apparent 
in the ways in which they characteristically dism iss these forms of 
am biguity as insignificant in their attem pts to construct a coherent 
normative foundation for green politics. In all of these approaches, this 
ambiguity is regarded as 'noise'.
Value identity approaches adopt interpretations of value rationality that 
exclude noise from consideration. Breaches of value rationality are
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typically attributed to ignorance, disingenuity or to resistance within the 
green project itself. These moves are patently  circular. Anom alous 
recourse to values is always somebody else's problem , not that of the 
analytical framework. Those who are mistaken regarding the implications 
of values should be educated appropriately. Those who breach the 
rationality of values will find that their chickens come home to roost. 
These are rather hollow claims that have little to offer the analysis of 
green politics. In any reading of the developm ent of green politics it is 
clear that political actors frequently pay little heed to the implications of 
normative rationality, however it is defined. Their chickens do not come 
home to roost. The cacophony of inappropriate value interpretations 
continues unabated.
A ttem pts to define green norm ative ra tionality  only succeed in 
dem onstrating the extent of irrationality both outside and w ithin the 
green m ovement. As such, value identity approaches do not provide 
feasible frameworks for analysing green dynamics, and have the added 
disadvantage of presenting highly restrictive depictions of the acceptable 
range of green politics in their attempts to filter out the noise.
8.2. A Summary of Perverse Effects
The practice of using values in order to make distinctions is hardly 
restricted to academic settings. Green political actors of the past twenty 
years have displayed a marked tendency to privilege normative rationality 
over other types of reasoning. Under such circumstances, values become 
the m ost, and som etim es the only legitim ate m eans of m aking 
distinctions. However, the ambiguity of normative discourse also becomes 
apparent to green political actors. Activists put aside or dismiss value 
ambiguity in similar ways to their academic counterparts, as the price of 
retaining faith in a distinctive normative rationality. But the problematic 
consequences of producing and ignoring noise are all the more apparent 
in green organisational settings which serve as experimental sites of value 
implementation. The second part of this thesis has outlined a range of 
systematic perverse effects of commitment to value rationality.
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The sites that I have explored are those in which greens are involved in 
constructing  and m ain tain ing  organ isations and decision-m aking 
processes. The grns.oz.forum  discussions explored in the case study 
revealed a strong tendency to normative primacy. Under such conditions, 
the emphasis upon value rationality reveals m any perverse effects and 
unintended consequences. Ultimately, the limitations on what can be said 
in green political forums places significant constraints on w hat can be 
done by green political actors. This m eans that some very basic and 
perennial tasks of political organisation are highly problem atic under 
conditions of value primacy.
In the construction of any political party  or o rganisation , some 
mechanisms of exclusion are necessary in order to define the boundaries 
between the organisation and the political environment. The intensity of 
normative primacy, however, will have a big impact upon the degree to 
which this is possible. Because of their ambiguity and rhetorical flexibility, 
values are patently ill-suited to the task of defining party or organisational 
boundaries. Value-based definitions that exclude some activists from 
participation are easily contested and in green parties are rarely if ever 
backed up by authority or sanctions. The evidence from the Australian 
case study graphically demonstrates the type of trouble that greens can get 
into when values are the only legitim ate tool they have to make 
organisational distinctions.
Values are also problematic as bases for decision-making because the 
process of m aking decisions inevitably involves the creation and 
m aintenance of distinctions. Difficulties are most apparent in stressful 
circumstances where there is significant internal conflict. Faith in a 
distinct and coherent norm ative rationality is of little utility in such 
circumstances. Normatively designed green structures are typically ill- 
equipped to deal with the possibility of conflicting interests within 
organisations. When conflict occurs and becomes entrenched, the options 
for interpreting and dealing with it are heavily restricted by the habit of 
privileging norm ative criteria. Once again, conflicts are not resolved 
according to value rationality in the absence of recognised normative 
authority. Value primacy, therefore, constitutes an enormous obstacle to
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decision-m aking and conflict resolution in green organisations. This 
inability to deal with conflict is a serious problem because it is unrealistic 
to expect any organisation to sail through life w ithout internal tensions. It 
is even more unrealistic for organisations that eschew hierarchical and 
authoritarian modes of discipline. A significant eccentricity of principled 
green politics lies in the assum ption that there are possible solutions to 
conflicts which are impeccably principled.
The final problem  associated with value prim acy is that it typically 
inhibits the developm ent of political action beyond the rather limited 
range of symbolic protests. One of the most im portant features of value 
prim acy is that non-norm ative reasons are easily construed as anti- 
norm ative reasons. Pragm atic rationality  is the alternative basis for 
evaluation that is most often juxtaposed against norm ative rationality, 
and, as such, often takes on the guise of dom inant paradigm  rationality. 
This disjunction between principled integrity and practicality is often the 
source of m uch organisational distress. Because of the flexibility of 
normative rhetoric, any political action can be construed as a compromise 
of green principles. There is no site of value in terpretation  that is 
im m une from these attacks. This is not because political actors are 
inherently immoral or untrustworthy. It is because whenever difficulties 
arise for green parties, they are liable to be interpreted first and foremost as 
a failure of normative character. Such characterisations are easy tasks for 
activists with the appropriate rhetorical skills.
Furthermore, whenever greens operate according to a basic distinction 
between the politics of the present and norm ative integrity, the term 
green politics is self-contradictory. The escape route of the future 
realisation of green rationality is of no use when decisions are to be made 
in the present. If the word green is defined in terms of values, and politics 
of the present is continually confirmed as antithetical to value rationality, 
then a green politics of the present is by definition an impossibility. In fact, 
Petra Kelly encapsulated this in declaring die Grünen as an anti-party 
party. Such a phrase may be rhetorically crisp and appealing, but on the 
day to day level sounds more like the recipe for chronic organisational 
schizophrenia that it has been for die Grünen. From these investigations
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into green parties and forums, much of the political anguish experienced 
by these groups is attributable to habits of normative primacy.
8.3. Characterising Green Politics
My interest in the topic of this thesis stems from a more general interest 
in the political consequences of norm ative rationality. As such, my 
critiques of the value identity thesis and habits of normative primacy are 
made prim arily  w ith this issue in m ind, rather than as a means of 
preparing the groundw ork for a different way of characterising green 
politics. I do not wish to suggest that green politics can somehow be 
identified in term s of the rhetorical prim acy of values. Nor am I 
attem pting to argue that green parties are inevitably prone to value 
primacy. I have restricted myself to four more specific claims. Firstly, 
green politics, as it has been constructed by influential figures such as 
Kelly, Bahro, Porritt and Parkin, contains the 'raw  m aterials' of value 
primacy. Secondly, the Australian discussions in 1991 about the formation 
of a green party  are a good example of value prim acy in operation. 
Thirdly, some of the dynamics identified in the Australian case study 
have their resonances in the experiences of other green parties, and 
fourthly, the most pervasive cleavage within green politics, realism v 
fundamentalism, is explicable in terms of value primacy.
Nevertheless, the analysis presented in this thesis raises more general 
questions about the norm ative rationality of green politics. Perhaps the 
most pertinent of such issues is the extent of connections between value 
prim acy and green politics. Green political projects have provided 
generally fertile ground for the habits of value primacy to take root. It is 
plausible to suggest that this strong connection is a predom inant feature of 
the formative stages of green parties, but it is uncertain that it will always 
be so prom inent as such organisations age. Indeed, the accumulation of 
po litica l experience  in com plex and am biguous in s titu tio n a l 
environments may well lead to attenuation of this tendency. There have 
been m any other political organisations with highly norm ative origins 
that have changed as a result of political experience. However, I would 
caution against suggesting that such a process is inevitable. There are 
num erous counter-examples of parties and political organisations that
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resolutely remain characterised by normative primacy. The British Green 
Party, nearly twenty years after its formation, elected the ’Messianic’ David 
Icke to the role of spokesperson. This seem ingly entrenched value 
primacy may have something to do with its extremely remote chances of 
getting any of its candidates elected to parliament.
Having noted the possible connection between norm ative primacy and 
the formative stages of green parties, the question arises of to what extent 
such parties can establish them selves w ithou t a strong  basis of 
comm itm ent to norm ative rationality. Once again, I w ould be cautious 
about claiming that green parties can only come about in such ways. There 
are recent examples, most notably from Eastern Europe, which do not 
appear to have followed the highly normative western path. There is also 
evidence, however, that these parties are less broadly green (in the sense 
of acting as an um brella for new social m ovem ents) and more an 
expression of 'single issue' environmentalism.
A third more general consideration relevant to the relationship between 
values and green politics concerns how green parties compare to other 
parties and organisations in terms of their reliance upon norm ative 
rationality. This is also a question that cannot be adequately addressed 
w ithin the confines of this thesis, because the focus has not been upon 
comparison. My hunch, though, is that it is reasonable to suggest that 
established political parties have far greater flexibility in the range of 
rhetorical reasons they are prepared to adopt. Undoubtedly, many parties 
and organisations are particularly adept at utilising norm ative rhetoric, 
not necessarily drawing from the same repertoire as greens. However, I 
would posit that, by and large, these groups can also easily switch into 
technical, pragmatic or self-interest mode (the relevant self being the state 
or the country). These switches can be made w ithout such rationalities 
being trum ped by values.
Finally, a somewhat broader issue raised in passing by this thesis is one 
which I am in no position to address, but others may well regard as 
significant. That is, if green politics can't be identified in terms of distinct 
values, then how else might it be identified? I certainly don't advocate a 
return to attempts to interest-based definitions, and the analysis pursued
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does not lead to the suggestion of new alternatives. It may be useful, 
however, to turn the issue around. Instead of searching for an alternative 
basis of identity, one can well ask for w hat purposes is it necessary to 
identify green politics. It may be sufficient to simply describe green politics 
as a particular project or series of projects, the motivations for which may 
change significantly over time. There may be little point in attem pting to 
go beyond historically specific contingent definitions. It may well be that 
the term  green, as an identifier of a particu lar package of political 
orientations and practices, has a limited lifespan. The package of green 
political orientations, though politically cohesive in the 1980s and 1990s, 
may turn out to be less cohesive in the future, as differences of preference 
and emphasis between (and within) the various elements of ecologism, 
peace, womens and indigenous movements become more apparent.
This is not to say that green parties w ould not survive under such 
conditions. It is quite feasible to suggest that, once institutionally  
established, green parties could withstand such a fracturing of the package, 
and represent and articulate quite different combinations of political 
orientations. This analysis suggests that green parties should not be treated 
as qualitatively different from other political parties because they happen 
to vociferously claim adherence to political principles. A rhetorical 
understanding of values removes the somewhat mystical connotations of 
a value-based identity. All that is distinct about green parties at this point 
in time compared to other parties is the rhetorical weight attached to such 
principles.
8.4. Some Final Reflections on the Role of Values
Given the potential for conflict and contradiction dem onstrated in this 
thesis, the political efficacy of green values clearly is not a function of their 
coherence. Both the ambiguity of the values which have been used to 
define the green paradigm, and the ambiguity of relationships between 
these values render judgements of coherence and consistency somewhat 
irrelevant. It is im portant to keep in m ind that this is not an observation 
restricted to green politics. It also applies to political ideologies in general 
when they are considered as repertoires of rhetorical common sense 
rather than logically consistent packages. Indeed, it is worth considering
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w hat a coherent norm ative fram ew ork w ithout dilem m atic themes 
w ould look like. Any attem pt at m oral coherence designed to deal 
comprehensively with the dilemmatic and ambiguous nature of the green 
repertoire would be a dubious achievement, if it were even possible. For 
instance, green discourse might be less dilemmatic if a choice was made 
between unity and diversity, or between autonomy and co-operation, but I 
doubt that greens would be any better off for having rejected a substantial 
store of rhetorical resources. The flexibility and potentially contradictory 
nature of green values need not be a problem, it is only a problem if one 
craves normative coherence in order to fend off ambiguity.
Instead, it may be w orth considering the im pact of green values in 
contexts where their inclusive functions are more to the fore. Value 
ambiguity and flexibility is well suited to the task of addressing wider 
audiences than the green constituency. Green values, therefore, are an 
im portant resource that can be deployed in w ider political battles. Many 
green values can be used to appeal to non-green audiences. After all, most 
of these values do have a history of usage independent from the green 
movement. But the other side of this coin is that greens are in no position 
to be too precious about 'their' values. 'Deviant' deploym ent of green 
values cannot be avoided. Greens must always be prepared to argue for 
their interpretations (if they are clear among greens). This does not require 
the foundation of a coherent norm ative framework. It does, however, 
require the ability to m uster political skills and resources, including the 
resources of norm ative rhetoric, and the capacity to effectively utilise 
channels of communication.
But this strategic view of values may prom pt a particular concern. If 
values are considered as artful rhetorical resources, is this just another 
way of saying they are sim ply excuses, post hoc rationalisations, and 
insincere attem pts to gloss over m ore basic, m undane or cynical 
motivations? While the deploym ent of values in these ways is always 
possible, this does not mean that the rhetorical usage of values should be 
considered as inherently shallow or cynical. The articulation of values in 
this thesis covers a wide spectrum  from the cynical to the incredibly 
sincere. A focus on the rhetorical aspect of values, however, suggests that
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it is not all that helpful to be concerned with the sincerity or otherwise of 
normative discourse. Such criteria are only significant in terms of what 
audiences make of an orator's sincerity, and this suggests a different set of 
issues. In this thesis, I have hoped to steer the focus on green values away 
from issues of conversion, integrity and sincerity which are inevitably 
raised under value identity frameworks. If 'bad' consequences can be seen 
as the fruit of 'good' green in tentions, then the predilection with 
diagnosing the norm ative character of political actors is hardly a useful 
path for analysts of green politics to pursue, be they academics or activists.
This thesis has show n that greens have often severed the connection 
between the perverse effects of their actions and the normative rationality 
that g rounds them . There are num erous exam ples in which, to 
paraphrase Weber, 'the Green does right and leaves the rest to Gaia ' . 1 
Responsibility for unfortunate consequences of right action is attributed to 
the forces opposed to green rationality. Within the confines of this circular 
habit of thinking, green experience of the political world emphatically 
confirms the ethical irrationality of the world. It is difficult to conceive of 
a more debilitating scenario for a value-based politics than that in which it 
is impossible to be both principled and 'worldly'. Yet the restrictions value 
primacy places upon legitim ate political discourse often forces green 
activists into such an impossible corner. In this sense, there are many 
resonances between green rhetoric and the rhetoric Weber attributes to the 
'other-w orldly ' religious intellectuals of the C hristian tradition. This 
reveals a further irony of green normative primacy. Rejection of worldly 
rationalities had some attraction if one believes that a life of principled 
integrity ensures eternal life beyond this world. But such a rationale is 
hardly an option available to greens, considering that their political 
objectives are framed by the need to save this world.
The rheto rica l fram ew ork offers ano ther rou te  to question ing  
conventional portrayals of the relationship between ethical principles and 
politics. In particular, it lends support to the efforts of Minson and
1 Weber's original quote is 'the Christian does right and leaves the rest to God’.
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Connolly to steer the way we think about values and politics away from 
assum ptions of fundam ental antagonism. Awareness of the rhetorical 
flexibility of values leads to the conclusion that green political processes 
and structures cannot feasibly be constructed on the fluid foundation of 
values. Sensitivity to the perverse effects of attem pts to do so calls for a 
rethink of many well developed green political habits. By highlighting the 
perverse effects of green values I do not expect to sway those who are most 
attached to a value-based identity that does not adm it the validity of non- 
norm ative considerations. It is w orth  keeping in m ind W eber's 
observation that dem onstra ting  the perverse effects of norm ative 
rationality m ay not make the slightest im pression on those who are 
committed to it. However, the exposure of these perverse effects will 
hopefully be of some use for those who are sympathetic to green political 
objectives, but are unhappy with the constraints of privileging normative 
rationality.
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Appendix
Pegasus N etw orks is an A ustralian com puter-based com m unications 
netw ork which enables individuals and organisations to communicate 
relatively quickly and cheaply. Pegasus began as a network facilitating 
com m unication betw een grassroots environm ental groups, and is a 
fo u n d in g  m em ber of the g lobal A ssocia tion  for P rogressive  
Com m unication (APC). Pegasus and its sister netw orks from other 
continents (such as EarthNet, The Web) played a large role in the 
netw orking of non-governm ent organisations at the U nited Nations 
Earth Summit in Brazil. Access to the Pegasus netw ork can be gained 
through subscription. Virtually all personal computers and modems are 
compatible with the network. Subscribers to Pegasus also gain access to a 
num ber of international computer networks including InterNet.
One of the most im portant services provided by the Pegasus network is 
that of 'conferencing'. Com puter conferencing is a growing and highly 
innovative form of electronic communication. It has been described as a 
'm any-to-m any' com m unication m edium . A conference is a space for 
discussion in which contributors 'post' items to the conference via 
electronic mail. Postings can be read by anyone w ith access to that 
conference. Conferences serve various purposes such as inform ation 
dissem ination, reporting of events and developm ents, and open-ended 
discussion around particu lar themes. Public access conferences are 
available to all Pegasus subscribers, and some conferences with restricted 
access are also in use (for exam ple, for specific com m ittees or 
organisations). Subscribers to Pegasus have access to hundreds of 
Australian public conferences and around two thousand international 
public conferences.
Postings to conferences take a variety of forms. As well as subm itting 
personally written contributions, some participants also subm it pieces of 
work written by others, or articles that have been published elsewhere in 
another form. Contributors may also respond to specific items posted by
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others such that dialogue can be generated. Perhaps the closest 
resemblance in the area of printed publications would be to newsletter 
articles and letters to the editor. However, electronic conferencing is a far 
more flexible medium than printed publications as it requires much less 
adm inistration than the latter (formatting, publication deadlines and the 
like). Thus, dialogue and debate can be generated with extremely fast 
response times. Any posting is usually accessible on the same day that it is 
posted. Conferences only require a facilitator who can decide whether or 
not a particular posting is suitable for the conference. Notwithstanding the 
significant novelty of this m edium , contributions to public access 
conferences can be considered analogous to contributions to publicly 
available newsletters and magazines for research purposes.
Conference postings are structured according to topics. Postings take the 
form either of new topics or responses to existing topics. All conference 
m aterial is accessible on-line. In order to read a particular posting, 
subscribers type the name of the conference, the num ber of the topic and, 
if necessary, the response num ber.1 Topics are num bered in chronological 
order of posting, as are responses to topics. (For example, response number 
2 to topic number 148 follows response number 1.)
For some conferences, particularly those which attract a lot of material, 
postings are archived after a certain length of time. However a number of 
conferences, including grns.oz.forum , are not not subject to archival. 
When conferences are not archived, all topics retain the topic num ber 
which they have been originally allocated, and all postings are accessible to 
subscribers. All contributions to grns.oz.forum, therefore, are permanently 
available for research purposes.
At this stage, I am not aware of any academic referencing conventions for 
com puter conference m aterial. As such, I have attem pted to base a 
referencing style on that which I have used for journals and magazines. 
The information contained in references to computer conference material 
is as follows:
1 The 'help' facility gives details of exactly how this can be done.
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(i): Hine, Doug (ii): 1991d. (iii): 'A View From a Green of WA\ (iv): 
grns.oz.forum (v): Topic No. 94 (vi): (6), (vii): 13/6/91, (viii): Pegasus 
Networks.
i) Name of contributor.
ii) Year of contribution. Almost all contributions are from 1991. Where 
there are multiple postings from a particular contributor for a particular 
year, these are sorted in alphabetical order of title, and given labels 1991a, 
1991b etc.
iii) Title of topic (in single quotes). Where the posting is a response to a 
topic, the title of the topic is retained.
iv) Name of computer conference (in italics). The computer conference 
name is considered as analogous to the name of a journal, newsletter or 
magazine.
v) Topic number. In grns.oz.forum this number is permanent.
vi) Response number (if applicable). This is cited in parentheses after the 
topic number.
vii) Date of posting (in the form of dd/mm/yy).
viii) Name of network.
Any enquiries regarding access and utilisation of Pegasus conferences can 
be directed to the following address:
P E G A S U S  N E T W O R K  S_____________________
P.O. Box 284 ph +61 7 2571111
Broadway, Qld 4006 fax +61 7 2571087
Australia e-mail <support@peg.apc.org>
